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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
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http://www.archive.org/details/whatnietzschetauOOniet 



WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 



/ 






What Nietzsche Taught 

By Willard Huntington Wright 



I am writing for a race of men which 
does not yet exist: for "the lords of the 
earth. " The Will to Power 




New York B. W. Huebsch 19 1 5 



W 



Copyright, 1915, by 
B. W. HUEBSCH 



x -1 - 



9 ^ 



Printed in U. S. A. 

FEB 16 1315 

©GI.A39364 
1a _ . 



TO 

H. L. MENCKEN 

the critic who has given the greatest impetus 

to the studv of Nietzsche in America 



CONTENTS 

Portrait Bust of Nietzsche by Professor 

Karl Donndorf, Stuttgart . . . Frontispiece 

PAGE 

Introduction 9 

I Biographical Sketch 19 

II "Human, All-Too-Human," Vols. I and II . . 45 

III "The Dawn of Day" 86 

IV "The Joyful Wisdom" 113 

V "Thus Spake Zarathustra" 133 

VI "The Eternal Recurrence" 167 

VII "Beyond Good and Evil" 173 

VIII "The Genealogy of Morals" 204 

IX "The Twilight of the Idols" 231 

X "The Antichrist" 250 

XI "The Will to Power," Vol. I 275 

XII "The Will to Power," Vol. II 301 

Bibliography 331 



INTRODUCTION 

IT is no longer possible to ignore the teachings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, or to consider the trend of mod- 
ern thought without giving the philosopher of the super- 
man a prominent place in the list of thinkers who con- 
tributed to the store of present-day knowledge. His 
powerful and ruthless mind has had an influence on 
contemporary thought which even now, in the face of all 
the scholarly books of appreciation he has called forth, 
one is inclined to underestimate. No philosopher since 
Kant has left so undeniable an imprint on modern 
thought. Even Schopenhauer, whose influence coloured 
the greater part of Europe, made no such wide-spread 
impression. Nietzsche has penetrated into both England 
and America, two countries strangely impervious to rig- 
orous philosophic ideals. Not only in ethics and litera- 
ture do we find the moulding hand of Nietzsche at work, 
invigorating and solidifying; but in pedagogics and in 
art, in politics and religion, the influence of his doctrines 
is to be encountered. The books and essays in German 
elucidating his philosophy constitute a miniature library. 
Nearly as many books and articles have appeared in 
France, and the list of authors of these appreciations in- 
clude many of the most noted modern scholars. Spain 
and Italy, likewise, have contributed works to an inquiry 
into his teachings; and in England and America numer- 
ous volumes dealing with the philosophy of the super- 
man have appeared in recent years. In M. A. Mugge's 
excellent biography, "Friedrich Nietzsche : His Life and 

9 



io INTRODUCTION 

Work," there is appended a bibliography containing 850 
titles, and this list by no means includes all the books 
and articles devoted to a consideration of this philoso- 
pher's doctrines. 

In this regard one should note that this interest is not 
the result of a temporary popularity, such as that which 
has met the philosophical pieties of Henri Bergson. To 
the contrary, Nietzsche's renown is gaining ground daily 
among serious-minded scholars, and his adherents have 
already reached the dimensions of a small army. But 
despite this appreciation there is still current an enor- 
mous amount of ignorance concerning his teachings. The 
very manner in which he wrote tended to bring about 
misunderstandings. Viewed casually and without studi- 
ous consideration, his books offer many apparent contra- 
dictions. His style, always elliptic and aphoristic, lends 
itself easily to quotation, and because of the startling 
and revolutionary nature of his utterances, many excerpts 
from his earlier works were widely circulated through 
the mediums of magazines and newspapers. These quo- 
tations, robbed of their context, very often gave rise to 
immature and erroneous judgments, with the result that 
the true meaning of his philosophy was often turned into 
false channels. Many of his best-known aphorisms have 
taken on strange and unearthly meanings, and often the 
reverse of his gospel has gained currency and masquer- 
aded as the original canon. 

To a great extent this misunderstanding has been un- 
avoidable. Systematisers, ever eager to bend a philoso- 
pher's statements to their own ends, have found in Nie- 
tzsche's writings much material which, when carefully 
isolated, substantiated their own conclusions. On the 
other hand, the Christian moralists, sensing in Nietzsche 



INTRODUCTION n 

a powerful and effective opponent, have attempted to 
disqualify his ethical system by presenting garbled por- 
tions of his attacks on Christianity, omitting all the quali- 
fying passages. It is impossible, however, to understand 
any of Nietzsche's doctrines unless we consider them in 
their relation to the whole of his teachings. 

Contrary to the general belief, Nietzsche was not sim- 
ply a destructive critic and a formulator of impossible 
and romantic concepts. His doctrine of the superman, 
which seems to be the principal stumbling block in the 
way of a rationalistic interpretation of his philosophy, is 
no vague dream unrelated to present humanity. Nor 
was his chief concern with future generations. Nietzsche 
devoted his research to immediate conditions and to the 
origin of those conditions. And — what is of greater im- 
portance — he left behind him a very positive and con- 
sistent system of ethics — a workable and entirely com- 
prehensible code of conduct to meet present-day needs. 
This system was not formulated with the precision which 
no doubt would have attached to it in its final form had 
he been able to complete the plans he had outlined. Yet 
there are few points in his code of ethics — and they are 
of minor importance — which cannot be found, clearly 
conceived and concisely stated, in the main body of his 
works. This system of conduct embraces every stage of 
society; and for the rulers to-day — the people for whom 
Nietzsche directly voiced his teachings — he outlines a 
method of outer conduct and a set of inner ideals which 
meet with every modern condition. His proposed ethical 
routine is not based on abstract reasoning and speculative 
conclusions. It is a practical code which has its founda- 
tion implanted in the dominating instincts of the organic 
and inorganic world. It is directly opposed to the pre- 



12 INTRODUCTION 

vailing code, and has for its ideal the fulness of life itself 
— life intensified to the highest degree, life charged with 
a maximum of beauty, power, enthusiasm, virility, 
wealth and intoxication. It is the code of strength and 
courage. Its goal is a race which will possess the hardier 
virtues of strength, confidence, exuberance and affirma- 
tion. 

This ideal has been the source of many misunderstand- 
ings, and it is the errors which have arisen from the vi- 
cious and inept dissemination of his teachings, that I have 
striven to rectify in the present book. I have hoped to 
accomplish this by presenting the whole of Nietzsche's 
philosophy, as far as possible, in his own words. This 
has not been so difficult a matter. His writings, more 
than those of any other modern philosopher, offer op- 
portunities for such treatment. There is no point in his 
entire system not susceptible to brief and clear quotation. 
Furthermore, his thought developed consistently and log- 
ically in straight-away, chronological order, so that at 
the conclusion of each book we find ourselves just so much 
further along the route of his thinking. Beginning with 
" Human, All-Too-Human," his first destructive volume, 
we can trace the gradual and concise pyramiding of his 
teachings, down to the last statement of his cardinal doc- 
trine of will as set forth in the notes which comprise the 
second volume of "The Will to Power." Each one of 
the intervening books embodies new material : it is a dis- 
tinct, yet co-ordinated, division in the great structure of 
his life's work. These books overlap one another in 
many instances, and develop points raised speculatively 
in former books, but they organise each other and lead 
one surely, if at times circuitously, to the crowning doc- 
trines of his thought. 



INTRODUCTION 13 

The majority of critics have chosen to systematise 
Nietzsche's teachings by separating the ideas in his dif- 
ferent books, and by drawing together under specific cap- 
tions (such as "religion," "the state," "education," etc.,) 
all the scattered material which relates to these different 
subjects. In many cases they have succeeded in offering 
a very coherent and consistent resume of his thought. 
But Nietzsche's doctrines were inherently opposed to 
such arbitrary dividing and arranging, because beneath 
the various sociological points which fell under his con- 
sideration, were two or three general motivating princi- 
ples which unified the whole of his thought. He did not 
work from modern institutions back to his doctrines ; but, 
by analysing the conditions out of which these institu- 
tions grew, he arrived at the conclusions which he after- 
ward used in formulating new methods of operation. It 
was the change in conditions and needs between ancient 
and modern times that made him voice the necessity of 
change between ancient and modern institutions. In 
other words, his advocacy of new methods for dealing 
with modern affairs was evolved from his researches into 
the origin and history of current methods. For instance, 
his remarks on religion, society, the state, the individual, 
etc., were the outcome of fundamental postulates which 
he described and elucidated in terms of human institu- 
tions. Therefore an attempt to reach an explanation of 
the basic doctrines of his philosophy through his applied 
teachings unconsciously gives rise to the very errors 
which the serious critics have sought to overcome: this 
method focuses attention on the application of his doc- 
trines rather than on the doctrines themselves. 

Therefore I have taken his writings chronologically, 
beginning with his first purely philosophical work — 



i 4 INTRODUCTION 

"Human, All-Too-Human" — and have set down, in his 
own words, every important conclusion throughout his 
entire works. In this way one may follow Nietzsche 
throughout every step in the development of his teach- 
ings — not only in his abstract theories but also in his ap- 
plication of them. There is not a single important point 
in the entire sweep of his thought not contained in these 
pages. Naturally I have been unable to give any of the 
arguments which led to these conclusions. The quota- 
tions are in every instance no longer than has been neces- 
sary to make clear the idea : for the processes of thought 
by which these conclusions were reached the reader must 
go direct to the books from which the excerpts are made. 
Also I have omitted Nietzsche's brilliant analogies and 
such desultory critical judgments, literary and artistic, 
as have no direct bearing on his philosophy; and have 
contented myself with setting down only those bare, un- 
elaborated utterances which embody the positive points 
in his thought. By thus letting Nietzsche himself state 
his doctrines I have attempted to make it impossible for 
anybody who goes carefully through these pages to mis- 
understand those points which now seem clouded in error. 
In order to facilitate further the research of the stu- 
dent and to make clear certain of the more obscure selec- 
tions, I have preceded each chapter with a short account 
of the book and its contents. In these brief essays, I 
have reviewed the entire contents of each book, set down 
the circumstances under which it was written, and at- 
tempted to weigh its individual importance in relation to 
the others. Furthermore, I have attempted to state 
briefly certain of the doctrines which did not permit of 
entirely self-explanatory quotation. And where Nie- 
tzsche indulged in research, such as in tracing the origin 



INTRODUCTION 15 

of certain motives, or in explaining the steps which led 
to the acceptance of certain doctrines, I have included in 
these essays an abridged exposition of his theories. In 
short, I have embodied in each chapter such critical ma- 
terial as I thought would assist the reader to a clear 
understanding of each book's contents and relative 
significance. 

This book is frankly for the beginner — for the student 
who desires a survey of Nietzsche's philosophy before 
entering upon a closer and more careful study of it. In 
this respect it is meant also as a guide ; and I have given 
the exact location of every quotation so that the reader 
may refer at once to the main body of Nietzsche's works 
and ascertain the premises and syllogisms which underlie 
the quoted conclusion. 

In the opening biographical sketch I have refrained 
from going into Nietzsche's personality and character, 
adhering throughout to the external facts of his life. His 
personality will be found in the racy, vigorous and 
stimulating utterances I have chosen for quotation, and 
no comments of mine could add colour to the impression 
thus received. It is difficult to divorce Nietzsche from 
his work : the man and his teachings are inseparable. His 
style, as well as his philosophy, is a direct outgrowth of 
his personality. This is why his gospel is so personal 
and intimate a one, and so closely bound up in the in- 
stincts of humanity. There are several good biographies 
of Nietzsche in existence, and a brief account of the best 
ones in English will be found in the bibliography at the 
end of this volume. 

It must not be thought that this book is intended as a 
final, or even complete, commentary on Nietzsche's doc- 
trines. It was written and compiled for the purpose of 



16 INTRODUCTION 

supplying an introductory study, and, with that end in 
view, I have refrained from all technical or purely philo- 
sophical nomenclature. The object throughout has been 
to stimulate the reader to further study, and if this book 
does not send the reader sooner or later to the original 
volumes from which these quotations have been made, I 
shall feel that I have failed somewhat in my enterprise. 
The volumes of Nietzsche's philosophy from which the 
quotations in this book are taken, comprise the first com- 
plete and authorised edition of the works of Nietzsche 
in English. To the courageous energy of Dr. Oscar 
Levy do we owe the fact that Nietzsche's entire writings 
are now obtainable in English. The translations of 
these books have, in every instance, been made by com- 
petent scholars, and each volume is introduced by an il- 
luminating preface. As this edition now stands, it is the 
most complete and voluminous translation of any for- 
eign philosopher in the English language. The edition 
is in eighteen volumes, and is published in England by 
T. N. Foulis, and in America by the Macmillan Com- 
pany. The volumes and their contents are given below. 

I. "The Birth of Tragedy," translated by William A. Hauss- 
mann, B.A., Ph.D., with a biographical introduction by the 
author's sister; a portrait of Nietzsche, and a facsimile of his 
manuscript. 

II. "Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays," translated 
by Maximilian A. Miigge, Ph.D. Contents: "The Greek 
State," "The Greek Woman," "On Music and Words," "Homer's 
Contest," "The Relation of Schopenhauer's Philosophy to a Ger- 
man Culture," "Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks" and "On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense." 

III. "The Future of Our Educational Institutions," translated 
by J. M. Kennedy. Besides the titular essay, this volume con- 
tains "Homer and Classical Philology." 



INTRODUCTION 17 

IV. "Thoughts Out of Season," Vol. I., translated by Anthony 
M. Ludovici. Contents: "David Strauss, the Confessor and 
the Writer" and "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." 

V. "Thoughts Out of Season," Vol. II., translated with intro- 
duction by Adrian Collins, M.A. Contents: "The Use and 
Abuse of History" and "Schopenhauer as Educator." 

VI. "Human, All-Too-Human," Vol. I., translated by Helen 
Zimmern, with introduction by J. M. Kennedy. 

VII. "Human, All-Too-Human," Vol. II., translated, with 
introduction, by Paul V. Cohn, B.A. 

VIII. "The Case of Wagner," translated by Anthony M. Ludo- 
vici and J. M. Kennedy, with introductions by the translators. 
Contents: "The Case of Wagner," "Nietzche contra Wagner," 
"Selected Aphorisms" and "We Philologists." 

IX. "The Dawn of Day," translated, with introduction, by 
J. M. Kennedy. 

X. "The Joyful Wisdom," translated, with introduction, by 
Thomas Common. The poetry which appears in the appendix 
under the caption of "Songs of Prince Free-As-A-Bird," is trans- 
lated by Paul V. Cohn and Maude D. Petre. 

XI. "Thus Spake Zarathustra," revised introduction by 
Thomas Common, with introduction by Mrs. Forster-Nietzsche, 
and commentary by A. M. Ludovici. 

XII. "Beyond Good and Evil," translated by Helen Zimmern, 
with introduction by Thomas Common. 

XIII. "The Genealogy of Morals," translated by Horace B. 
Samuel, M.A., with introductory note. "People and Countries," 
an added section to this book, is translated by J. M. Kennedy 
with an editor's note by Dr. Oscar Levy. 

XIV. "The Will to Power," Vol. I., translated, with an intro- 
duction, by A. M. Ludovici. 

XV. "The Will to Power," Vol. II., translated, with an intro- 
duction, by A. M. Ludovici. 

XVI. "The Twilight of the Idols," translated, with an intro- 
duction, by A. M. Ludovici. Contents: "The Twilight of the 
Idols," "The Antichrist," "Eternal Recurrence," and "Explana- 
tory Notes to 'Thus Spake Zarathustra.' " 

XVII. "Ecce Homo," translated by A. M. Ludovici. Various 
poetry and epigrams translated by Paul V. Cohn, Herman 



18 INTRODUCTION 

Scheffauer, Francis Bickley and Dr. G. T. Wrench. In addition 
this volume contains the music of Nietzsche's "Hymn to Life" 
— words by Lou Salome — with an introduction by A. M. Ludovici. 
XVIII. "Index to Complete Works," compiled by Robert 
Guppy, with vocabulary of foreign quotations occurring in the 
works of Nietzsche translated by Paul V. Cohn, B.A., and an 
introductory essay, "The Nietzsche Movement in England (A 
Retrospect — A Confession — A Prospect)," by Dr. Oscar Levy. 

There are in the present volume no quotations from 
Nietzsche's "Ecce Homo" or from the pamphlets dealing 
with Wagner. The former work is an autobiography 
which, while it throws light on both Nietzsche's charac- 
ter and his work, is nevertheless outside his purely philo- 
sophical writings. And the Wagner documents, though 
interesting, have little to do with the Nietzschean doc- 
trines, except as showing perhaps the result of their ap- 
plication. I have therefore left them intact for the stu- 
dent who wishes to go more deeply into the philosopher's 
character than I have here attempted. 

W. H. W. 



WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 



Biographical Sketch 

NIETZSCHE liked to believe that he was of Polish 
descent. He had a greater admiration for the 
Poles than for the Germans, and went so far as to insti- 
gate an investigation by which he hoped to prove beyond 
a shadow of a doubt that he was not only Polish but 
was descended from the Polish nobility. His efforts, 
his sister tells us, were not entirely successful, although 
some evidence was turned up which pointed to the truth 
of this theory. Several of the dates in the report, how- 
ever, did not accurately tally, and since many of Nie- 
tzsche's papers containing the results of his genealogical 
research were lost in Turin after his breakdown, the hy- 
pothesis of his Polish descent consequently remains 
somewhat mythical. Nietzsche's theory was that his 
great-great-grandfather was a nobleman named Nicki 
who fled from Poland during the religious wars, as a 
fugitive under sentence of death, and took with him a 
young son who afterward changed his name to Nietzsche. 
There is a romance in this belief which appealed strongly 
to the philosopher. He saw a genuine grandeur in the 
fact that his ancestor had become a fugitive for his reli- 
gious and political opinions. This belief in time be- 
came a conviction with him, and in the later years of his 

19 



20 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

life we find him definitely asserting the truth of this 
family tradition. 

The matter, however, one way or the other, is of little 
consequence, for Nietzsche's mind embodied universal 
traits: it was uncommonly free from distinctly national 
characteristics. All the important facts of his life and 
of his immediate ancestry are known to us. He was 
born at Rocken, a little village in the Prussian province 
of Saxony, on October 15, 1844.. The day was the an- 
niversary of the birth of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King 
of Prussia, and Nietzsche was christened Friedrich Wil- 
helm in honour of the event. The coincidence was all 
the more marked by the fact that Nietzsche's father, 
three years previous, had been tutor to the Altenburg 
Princesses, in which capacity he had met the sovereign 
and made so favourable an impression that it was by 
the royal favour he was living at Rocken. There were 
two other children in the Nietzsche household — a girl 
born in 1846, and a son born in 1850. The girl was 
named Therese Elizabeth Alexandra after the Duke of 
Altenburg's three daughters who had come under her 
father's tutorship. Afterward she became the philoso- 
pher's closest companion and guardian and his most 
voluminous biographer. The boy Joseph, named after 
the Duke of Altenburg himself, did not survive his first 
year. 

The longevity and hardiness which marked the stock 
of Nietzsche's ancestors does away with the theory, often 
advanced, that his sickness and final mental breakdown 
were the outcome of hereditary causes. Out of his eight 
great-grandparents only two failed to reach the age of 
seventy-five, while one reached the age of eighty-six and 
another did not die until ninety. Both of his grand- 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 21 

fathers attained to the age of seventy, and his maternal 
grandmother lived until she was past eighty-two. Fur- 
thermore, the Nietzsche families for three generations 
had been very large and in every instance healthy and 
robust. Nietzsche's grandmother Nietzsche had twelve 
children, and his grandmother Oehler had eleven chil- 
dren — both families being strong and free from sickness. 
Nietzsche himself, so his sister tells us in her biography, 
was strong and healthy from his earliest childhood until 
maturity. He participated in outdoor sports such as 
swimming, skating and ball playing, and was character- 
ised by a ruddy complexion which in his school days 
often called forth remarks concerning his evident splen- 
did health. It seems that only one physical defect 
marked the whole of his younger life — a myopia inher- 
ited from his father. This impediment, though slight 
at first, became rapidly aggravated by the constant use 
to which he put his eyes in his sedulous application to 
study. 

Nietzsche, the most terrible and devastating critic of 
Christianity and its ideals, was the culmination of two 
long collateral lines of theologians. His grandfather 
Nietzsche was a man of many scholarly attainments, 
who, because of his ecclesiastical writings, had received 
the degree of Doctor of Divinity. His second wife, the 
mother of Nietzsche's father, came from a whole family 
of pastors by the name of Krause. Her favourite 
brother was a preacher in the Cathedral at Naumburg; 
and of the other two one was a Doctor of Divinity and 
one a country clergyman. The father of Nietzsche's 
mother was also a pastor by the name of Oehler, and had 
a parsonage in Pobles. Likewise Nietzsche's father, 
Karl-Ludwig Nietzsche, was a pastor in the Lutheran 



22 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

church; but he possessed a greater culture than we are 
wont to associate with the average country clergyman, 
and was a man looked up to and revered by all those who 
knew him. In fact, his appointment to the post at 
Rocken was an expression of appreciation paid his tal- 
ents by the Prussian King. He was thirty-one years of 
age and had been married only a year when his son 
Friedrich was born. Though in perfect health, he was 
not destined to live more than five years after this event, 
for in 1848 he fell down a flight of stone stairs, and died 
after a year's invalidism, as a result of concussion of the 
brain. 

The event cast a decided influence on the Nietzsche 
household and altered completely its plans. After lin- 
gering eight months at the parsonage, the family left 
Rocken and moved to Naumburg-on-the-Saale, there es- 
tablishing a new domicile in the home of the pastor's 
mother. The household was composed of the two chil- 
dren, Friedrich and Elizabeth, their mother, then only 
twenty-four, their grandmother Nietzsche, and two 
maiden sisters of the dead father. This establishment 
was run on strict and puritanical lines. All the women 
were of strong theological inclinations. One of the 
maiden aunts, Rosalie, devoted herself to Christian be- 
nevolent institutions. The other aunt, Augusta, was not 
unlike the paternal grandmother — pious and God-fear- 
ing and constantly busied with her duties to others. The 
widowed mother carried on the Christian tradition of the 
family, and never forgot that she was once the wife of a 
Lutheran pastor. Daily prayers and Biblical readings 
were fixed practices. The young Friedrich was the pet 
of the household, and there were secret hopes held by all 
that he would grow up in the footsteps of his father and 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 23 

become an honoured and respected light in the church. 
To the realisation of this hope, all the efforts and influ- 
ences of the four women were given. Such was the at- 
mosphere in which the early youth of the author of "The 
Antichrist" was nurtured. 

Soon after the family's arrival at Naumburg, Fried- 
rich, then only six years old, was sent to a local Munici- 
pal Boys' School, in accordance with the educational 
theories of his grandmother, who believed in gregarious 
education for the very young. But she had failed to 
count upon the unusual character of her grandson, and 
the attempt to educate him at a municipal institution re- 
sulted in failure. His upbringing had made him some- 
what priggish and hypersensitive. He was ridiculed by 
the other boys who taunted him with the epithet of "the 
little minister." He refused to mingle with the riff-raff 
which composed the larger part of the pupils, and held 
himself isolated and aloof. Consequently, before the 
year was up, he was withdrawn from the school and en- 
tered in a private educational institution which prepared 
the younger students for the Cathedral Grammar School. 
Here he was in more congenial surroundings. He had 
for schoolmates two youths whose families were friends 
of the Nietzsche household — young Wilhelm Pinder and 
Gustav Krug, who later were to influence his youth. 
Nietzsche remained at this school for three years. 

As a boy Nietzsche was always thoughtful and studi- 
ous. He was a taciturn child and took long walks in the 
country alone, preferring solitude to companionship. 
He was sensitive to a marked degree, polite, solicitous of 
all about him, and inclined to moodiness. As soon as he 
could write he started a diary in which he included not 
only the external events of his life but his thoughts and 



24 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ideas and opinions. The pages of this diary, partially- 
preserved, make unique and interesting reading. At a 
very early age he began writing poetry. His verses, 
though conventional in both theme and metre, reflected 
a knowledge of contemporary prosody unusual in a boy 
of his years. He had ample opportunity in his home of 
hearing good music, and he manifested a great love for 
it in very early youth. He devoted much time to study- 
ing the piano, and not infrequently tried his hand at 
composing. Later in his life we still find him writing 
music, and also publishing it. In deportment Nietzsche 
was a model child. He was thoroughly imbued with the 
religious atmosphere of his surroundings, and was far 
more pious than the average youth of his own age. For 
a long while he gave every indication of fulfilling the ec- 
clesiastical hopes which his family harboured for him. 
Consequently there was no lack of encouragement on the 
part of his guardians toward his first literary efforts which 
reflected the piety of his nature. 

After a few years in the Naumburg school, where he 
distinguished himself as a model student and incidentally 
impressed the visiting inspectors by his quickness and 
brilliance in answering test questions, Nietzsche took the 
entrance examinations for the well-known Landes-Schule 
at Pforta, an institution then noted for its fostering and 
promotion of scientific studies. The vacancy at Pforta 
had been offered Nietzsche's mother by the Rector who 
had heard rumours concerning the intellectual gifts of the 
young "Fritz." The examinations were passed success- 
fully, and in October, 1858, after a tearful leave-taking, 
he entered the Lower Fourth Form. Pforta, at that 
time, was an institution of considerable eminence, with a 
tradition attaching to it not unlike that of Eton. It was 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 25 

a hot-bed of academic culture, and the professors were 
among the most learned in the country. The school had 
been founded as a monastery in the twelfth century by 
the Cistercian monks. In the sixteenth century it had 
fallen under the rule of the Duke Moritz of Saxony, who 
turned it into a secular educational academy, making 
way for the advance of the newer ideals. 

The life at Pforta in Nietzsche's day was strict, and 
we learn that the young philosopher chafed somewhat 
under the stringent discipline. But in time he accustomed 
himself to the regulations, and it was not long before we 
find him actively and interestedly participating in the 
school life. However, new ideas were fomenting. If 
outwardly he acquiesced to the routine, inwardly he was 
in a state of revolt. He had already begun to indulge in 
original thinking, and he felt the lack of freedom in com- 
municating his ideas to others. His only confidante dur- 
ing these days was his sister whom he always saw during 
the holidays and on brief leaves of absence. His spare 
moments were devoted to music and literature other than 
that prescribed by the school curriculum. He resented 
the fact that one had to think of particular themes at 
specified times, and no doubt caused his good tutor, Pro- 
fessor Buddensieg, much uneasiness, for, to judge from 
his diary, he did not keep to himself the resentment he 
felt toward the enforcement of the irksome and repres- 
sive calendar of studies. 

This resentment doubtlessly had much to do with the 
inauguration of a society which was called the Germania 
Club. Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug, Nietzsche's 
former school companions at Naumburg, were partici- 
pants in its formation; and on the highest ledge of the 
watch tower, overlooking the Saale valley, its object was 



26 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

discussed and its inception dedicated and solemnised with 
a bottle of red wine. This society, while bearing many 
of the ear-marks of mere youthful enthusiasm, formed an 
important turning point in Nietzsche's life. It acted, 
at a psychological moment, as a safety-valve for the 
heretical ideas and aspirations which, up to that time, he 
had confided only to his sister and his diary. The pur- 
pose of the club can best be stated in Nietzsche's own 
words: "We resolved to found a kind of small club 
which would consist of ourselves and a few friends, and 
the object of which would be to provide us with a stable 
and binding organisation, directing and adding interest 
to our creative impulses in art and literature ; or to put it 
more plainly, each of us would be pledged to present an 
original piece of work to the club once a month, either a 
poem, a treatise, an architectural design, or a musical 
composition, upon which each of the others, in a friendly 
spirit, would have to pass free and unrestricted criticism. 
We thus hoped by means of mutual correction to be able 
both to stimulate and to chasten our creative impulses." 
It was during one of his lectures before this group of 
youthful individualists that Nietzsche first expressed his 
true views on Christianity — views, which, could they have 
been overheard by his devoted family, would have 
brought sorrow to their pious hearts. The list of Nie- 
tzsche's contributions to this synod numbered thirty-four, 
and included musical compositions, poems, political ora- 
tions and various literary works. 

Nietzsche remained at Pforta until 1864, He had 
been confirmed at Easter, 1861, and to all outward man- 
ifestations retained his religious principles. His final 
report states that "he showed an active and lively interest 
in the Christian doctrine." In religion he was given the 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 27 

grade of "excellent." During his later years at Pforta 
he manifested an interest in the works of Emerson and 
Shakespeare and especially in the Greek and Latin au- 
thors. His dislike for mathematics increased steadily, 
and his love for Sophocles, iEschylus, Plato and the 
Greek lyricists "grew by leaps and bounds." His final 
paper — the departing thesis which was compulsory for 
all graduating students — was a Latin essay on Theognis 
of Megara, "De Theognide Megarensi." Between Nie- 
tzsche and that ancient aristocrat, with his fine contempt 
for democracy, there existed many temperamental affini- 
ties; and this final essay was no less than a foundation 
on which the young Dionysian later built his philosophy 
of aristocracy. On the 7 th of September he left Pforta. 

After resting at Naumburg until the middle of Oc- 
tober, Nietzsche set forth for the University of Bonn. 
It was here that he came under the guidance of Professor 
Ritschl, who later was to exert a great influence over 
him. Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl was not only the fore- 
most philologist of his time, but a scholar deeply versed 
in classical literature and rhetoric. It was he who 
founded the science of historical* literary criticism as we 
know it to-day. When he first met Nietzsche his in- 
terest in the young man at once became very great, and 
the relationship between them rapidly developed into the 
warmest of friendships. To Ritschl Nietzsche owed 
many things. It was at the former's house that he be- 
came acquainted with many of the leading learned men 
of the day. And it would be unfair not to credit Ritschl 
with much of the future philosopher's ardent and lasting 
interest in ancient cultures. 

At Bonn Nietzsche entered the collegiate life with 
unusual zest. He became a member of the Franconia 



28 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Student Corps, and participated freely in the drinking 
bouts which, from what we can learn from his letters 
home, constituted one of the main duties attached to his 
membership. But this phase of the student life was for- 
eign to his tastes, and after brief activities in the role of 
"good fellow," he found a more spontaneous recreation 
in attending concerts and the better class theatres. He 
privately studied Schumann, and during 1864 and 1865 
his life bore a marked musical stamp. 

It was during Nietzsche's days at Bonn that a decided 
change came over his religious views. His critical studies 
in the literature and culture of the ancients had done 
much toward weaning him from the formal and almost 
literal theological beliefs of his family. The first open 
breach between his newer ideals and the established 
prejudices of his mother came at Easter-time about mid- 
way of his course at Bonn. He was home for the holi- 
days, and when the good people were preparing to attend 
communion, he suddenly informed them of his decision 
not to accompany them. Arguments were unavailing. 
An animated discussion arose in which he firmly defended 
his attitude; and from that time on there was never a 
reconciliation between his religious standpoint and the 
one held by his family. Two learned ecclesiastics were 
called into consultation, but they were unable to meet 
the disquieting arguments of the young heretic, and his 
case was dismissed for the moment on his Aunt Rosalie's 
theory that even in the lives of the devoutest Christians 
there often come periods of doubt, and that during such 
periods it is best to leave the backslider to his own con- 
science. Nietzsche, however, never again entered the 
fold. 

Curiously enough it was at this same period that came 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 29 

his revulsion toward the dissipations of student life. He 
went so far as to attempt an imposition of his moral 
theories on the members of the Franconia, but this at- 
tempt at reformation resulted only in his own unpopu- 
larity. In his attitude toward duelling — a pastime some- 
what over-emphasised at Bonn — Nietzsche was consistent 
with his other beliefs. The chivalrous side of it ap- 
pealed to him, although he detested the spirit of it from 
the standpoint of the student body. However, he took 
heroic, if unconventional, means to involve himself in a 
duel lest his position be misconstrued as cowardice. He 
selected an adversary he thought worthy of him, and 
pleasantly demanded a combat on the field of honour, 
ending his request: "Let us waive all the usual prelim- 
inaries." The other agreed, and the duel was fought. 
But the incident merely resulted in emphasising Nie- 
tzsche's disgust for student life. Says his sister, "The 
circumstances which above all aroused my brother's wrath 
was the detestable 'beer materialism' with which he met 
on all sides, and owing to these early experiences in Bonn 
he for ever retained a very deep dislike for smoking, 
drinking, and the whole of so-called 'beer-conviviality.' " 
His decision to leave Bonn and enter the University 
of Leipzig was due to his fondness for Ritschl. In the 
dispute which arose between the two Professors, Jahn 
and Ritschl, Nietzsche's friendship for the latter made 
him a partisan, although he held Jahn in the highest re- 
spect; and when Ritschl decided to transfer himself to 
Leipzig, the young philosopher, along with several of 
the other students, followed him. This was in the au- 
tumn of 1865. Nietzsche reached Leipzig on the 17th 
of October, and the next day he presented himself to the 
Academic Board. It was the centennial anniversary of 



30 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the day when Goethe had entered his name on the regis- 
ter, and the University was celebrating the event. The 
coincidence delighted Nietzsche greatly, who regarded it 
as a good omen for his future at the new institution. 

It was during his residence at Leipzig that there came 
into his life two events which were to have a profound 
and lasting influence on his future. One of these was his 
acquaintance with Wagner — an acquaintance which sev- 
eral years later developed into the strongest friendship of 
his life. The other event (in many ways more important 
than the first) was his discovery of Schopenhauer. This 
discovery is characteristically described in a letter to his 
sister: "One day I came across this book at old Rohn's 
curiosity shop, and taking it up very gingerly I turned 
over its pages. I know not what demon whispered to 
me: 'Take this book home with thee.' At all events, 
contrary to my habit not to be hasty in my purchase of 
books, I took it home. Once in my room I threw myself 
into the corner of the sofa with my booty, and began to 
allow that energetic and gloomy genius to work upon my 
mind. In this book, in which every line cried out re- 
nunciation, denial, and resignation, I saw a mirror in 
which I espied the whole world, life and my own mind 
depicted in frightful grandeur. In this volume the full 
celestial eye of art gazed at me ; here I saw illness and re- 
covery, banishment and refuge, heaven and hell. The 
need of knowing myself, yea, even of gnawing at myself, 
forcibly seized me." This book went far in arousing 
the philosophic faculties of the young philologist, and 
later he wrote many essays, long and short, both in praise 
and in refutation of the great pessimist. That he should 
at first have subscribed to all of Schopenhauer's teachings 
is natural. Nietzsche was vital and susceptible to en- 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 31 

thusiasms. It was in accord with his youthful nature, 
full of courage and strength, that he should have been 
seduced to pessimism. 

At Leipzig Nietzsche accomplished an enormous 
amount of work: and his nature developed in proportion. 
The life was freer than it had been at Pforta or at Bonn. 
Far from being hampered in the voicings of his inner be- 
liefs, he found his environment particularly congenial to 
self-expression. He made numerous friends, principal 
among them being Erwin Rohde, who crossed his later 
life at many points. He showed a great interest in po- 
litical, as well as in literary and musical, events; and 
the war between Prussia and Austria fanned his youthful 
ardour to an almost extravagant degree. Twice he of- 
fered himself to the authorities, hoping to be permitted 
to serve as a soldier, but was rejected both times on ac- 
count of his shortsightedness. His interest in his 
studies, however, was in no wise diminished. He read 
widely in English, French, Greek and Latin, and devoted 
much scholarly research to Theognis, Diogenes Laertius, 
and Democritus. His essay on the subject, "De Fonti- 
bus Diogenis Laertii" won the first university prize, and 
was later published, with other of his essays on philology, 
in the Rheinisches Museum. 

At this time the Prussian army found itself in sore 
need of men, and although Nietzsche had been exempt 
from military duties and had failed to secure enlistment, 
he suddenly found himself, in the autumn of 1867, called 
upon for compulsory training. A new army regulation 
had just been passed requiring all young men, if other- 
wise physically sound, to enter military service even 
though their eyesight was partially impaired. As a con- 
sequence Nietzsche had to leave Leipzig and go into 



32 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

training. He made an effort to enlist in a Berlin Guard 
Regiment, but was finally compelled to join the horse 
artillery at Naumburg. Although he had previously 
volunteered for service, he now found that the life of a 
soldier was far more irksome and far less romantic than 
he had imagined. He was unhappy and disconsolate, 
and deplored the slavery attached to the life of a mounted 
artilleryman. He was not destined, however, to fulfil 
his arduous military duties to the full term of his pro- 
scription. Barely a year had gone by when he was 
thrown from his horse and received what at first was 
thought a slight strain, but what later turned out to be a 
serious injury. The pommel of his saddle had com- 
pressed his chest, and the inflammation which set in ne- 
cessitated his permanent withdrawal from service. 

For a long time Nietzsche was under the care of the 
famous specialist, Volkmann, to whom the military doc- 
tors had turned him over when they had begun to despair 
of his recovery. During convalescence, he busied him- 
self with preparations for his coming university year and 
assisted in some intricate indexing for members of the 
faculty. In October, 1868, he was able to return to 
Leipzig and resume his work. But another unexpected 
event — this one of an advantageous nature and destined 
to alter his whole future — came in the form of an in- 
quiry from the University of Bale in Switzerland. The 
members of that institution's educational board, attracted 
by Nietzsche's essays in the Rheinisches Museum, wrote 
to Ritschl for information regarding the young philolo- 
gist. Ritschl replied that Nietzsche was a genius and 
could do whatever he put his mind to. Thus it hap- 
pened that, although only 24, he was offered the vacant 
post of Classical Philology at Bale, without even being 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 33 

put through the formalities of an examination. How- 
ever, he was straightway granted a Doctor's degree by 
the University of Leipzig, and on the 13th of April, 
1869, he left Naumburg to assume the duties of his new 
appointment. His departure marked the passing of the 
Nietzsche household. His grandmother and both the 
maiden aunts were dead, and because, no doubt, of re- 
ligious differences, he and his mother became estranged. 
Of that intimately welded family circle, only the 
deep friendship between Nietzsche and his sister re- 
mained. 

On May 28, Nietzsche delivered his inaugural address 
at Bale, using the personality of Homer as his subject. 
The hall was crowded, and the address made a decided 
impression on both students and faculty. The lecture 
was an unusual one and well off the conventional track. 
It created not a little mild excitement among the profes- 
sors at Leipzig, and the cut-and-dried philologists of that 
institution were frankly scandalised by its boldness. 
The address, however, was an index to Nietzsche's char- 
acter, and, in looking back on it, we can see that it unmis- 
takably pointed the way along which the future develop- 
ment of his mind was to take place. At Bale, the young 
philologist, despite the people's kindly disposition toward 
him, suffered from solitude. His classes were small. 
Although he had made an impassioned plea for his par- 
ticular science, the interest in philology was slight, and his 
morning lectures were attended by only eight students. 
Nietzsche was without a companion with whom he might 
exchange his ideas and personal thoughts. His only di- 
version came in the form of occasional trips to neighbour- 
ing parts of the country; and the letters he wrote to his 
sister and his former friends were tinged with melancholy. 



34 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

But he was conscientious in his work, and a year later he 
was given a professorship. 

Before he could accept this later appointment it had 
been necessary for him to become a naturalised subject 
of Switzerland, so that when the Franco-German War 
of 1870 broke out, he could not serve as a combatant — a 
fact which caused him keen disappointment. He was 
able, however, to secure service as an ambulance attend- 
ant in the Hospital Corps, and set forth upon his patriotic 
duties with a glad heart. Having been granted the leave 
he asked for at the University, he went to Erlangen, 
where he entered for a course of surgery and medicine 
at the Red Cross Society. After a brief training as a 
nurse, in which line of work he showed remarkable 
adaptability, he was sent to the seat of war at the head of 
an ambulance corps. He was untiring in his energies 
and laboured day and night in the midst of the battle- 
fields. But the overwork proved too much for him, and 
he soon reached the limit of his endurance. One day, 
after long exposure in a cattle truck filled with severely 
wounded and diseased men, he began to show signs of 
serious illness, and when, after great difficulty, he man- 
aged to reach Erlangen, it was discovered that he was 
suffering from diphtheria and severe dysentery. Though 
he had seen but a few weeks' hospital service, it was now 
necessary for him to discontinue his duties entirely. His 
sister tells us that this illness greatly undermined his 
health, and was the first cause of his subsequent condi- 
tion. To make matters worse, the slight medical educa- 
tion which he had received in preparation for his ambu- 
lance service led him to pursue a fateful course of self- 
doctoring — a practice which he continued to his own 
detriment throughout the remainder of his life. Nie- 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 35 

tzsche did not even wait until he was well before resum- 
ing his duties at the University, and this new strain im- 
posed on his already depleted system had much to do with 
bringing on his final breakdown. 

As a result of the Philistinism which broke out all over 
Germany at the end of the war, Nietzsche delivered a 
course of lectures at Bonn, which he entitled "On the 
Future of Our Educational Institutions." Germany had 
insisted that her victory was due not only to physical 
bravery but also in a large measure to the superiority 
of Germanic culture and Teutonic ideals. Nietzsche be- 
held in this snobbish attitude a very grave danger for his 
country, and endeavoured in a small way to rectify this 
attitude by a series of lectures. He severely criticised 
the German educational institutions of the day and went 
so far as to deny them the great culture which they so 
ardently claimed. While these lectures in no wise 
stemmed, even locally, the tide of Philistinism at which 
they were aimed, the criticisms contained in them are of 
the greatest importance in reviewing the development of 
the philosopher himself. The lectures contained, per- 
haps unconsciously but none the less clearly, many of the 
elements of that philosophy which later was to have so 
tremendous an influence not only on Germany but on the 
whole civilised world. 

In the same year, 1872, Nietzsche's first important 
book appeared. This work, dedicated to Richard Wag- 
ner, had been begun in 1869, and was first called "The 
Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music." When 
the third edition appeared in 1886 the title was changed 
to "The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism," 
and a preface called "An Attempt at Self-Criticism" was 
added. In a large measure this book was a tribute to 



36 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Wagner, and was written by Nietzsche in an effort to be 
of immediate benefit to the musician who at that time was 
passing through a period of despondency. Wagner was 
then living at Tribschen, not far from Bale, and Nie- 
tzsche's visits to him were frequent. It was during these 
years that the great friendship between the two men de- 
veloped. "The Birth of Tragedy," however, was not 
well received by the public. Musicians were pleased 
with it, but philologists in particular deplored its utter- 
ances. They looked upon its author as a traitor to their 
science for having dared to venture beyond the narrow 
bounds of academic formalism. One well-known philol- 
ogist, Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, attacked Nietzsche in 
an ill-humoured pamphlet; and although Erwin Rohde 
answered it adequately with another pamphlet, the at- 
tack proved detrimental to Nietzsche's standing at Bale. 
During the following winter term the young philologist 
was entirely without pupils. 

His mind, however, was now undergoing decided and 
important changes. He was becoming bolder and surer 
of himself. New ideals were taking the place of old 
ones, and in 1873 he began a series of famous pamphlets 
which later were put into book form under the title of 
"Thoughts Out of Season." His first attack was upon 
David Strauss ; the second was directed towards the Ger- 
man historians of the day; the third was aimed at Scho- 
penhauer; and the fourth was the famous panegyric, 
"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." These essays, together 
with his work at Bale, occupied him until 1876. Nie- 
tzsche was now suffering severely from the malady he 
carried to his grave, catarrh of the stomach. This was 
accompanied by severe headaches, and during his holidays 
he alternated between Switzerland and Italy in an en- 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 37 

deavour to recover his health. In the former place he 
was with Wagner. In Italy, at Sorrento, he met Dr. 
Paul Ree, who, if we are to believe Max Nordau, was the 
father of all Nietzsche's ideas. Credence, however, can- 
not be given to this accusation, for the nucleus of all of 
his later ideas was undeniably contained in his writings 
previous to his meeting with Ree. That Ree influenced 
him to some small extent no one will deny, for it was he 
who turned the young philosopher's attention to the latter 
day scientists of both England and France; and it was 
shortly after this meeting that Nietzsche began his first 
independent philosophical work, "Human, All-Too-Hu- 
man." 

It was in the year 1876 that his famous friendship with 
Wagner began to cool. Nietzsche had gone to Bayreuth to 
witness the performance of "Der Ring des Nibelungen" 
Already he had begun to question his own high opinion 
of the composer, and Bayreuth solidified his doubts. It 
had been two years since he had seen Wagner, and after 
a brief conversation, Nietzsche became bitter and dis- 
gusted. When he finally went away his revulsion was 
complete, and one of the greatest of historic friendships 
was at an end. Whatever were the individual merits in 
the quarrel between these two great contemporaneous 
men, Nietzsche's attitude was at least consistent with his 
innermost ideals. He had admired in Wagner certain 
definite, revolutionary qualities, and when he was con- 
vinced, as he had every reason to be, that Wagner was 
compromising his art for the purpose of popularity, the 
ideal was broken. He could no longer remain true to 
himself and also to his friendship for the great composer. 
"Parsifal" was undoubtedly a decadent work, viewed 
from the standpoint of Wagner's previous performances. 



38 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Decadence is simply the inability to create new tissue; 
and when Wagner forswore modern ideas and reverted 
to the past, it attested to an entire change of mental atti- 
tude: and no purely esthetic doctrine can controvert the 
fact. Had Cezanne in later life essayed the painting of 
conventionally posed saints — no matter what his tech- 
nical means might have been — his art would have con- 
tained the elements of decadence, for an artist's mental 
attitude cannot be dissevered from his product. This, I 
believe, was Nietzsche's theory in regard to Wagner. 
That the breaking off of this friendship was a great blow 
to the philosopher we know from his diary and from his 
letters. In fact, his affection for Wagner, the man, was 
so great that it was not until ten years had passed that 
he could bring himself to write the essay which he had 
long had in mind, "The Fall of Wagner." 

The year after the appearance of "Human, All-Too- 
Human," Nietzsche's ill-health compelled him to resign 
his professorship at Bale. He had a small income which, 
together with the three thousand francs retiring allow- 
ance granted him by the University, permitted him now 
to travel moderately and to devote his entire time to his 
literary labours. He first went to Berne, where he stayed 
a few weeks. Later he visited Zurich and then St. 
Moritz. It was a brief holiday, but the change of locale, 
coupled with the relaxation from work, improved him 
both in physical health and in spirits. The winter of 
1879-80 he spent with his mother at Naumburg, his old 
home; but the climate and the uncongenial surroundings 
dragged down his health once more, and it was not until 
toward the following spring, when he went to Venice, 
that he regained even a semblance of his normal condi- 
tion. Here he was in company with Paul Ree and his 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 39 

life-long friend and disciple, Heinrich Koselitz, com- 
monly known as Peter Gast. Nietzsche stayed at 
Venice until October, when he went to Genoa. The fol- 
lowing year appeared "The Dawn of Day," his first book 
of constructive thinking. 

The remainder of Nietzsche's life up to the time of 
his final breakdown in January, 1889, was spent in a 
fruitless endeavour to regain his undermined health. For 
eight years, during all of which time he was busily en- 
gaged in writing, he sought a climate that would revive 
him. His summers were spent for the most part in the 
quiet solitude of Sils-Maria, a little Swiss village to 
which the tourist rarely ventured. In 1882 he visited 
Genoa and, with Paul Ree as companion, made a trip to 
Monaco. This journey ended disastrously for his health, 
and by his physician's order he made a trip to Messina. 
Soon after he settled at Grunewald, near Berlin; but the 
place depressed him, and we find him later in Tautenburg. 
Again Genoa claimed him for several months, and then, 
addicted to chloral, and despondent, he sought relief at 
Rome. But he could not stand the hot weather, and 
again he visited Sils-Maria, where, it seems, he was for 
the time greatly improved. In 1884, we fi n d him again 
at Naumburg, and a little later at Nice and Venice. In 
the autumn of the same year, he spent several weeks 
travelling with his sister in Germany, but at the approach 
of winter, he proceeded to Mentone. In 1885 he again 
sought the company of Peter Gast at Venice, and spent 
the larger part of that year and the next at Venice and 
Nice. The lonely philosopher then paid a short visit to 
Leipzig to be once again with his old friend Rohde. But 
the years had estranged them; their views were now at 
opposites. Another of his few friends thus lost to him, 



4 o WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

he immediately returned to Nice. The year 1886 found 
him at the Riviera, and in 1887 ne was again at Sils- 
Maria. Here he laboured incessantly, travelling to both 
Venice and Nice in the meantime. In the spring of 1888 
he changed his plans and went to Turin. Then after 
his usual summer visit to Sils-Maria, he returned to 
Turin, where he remained until the fatal winter of 
1888-89. Nietzsche was rarely happy during his trav- 
els. He was constantly ill and for the most part alone, 
and this perturbed and restless period of his life resolved 
itself into a continuous struggle against melancholy and 
physical suffering. 

During these eight years of solitary labour and futile 
seeking for health, Nietzsche had written "Thus Spake 
Zarathustra," "The Joyful Wisdom," "Beyond Good 
and Evil," "The Genealogy of Morals," "The Case of 
Wagner," "The Twilight of the Idols," "The Anti- 
christ," "Ecce Homo," "Nietzsche contra Wagner," and 
an enormous number of notes which were to constitute 
his final and great philosophical work, "The Will to 
Power." The cold reception with which his books met 
tended to discourage him and to retard his physical re- 
covery. His "Zarathustra" was as greatly misunder- 
stood by the critics as had been his earlier volumes. 
With the exception of Burckhardt and Taine, the critics 
were unfavourable to "Beyond Good and Evil." "The 
Genealogy of Morals" met with scarcely more friendly a 
reception, and "The Case of Wagner," while arousing 
the ire of the Wagnerians, caused no comment of any 
kind in any other quarter. "The Twilight of the Idols" 
appeared about the time of his breakdown, and "The 
Antichrist" and "Ecce Homo" were not published until 
long after his death. The notes on "The Will to 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 41 

Power" have only recently been put together and issued. 
The events during this period of Nietzsche's career 
were few. Perhaps the most important was his meeting 
with Miss Lou Salome. But even this episode had small 
bearing on his life, and has been unduly emphasised by 
biographers because of its isolation in an existence out- 
wardly drab and uneventful. It was while Nietzsche 
was at Tautenburg that Paul Ree and another friend, 
Malvida von Mysenburg, hearing that he was in need of a 
secretary, sent to him Miss Salome, a young Russian 
Jewess. That it would have been difficult to find a per- 
son less suited to the philosopher's needs was borne out 
by subsequent events. According to some accounts Nie- 
tzsche fell mildly in love with her, and was upset and 
irritated by her aloofness. But such a hypothesis is sub- 
stantiated only by the flimsiest of evidence, and, when 
we take into consideration the temperamental gulf be- 
tween these two people, it is highly incredible that Nie- 
tzsche had any desire to form an alliance with his amanu- 
ensis. The truth of the matter probably is that the 
philosopher was sadly disappointed in his secretary — if 
not indeed disgusted with her — and, in showing his re- 
gret, piqued her to retaliation. In fact, we have a letter 
from Nietzsche to the young lady which bears out this 
contention. In any event, we know that their compan- 
ionship lasted but a short time and that Miss Salome 
wrote a most inept and unreliable book on Nietzsche, 
"Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken" published in 
Vienna in 1894. The affair had other painful results. 
Ree defended his protegee, and he and Nietzsche became 
bitter enemies. Nietzsche's sister also was dragged into 
the episode, and quarrelled with both Ree and Miss Sa- 
lome. 



42 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Shortly after this unpleasant event, Nietzsche, urged 
by his sister, made a half-hearted attempt to secure a pro- 
fessorship at the University of Leipzig, but negotiations 
for the post fell through, due largely to Nietzsche's own 
indifference in the matter. Soon after this the philoso- 
pher became estranged from his sister because of her in- 
tention to marry Dr. Forster. Nietzsche's opposition to 
the marriage — an opposition which was supported by his 
mother — was due to several reasons. First, it would 
necessitate his sister leaving him and accompanying her 
husband to Paraguay. Secondly, it had been rumoured 
that Dr. Forster had severely criticised his books. And 
thirdly, Nietzsche had small respect for Dr. Forster him- 
self, who was an impractical idealist and an anti-Semite. 
However, despite all the family protestations, the mar- 
riage took place. Nietzsche was disappointed and 
brooded over the event, but a year later he became recon- 
ciled with his sister, and she remained, to the end of his 
life, his closest friend and companion. 

In January, 1889, an apoplectic fit, which rendered 
Nietzsche unconscious for two days, marked the begin- 
ning of the end. His manner suddenly became alarm- 
ing. He. exhibited numerous eccentricities, so grave as 
to mean but one thing: his mind was seriously affected. 
There has long been a theory extant that his insanity was 
of gradual growth. Nordau holds that he was unbal- 
anced from birth. But there is no evidence to substan- 
tiate these two theories. For seven years Nietzsche's 
physical condition had been improving, and his mind up 
to the end of 1888 was perfectly clear and gave no indi- 
cation of what his end would be. During this period his 
books were thought out in his most clarified manner; in 
all his intercourse with his friends he was restrained and 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 43 

normal; and his voluminous correspondence showed no 
change either in sentiment or in tone. The theory ad- 
vanced in some quarters that his books, and especially 
his later ones, were the work of a madman, is entirely 
without foundation. His insanity was sudden; it came 
without warning; and it is puerile to point to his state 
of mind during the last years of his life as a criticism of 
his work. His books must stand or fall on internal evi- 
dence — and on nothing else. Judged from that stand- 
point they are scrupulously sane. 

The direct cause of Nietzsche's mental breakdown is 
not known. As a matter of fact, there was probably no 
direct cause. It was due to a number of influences — 
his excessive use of chloral which he took for insomnia, 
the tremendous strain to which he put his intellect, his 
constant disappointments and deprivations, his mental 
solitude, his prolonged physical suffering. We know 
little of his last days before he went insane. He was 
living alone in Turin and working desperately. Then 
suddenly to Professor Burckhardt at Bale he wrote a let- 
ter which was obviously the work of a madman. "I am 
Ferdinand de Lesseps," he wrote. "I am Prado. I am 
Schambige.* I have been buried twice this autumn." 
This was the first indication of his insanity. Immedi- 
ately after he wrote a similar letter to his old friend, 
Professor Overbeck. Other of Nietzsche's friends re- 
ceived disquieting and indecipherable notes. To Georg 
Brandes he sent a letter signed "The Crucified." To 
Peter Gast he wrote, "Sing me a new song. The world 
is clear and all the skies rejoice." To Cosima Wagner: 
"Ariadne, I love you." 

* Schambige and Prado were two assassins whose exploits were then 
occupying the French journals. 



44 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

There was now no doubt of his condition. Overbeck 
went immediately to Turin. He found the philosopher 
playing wildly on the piano, and crying blasphemies to 
the empty room. Nietzsche was taken back to Bale, and 
then placed in a private psychiatric institution at Jena. 
Here he stayed until the following spring when he was 
permitted to be taken to the home of his mother at Naum- 
burg. It was three years later that his sister returned 
from Paraguay, where her husband had died, and Nie- 
tzsche was sufficiently recovered to meet her when she 
arrived. But though he lived for another seven years, 
his mind was irretrievably ruined. When his mother 
died in 1897, his sister removed him to a villa at Weimar. 
There on a great veranda, overlooking the hills and the 
river valley, he remained until the end, receiving a few 
of his friends and taking his old delight in music. His 
sister watched over him tenderly, and though he was 
never strong enough to resume work, he would often 
talk of his books. When shown a portrait of Wagner, 
he said, "Him I loved dearly." He was all tenderness 
toward the end. The mighty yea-sayer had become as a 
little child. "Elizabeth," he would say, "do not cry. 
Are we not happy 1 ? " 

Nietzsche died on the 25th of August, 1900, and was 
buried at Rocken, his native village. 



II 

"Human, All-Too-Human" 

Volumes I and II 

"TTUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" ("Menschliches 
JL JL Allzu Menschliches") was first published in 
1878. Previous to this time Nietzsche had devoted him- 
self to a sedulous study of the French philosophers — 
Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Vanergues, Montaigne and 
others — and these men influenced him in his selection of 
the aphoristic style as a medium for his thoughts. His 
serious illness at the time made it impossible for him to 
attempt any large and co-ordinated philosophical task 
which would have required sustained thinking and con- 
tinual physical labour, and the detached manner of writ- 
ing employed by the French thinkers fitted in with the 
intermittent manner in which he was necessitated to 
work. "Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions," the sec- 
ond part of "Human, All-Too-Human," appeared the 
following year; and "The Wanderer and his Shadow," 
the third section, was made public in 1880. Six years 
later these three parts were put together in two volumes 
under the caption of the original book, and were subtitled 
"A Book of Free Spirits." 

At that time Nietzsche already had numerous writings 
to his credit. "The Birth of Tragedy" ("Die Geburt der 
Tragodie") was composed between 1869 and 1871, and 
issued in January, 1872. It was a treatise on pessimism 

45 



46 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

and Hellenism, and in it Nietzsche endeavoured to ascer- 
tain the origin of Greek tragedy. In his research he 
passed over many of the lesser philological discussions 
which were then occupying the minds of his academic 
confreres, and, mild as was this first published work of 
his, he suddenly found himself the centre of a discussion 
which augured ill for his future at the University of 
Bale. In this book he undertook to explain the constant 
conflict between the Apollonian and Dionysian ideals, 
and defined the differences underlying these two great in- 
fluences in Greek art. Later in his writings we find him 
applying the theories stated in "The Birth of Tragedy" 
to all human transactions. 

"On the Future of our Educational Institutions" and 
"Homer and Classical Philology," contained in one vol- 
ume, were addresses delivered during Nietzsche's profes- 
sorship of classical philology at Bale University. In 
these lectures he pointed out the necessity of protecting 
the man of genius, and denied the existence of actual cul- 
ture in the educational institutions of modern Germany, 
holding that true culture is only for the higher type of 
man. He made a plea for an institution where genuine 
culture, founded on the ideals of ancient Greece, would 
be harboured for the few who would devote their lives to 
it. Here unquestionably was the faint beginning of his 
conception of the superman. While these lectures dealt 
only with the educational institutions of Germany, the 
criticisms in them may nevertheless be applied in a broader 
sense to the general principles underlying all schools. 
This book is the first visible step in the development of 
his thought. 

More evidences of what was to come later are found in 
a series of essays written during the early seventies, which 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 47 

are now published under the general caption of "Early 
Greek Philosophy and Other Essays." The seven essays 
contained in this volume are: "The Greek State" (1871), 
in which he attacked the modern conception of labour, 
and advanced a brief for slavery based on the assumption 
that without it true culture cannot exist; "The Greek 
Woman" (1871), an outline of Nietzsche's ideal of 
woman; "On Music and Words" (1871), an analysis of 
the origins of music and language and a statement of the 
functions of each; "Homer's Contest" (1872), a com- 
parison of the ancient and modern individualistic strife, 
in which was pointed out the necessity of competition in 
any successful commonwealth; "The Relation of Scho- 
penhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture" (1872), a 
gay attack upon certain phases of German philistinism, 
with the suggestion that Schopenhauer's philosophy would 
prove an excellent counter-irritant; "Philosophy During 
the Tragic Age of the Greeks" (1873), a brilliant ac- 
count and exposition of those Greek thinkers who pre- 
ceded Socrates; and "On Truth and Falsity in their Ul- 
tramoral Sense" (1873), a rhapsodic refutation of the 
theory of absolute truth, in which we find many denials 
of the values attached to current conventions. These 
denials we are constantly meeting in the major part of 
Nietzsche's later work. 

In Volume I of "Thoughts Out of Season" we find 
two essays : "David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer" 
(written in 1873), and "Richard Wagner at Bayreuth" 
(written during the close of 1875 and at the beginning 
of 1876). The first essay is an attack upon an ex-cleri- 
cal who set up a philosopher's shop in Nietzsche's day 
and succeeded in sufficiently inflaming the popular mind 
to secure for himself a wide and ardent following. Nie- 



48 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tzsche, angered by the effect that Strauss's sophistries had 
upon the German mind, undertook to answer them and 
show up their spuriousness. In the essay on Richard 
Wagner, Nietzsche praised the composer in no uncertain 
terms, hailing him as a saviour of mankind through the 
medium of the drama. Nietzsche thought he saw in 
Wagner a kindred spirit, a man free from the narrow 
dictates of his time, one capable of establishing a new 
order of things in the realm of art. Subsequently the 
philosopher turned against Wagner and denounced him 
bitterly for his anti-Hellenic tendencies. 

Volume II of "Thoughts out of Season" contains "The 
Use and Abuse of History" and "Schopenhauer as Edu- 
cator," both written in 1874. I n tne ^ rst °f these es- 
says Nietzsche attacked the study of history which was 
then the foremost educational fad in Germany. He de- 
nied it a place in the curriculum of culture unless it had 
for its foundation a profound knowledge of the causes 
of history. Also in this essay he made a plea for the in- 
dividualistic interpretation of history, arguing that the 
events founded on the activities of majorities are useless 
to a true understanding of the fundamentals of racial de- 
velopment. Here again we encounter the foreshadow- 
ing of the philosophy of the superman. Nietzsche paid 
high tribute to Schopenhauer in his essay "Schopenhauer 
as Educator." Without subscribing unqualifiedly to all 
the doctrines of the great pessimist, he nevertheless allied 
himself philosophically with Schopenhauer's theory that 
all logic is an outgrowth of the law of self-preservation. 

In the autumn of 1874 Nietzsche wrote a series of 
brief comments dealing with the subject of education. 
These paragraphs contain about 20,000 words, and were 
to have constituted, when completed, the fifth part of 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 49 

"Thoughts Out of Season." He never finished them, 
however, and they were not published until after his 
death. These fragments appear, under the caption of 
"We Philologists," at the end of the volume entitled 
"The Case of Wagner." "We Philologists" is a protest 
against the manner in which classical culture was pro- 
mulgated in the universities. It offers a stinging criti- 
cism of those German professors, the philologists, to 
whom was entrusted the duty of disseminating Greek 
cultural ideals, and in addition presents a concise outline 
of what genuine Hellenic culture should consist. Nie- 
tzsche protests against the filtering of pagan antiquity 
through Christian doctrines — the method of teaching then 
in vogue — and insists that such a form of education en- 
tirely misses its aim. Although "We Philologists" is 
comparatively of small value to the student of Nietzsche's 
later philosophy, it is interesting to note that as early as 
1874, his anti-Christian spirit was already well defined. 
The four essays contained in the two volumes of 
"Thoughts out of Season" and "We Philologists" were 
the first of an intended series of pamphlets to be called 
"Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen" * but the series was 
never finished. However, the Nietzschean philosophical 
ideas had unquestionably begun to take definite form. 
Already there had been attempts at idealistic and moral- 
istic valuations. There had also been a considerable 
amount of that preliminary analysis which was to form a 
foundation for the destructive and constructive thoughts 
of later years. In these essays Nietzsche had already be- 
gun to strike his bearings, and while they cannot be taken 
as a part of his philosophical scheme, they nevertheless 
form an excellent introduction for those students who 

* "Inopportune Speculations." 



So WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

care to go behind the final expression of his ideas and 
behold them in embryo. 

"Human, All-Too-Human," following two years later, 
came as a distinct surprise even to Nietzsche's most in- 
timate friends: Wagner especially was horrified at the 
heresies contained in it. There had not been sufficient in- 
dications in his earlier writings for one to predict so devas- 
tating an arraignment of modern life as was contained 
in this work. It was a departure, not only in thought but 
also in manner, from all else he had written. The con- 
ventional essay form had been set aside for an aphoris- 
tic style. Here we find a series of paragraphs varying 
in length from a few lines to a page or more, each dealing 
with a separate and syllogistically detached idea. The 
epigram, which was to play such an important part in 
all of Nietzsche's writings, is also found in abundance. 
The form in which these two volumes are cast gives the 
effect of a man felling a giant tree with a thousand blows 
of an axe, as distinguished from the method of the man 
who saws it down gradually and continuously. 

Despite its muscular and incisive qualities, the manner 
of this work is calm. As a whole it is an excellent ex- 
ample of those writings which Nietzsche himself has 
called Apollonian. At times one even feels a tentative- 
ness in its utterances not unlike that which attaches to the 
steps a man takes in a region he knows to be full of 
quicksands. In this regard it is interesting to note how 
a certain insecurity at the beginning of the work, which 
manifests itself in ultra-obscure passages, later gives way 
to a clarity and humour indicative of almost wanton 
temerity. In this book Nietzsche passes from the acade- 
mician to the iconoclast. He bridges the chasm from the 
doctor of philology to the independent thinker. It is 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 51 

the record of the psychological transition of his mind; 
and this record is evident in both his outlook and his 
habits of expression. 

Nietzsche, at his birth as a thinker, presents himself 
as an arch-nihilist. He realised the necessity of destroy- 
ing the universe before an understanding of it was pos- 
sible, and so the two volumes of "Human, All-Too-Hu- 
man" are almost entirely destructive. In this work we 
have Nietzsche the trail-blazer, the incendiary, the idol- 
smasher, the pessimist, the devastator. One by one the 
doctrines and tenets, strengthened by the accumulative 
acceptance of centuries, go down before his bludgeon. 
Piece by piece the universe of reality is neutralised by his 
analyses. Every human transaction, every phase of hu- 
man hope and aspiration, is reduced to negation. An- 
cient and modern cultures are dissected unsparingly. Po- 
litical systems are stripped of their integuments and their 
origins exposed. New valuations are attached to the 
great artists and writers. Many of Nietzsche's most 
famous definitions grow out of the ruthless inquests he 
makes in this work. 

This uncompassionate clearing away of accepted values 
prepared the way for the books which were to come. 
Once having ascertained the foundation on which human 
actions are built, the path was clear for reconstruction 
and reorganisation. "Human, All-Too-Human," then, 
was the first indirect voicing of Nietzsche's philosophy. 
All else had been mere skirmishing with ideas. Only 
vaguely and desultorily had his opinions been heretofore 
voiced. His analysis of history, his criticisms of ancient 
and modern thought, had actually pried away the super- 
ficial manifestations of existence and given him that in- 
sight into the undercurrents of causation which was later 



52 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

to inspire him in his work. For this reason we are more 
conscious of the man than of the philosopher when read- 
ing the series of aphorisms which constitute the main 
body of this document. "Human, All-Too-Human" 
is in the main an inquiry into the fundamental rea- 
sons for human conduct. Nietzsche devotes his efforts 
to showing that ideals, when pushed to their final analy- 
sis, reveal a basis in human need. Especially does he 
concern himself with the causes underlying current moral 
doctrines. He points out that there is no static and ab- 
solute morality, but that all moral codes are systems of 
deportment founded on human conditions in accordance 
with the environmental needs of a people. From this he 
states the corollary that all morality is subject to altera- 
tion, amendment and abrogation. He asserts the rela- 
tivity of the terms "good" and "evil," and denies the jus- 
tice of any final criticism of right and wrong as applied 
to any human action. 

From this Nietzsche deduces the formula which is at 
the bottom of all individualistic philosophy, namely : that 
what is immoral for one man is moral for another, and 
that the application of any moral code is undesirable for 
the reason that no system of conduct can apply alike to 
all men. Thus any attempt on the part of any one man 
to direct the actions of any other man is in itself an im- 
morality, because it is an attempt to hinder and retard 
the development of the individual. It must not be 
thought that Nietzsche's arrival at this conclusion is a 
direct and simple affair based on superficial observation. 
Nor is it in itself the end for which he strives. To the 
contrary, the conclusion is stated mainly by inference. 
The work he lays out for himself is one of analysis, and 
under his critical scalpel fall religions, political institu- 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 53 

tions and nations, as well as individuals. Wherever he 
finds a belief whose origin is considered divine, he tears 
away its surface characteristics and inquires into it. In 
every instance he finds a human ground for it. Going 
still further, he points out that all institutions, in order 
to meet the constantly fluctuating conditions of society, 
must subject themselves to change. 

A multiplicity of themes comes under Nietzsche's ob- 
servation in this work. Not only is there a great deal of 
abstract reasoning but also a vast amount of brilliant and 
penetrating criticism of men and art. Ancient and mod- 
ern philosophers, novelists, poets, musicians, dramatists, 
as well as theories of art, literature and music, here come 
under his careful and acute analysis. There are passages 
of startling poetry interpolated between paragraphs of 
cynical and destructive research. Nietzsche reveals him- 
self as a scholar, the philologist, the historian and the 
scientist, as well as the thinker. The amount of general 
knowledge he displays in nearly every line of human en- 
deavour is astonishing. In his most elaborate processes 
of ratiocination he is always capable of adhering to au- 
thenticated facts. He never side-steps into the purely 
metaphysical or denies the existence of corporeality once 
it has been assumed as a hypothesis. He breaks once and 
for all with the metaphysicians and word-jugglers. De- 
nying all reason in the Kantian sense, he is always scrupu- 
lously reasonable. 

Although no direct philosophical doctrines are pro- 
pounded in "Human, All-Too-Human," Nietzsche had 
undoubtedly outlined in his mind the constructive works 
which were to come later. However, in reading this 
work one finds but little indication — and that only ob- 
scurelv hinted at — of the transvaluation of values which 



54 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

was to follow the devaluation. We have no hint, for in- 
stance, of the doctrine of the superman other than an im- 
plied ideal of an intellectual aristocracy which will per- 
mit of the highest development; of the individual. Evo- 
lution beyond the present is mentioned but indirectly. 
The future, to this destructive Nietzsche, is non-existent. 
His eyes are continually turned toward the past and they 
shift no further than the present. Only through impli- 
cation is the Hellenic ideal voiced, and then it is with a 
certain degree of speculation as to its efficacy in meeting 
the demands of the modern man. Greek culture is used 
largely as a means of comparison, or as an arbitrary 
premise of his dialectic. The doctrine of eternal recur- 
rence, which was to form one of the bases of "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra," is not even suggested. The "will 
to power," the anti-Schopenhauerian doctrine, which is 
the framework on which all of Nietzsche's constructive 
thinking is hung, was, at the time of his writing "Hu- 
man, All-Too-Human," a hypothesis, vague and unde- 
veloped. 

"Human, All-Too-Human" is the first work of Nie- 
tzsche one should read. In reality it is an elaborate in- 
troduction to his later works. In his following book, 
"The Dawn of Day," comes the birth of his philosophy; 
it is the first real battle in his righteous warfare, the first 
great blasphemous assault upon the accepted order of 
things. But it cannot be readily understood or appre- 
ciated unless we have prepared ourselves for it. 

The selection of the passages from the present two 
volumes has been extremely difficult, due to their mul- 
tiplicity of themes and to the heterogeneity of their treat- 
ment. It is impossible to create a convincing effect of a 
razed forest by presenting a picture of an occasional 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 55 

fallen tree. Herein has lain my chief difficulty. I have 
been able to show only sections of the destruction of 
human values which Nietzsche here accomplishes. Fur- 
thermore, it has been impossible to give any very adequate 
idea of the vast amount of brilliant criticism of men and 
art which is to be encountered in these two volumes. All 
this must be got direct. It has been possible only to 
suggest it here. Those portions of the books which I 
have been able to comprehend in these excerpts are neces- 
sarily limited to Nietzsche's more important destructive 
conclusions. 

EXCERPTS FROM "HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 

Everything essential in human development happened 
in pre-historic times, long before those four thousand 
years which we know something of. . . . i, 15 

Everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, as 
there are likewise no absolute truths. 1, 15 

It is probable that the objects of religious, moral, 
sesthetic and logical sentiment likewise belong only 
to the surface of things, while man willingly believes 
that here, at least, he has touched the heart of the 
world. . . . i, 17 

Nothing could be said of the metaphysical world but 
that it would be a different condition, a condition inac- 
cessible and incomprehensible to us; it would be a thing 
of negative qualities. Were the existence of such a 
world ever so well proved, the fact would nevertheless 
remain that it would be precisely the most irrelevant of 
all forms of knowledge. ... 1, 21-22 

Belief in the freedom of the will is an original error of 
everything organic, as old as the existence of the awak- 
enings of logic in it; the belief in unconditioned sub- 



56 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

stances and similar things is equally a primordial as well 
as an old error of everything organic, i, 33 

A degree of culture, and assuredly a very high one, is 
attained when man rises above superstitious and religious 
notions and fears, and, for instance, no longer believes in 
guardian angels or in original sin, and has also ceased to 
talk of the salvation of his soul, — if he has attained to 
this degree of freedom, he has still also to overcome meta- 
physics with the greatest exertion of his intelligence, i, 35 

Away with those wearisomely hackneyed terms Optim- 
ism and Pessimism! . . . We must get rid of both the 
calumniating and the glorifying conception of the world. 
1, 43-44 

Error has made man so deep, sensitive, and inventive 
that he has put forth such blossoms as religions and arts. 
Pure knowledge could not have been capable of it. i, 44-45 

The usual false conclusions of mankind are these: a 
thing exists, therefore it has a right to exist. Here there 
is inference from the ability to live to its suitability; from 
its suitability to its rightfulness. Then: an opinion 
brings happiness ; therefore it is the true opinion. Its ef- 
fect is good ; therefore it is itself good and true. i, 45 

Every belief in the value and worthiness of life is based 
on vitiated thought; it is only possible through the fact 
that sympathy for the general life and suffering of man- 
kind is very weakly developed in the individual. 1, 4 t-48 

Science . . . has no consideration for ultimate pur- 
poses, any more than Nature has, but just as the latter 
occasionally achieves things of the greatest suitableness 
without intending to do so, so also true science, as the 
imitator of nature in ideas, will occasionally and in many 
ways further the usefulness and welfare of man, — but 
also without intending to do so. i, 58 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 57 

All single actions are called good or bad without any 
regard to their motives, but only on account of the useful 
or injurious consequences which result for the community. 
But soon the origin of these distinctions is forgotten, and 
it is deemed that the qualities "good" or "bad" are con- 
tained in the action itself without regard to its conse- 
quences. ... 1, 59 

The hierarchy of possessions ... is not fixed and 
equal at all times; if any one prefers vengeance to justice 
he is moral according to the standard of an earlier civili- 
sation, but immoral according to the present one. 1, 6 s 

People who are cruel nowadays must be accounted for 
by us as the grades of earlier civilisations which have sur- 
vived. ... 1, 63 

Certainly we should exhibit pity, but take good care not 
to feel it, for the unfortunate are so stupid that to them 
the exhibition of pity is the greatest good in the world, i, 6 s 

The thirst for pity is the thirst for self-gratification. 

... I, 69 

There must be self-deception in order that this and that 
may produce great effects. For men believe in the truth 
of everything that is visibly, strongly believed in. i, 71 

One of the commonest mistakes is this: because some 
one is truthful and honest towards us, he must speak the 
truth, i, 71 

Why do people mostly speak the truth in daily life? 
. . . Because . . . the path of compulsion and authority 
is surer than that of cunning. 1, 72 

One may promise actions, but no sentiments, for these 
are involuntary. 1, 7 e 

Our crime against criminals lies in the fact that we 
treat them like rascals. 1, 79 

Every virtue has its privileges; for example, that of 



58 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

contributing its own little fagot to the scaffold of every 
condemned man. 1, 8 o 

Why do we over-estimate love to the disadvantage of 
justice, and say the most beautiful things about it, as if 
it were something very much higher than the latter"? Is 
it not visibly more stupid than justice? Certainly, but 
precisely for that reason all the pleasanter for every one. 

1, 81 

Hope, — in reality ... is the worst of all evils, be- 
cause it prolongs the torments of man. i, 82 

One will seldom go wrong if one attributes extreme 
actions to vanity, average ones to habit, and petty ones to 
fear, i, 83 

Religion is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for 
suicide, and thus it ingratiates itself with those who wish 
to cling to life, i, ss-se 

The injustice of the powerful, which, more than any- 
thing else, rouses indignation in history, is by no means 
so great as it appears. . . . One unconsciously takes it 
for granted that doer and sufferer think and feel alike, 
and according to this supposition we measure the guilt of 
the one by the pain of the other, i, 8 e-87 

When virtue has slept, it will arise again all the 
fresher, i, 8 t 

What a great deal of pleasure morality gives ! Only 
think what a sea of pleasant tears has been shed over de- 
scriptions of noble and unselfish deeds! This charm of 
life would vanish if the belief in absolute irresponsibility 
Were to obtain supremacy. i, so 

Justice (equity) has its origin amongst powers which 
are fairly equal. . . . The character of exchange is the 
primary character of justice. . . . Because man, accord- 
ing to his intellectual custom, has forgotten the original 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN' 5 59 

purpose of so-called just and reasonable actions, and par- 
ticularly because for hundreds of years children have been 
taught to admire and imitate such actions, the idea has 
gradually arisen that such an action is un-egoistic; upon 
this idea, however, is based the high estimation in which 
it is held. ... 1, 90-91 

The feeling of pleasure on the basis of human relations 
generally makes man better; joy in common, pleasure en- 
joyed together is increased, it gives the individual security, 
makes him good-tempered, and dispels mistrust and envy, 
for we feel ourselves at ease and see others at ease. Sim- 
ilar manifestations of pleasure awaken the idea of the 
same sensations, the feeling of being like something; a 
like effect is produced by common sufferings, the same bad 
weather, dangers, enemies. Upon this foundation is based 
the oldest alliance, the object of which is the mutual 
obviating and averting of a threatening danger for the 
benefit of each individual. And thus the social instinct 
grows out of pleasure. 1, 97 

The aim of malice is not the suffering of others in it- 
self, but our own enjoyment. . . . 1, 102 

If self-defence is allowed to pass as moral, then almost 
all manifestations of the so-called immoral egoism must 
also stand. ... 1, 104 

He who is punished does not deserve the punishment, he 
is only used as a means of henceforth warning away from 
certain actions; equally so, he who is rewarded does not 
merit this reward, he could not act otherwise than he 
did. 1, 105 

Between good and evil actions there is no difference of 
species, but at most of degree. Good actions are sub- 
limated evil ones; evil actions are vulgarised and stupe- 
fied good ones, i, ios 



60 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The religious cult is based upon the representations of 
sorcery between man and man. . . . i, 121 

Christianity . . . oppressed man and crushed him ut- 
terly, sinking him as if in deep mire ; then into the feeling 
of absolute depravity it suddenly threw the light of 
divine mercy, so that the surprised man, dazzled by for- 
giveness, gave a cry of joy and for a moment believed 
that he bore all heaven within himself, i, 124 

People to whom their daily life appears too empty and 
monotonous easily grow religious; this is comprehensible 
and excusable, only they have no right to demand relig- 
ious sentiments from those whose daily life is not empty 
and monotonous, i, 125 

No man ever did a thing which was done only for 
others and without any personal motive. ... 1, 134 

In every ascetic morality man worships one part of 
himself as a God, and is obliged, therefore, to diabolise 
the other parts. 1, i 4 o 

What is it that we long for at the sight of beauty? 
We long to be beautiful, we fancy it must bring much 
happiness with it. But that is a mistake, i, i 5 e 

There is an art of the ugly soul side by side with the 
art of the beautiful soul. . . . i, 157 

Artists of representation are especially held to be pos- 
sessed of genius, but not scientific men. In reality, how- 
ever, the former valuation and the latter under-valuation 
are only puerilities of reason. i, lee-m 

A good author possesses not only his own intellect, but 
also that of his friends. 1, its 

To look upon writing as a regular profession should 
justly be regarded as a form of madness. 1, isi 

A conversation with a friend will only bear good fruit 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 61 

of knowledge when both think only of the matter under 
consideration and forget that they are friends. 1, 1*3 

Complete praise has a weakening effect. 1, 184 

There will always be a need of bad authors; for they 
meet the taste of readers of an undeveloped, immature 
age. . . . i, 185 

The born aristocrats of the mind are not in too much 
of a hurry; their creations appear and fall from the tree 
on some quiet autumn evening, without being rashly de- 
sired, instigated, or pushed aside by new matter. The 
unceasing desire to create is vulgar, and betrays envy, 
jealousy, and ambition. If a man is something, it is not 
really necessary for him to do anything — and yet he does 
a great deal. There is a human species higher even than 
the "productive" man. . . . i, i 8 9 

Deviating natures are of the utmost importance wher- 
ever there is to be progress. Every wholesale progress 
must be preceded by a partial weakening. The strongest 
natures retain the type, the weaker ones help it to de- 
velop, i, 208 

In the knowledge of truth, what really matters is the 
possession of it, not the impulse under which it was 
sought, the way in which it was found, i, 210 

The fettered spirit does not take up his position from 
conviction, but from habit ; he is a Christian, for instance, 
not because he had a comprehension of different creeds 
and could take his choice; he is an Englishman, not be- 
cause he decided for England, but he found Christianity 
and England ready-made and accepted them without any 
reason, just as one who is born in a wine-country becomes 
a wine-drinker, i, 211 

The restriction of views, which habit has made in- 



62 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

stinct, leads to what is called strength of character, i, 212-213 
The highest intelligence and the warmest heart cannot 
exist together in one person, and the wise man who passes 
judgment upon life looks beyond goodness and only re- 
gards it as something which is not without value in the 
general summing-up of life. The wise man must oppose 
those digressive wishes of unintelligent goodness, because 
he has an interest in the continuance of his type and in 
the eventual appearance of the highest intellect; at least, 
he will not advance the founding of the "perfect State," 
inasmuch as there is only room in it for wearied individ- 
uals. I, 218-219 

Interest in Education will acquire great strength only 
from the moment when belief in a God and His care is 
renounced. . . . An education that no longer believes in 
miracles must pay attention to three things: first, how 
much energy is inherited? secondly, by what means can 
new energy be aroused? thirdly, how can the individual 
be adapted to so many and manifold claims of culture 
without being disquieted and destroying his personality, 
— in short, how can the individual be initiated into the 
counterpoint of private and public culture, how can he 
lead the melody and at the same time accompany it. 

Ij 224-225 

A higher culture must give man a double brain, two 
brain-chambers, so to speak, one to feel science and the 
other to feel non-science, which can lie side by side, with- 
out confusion, divisible, exclusive; this is a necessity of 
health. In one part lies the source of strength, in the 
other lies the regulator; it must be heated with illusions, 
onesidednesses, passions; and the malicious and dangerous 
consequences of overheating must be averted by the help 
of conscious Science. i, 232 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 63 

Simultaneous things hold together, it is said. A rela- 
tive dies far away, and at the same time we dream about 
him, — Consequently! But countless relatives die and 
we do not dream about them. . . . This species of super- 
stition is found again in a refined form in historians and 
delineators of culture, who usually have a kind of hydro- 
phobic horror of all that senseless mixture, in which indi- 
vidual and national life is so rich. i, 235 

It is true that in the spheres of higher culture there 
must always be a supremacy, but henceforth this suprem- 
acy lies in the hands of the oligarchs of the mind. In 
spite of local and political separation they form a cohe- 
sive society, whose members recognise and acknowledge 
each other, whatever public opinion and the verdicts of 
review and newspaper writers who influence the masses 
may circulate in favour of or against them. Mental 
superiority, which formerly divided and embittered, now- 
adays generally unites. . . . Oligarchs are necessary to 
each other, they are each other's best joy, they under- 
stand their signs, but each is nevertheless free, he fights 
and conquers in his place and perishes rather than sub- 
mit. 1, 243 

The greatest advance that men have made lies in their 
acquisition of the art to reason rightly. 1, 249-250 

The strength and weakness of mental productiveness 
depend far less on inherited talents than on the accom- 
panying amount of elasticity. 1, 250 < 

Whoever, in the present day, still derives his develop- 
ment from religious sentiments, and perhaps lives for 
some length of time afterwards in metaphysics and art, 
has assuredly gone back a considerable distance and be- 
gins his race with other modern men under unfavourable 
conditions; he apparently loses time and space. But 



64 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

because he stays in those domains where ardour and 
energy are liberated and force flows continuously as a 
volcanic stream out of an inexhaustible source, he goes 
forward all the more quickly as soon as he has freed him- 
self at the right moment from those dominators. . . . 

if 252 

Whoever wishes to reap happiness and comfort in life 
should always avoid higher culture. i, 255-256 

All mankind is divided, as it was at all times and is 
still, into slaves and freemen; for whoever has not two- 
thirds of his day for himself is a slave. ... 1, 259 

If idleness is really the beginning of all vice, it finds 
itself, therefore, at least in near neighbourhood of all the 
virtues ; the idle man is still a better man than the active. 
You do not suppose that in speaking of idleness and 
idlers I am alluding to you, you sluggards? \, 2 eo 

I believe that every one must have his own opinion 
about everything concerning which opinions are possible, 
because he himself is a peculiar, unique thing, which as- 
sumes towards all other things a new and never hitherto 
existing attitude, i, 2 eo-26i 

Whoever earnestly desires to be free will therewith 
and without any compulsion lose all inclination for faults 
and vices ; he will also be more rarely overcome by anger 
and vexation. 1, 261-262 

You must have loved religion and art as you loved 
mother and nurse, — otherwise you cannot be wise. But 
you must be able to see beyond them, to outgrow them; 
if you remain under their ban you do not understand 
them. 1, 264 

The rage for equality may so manifest itself that we 
seek either to draw all others down to ourselves (by be- 
littling, disregarding, and tripping up), or ourselves and 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 65 

all others upwards (by recognition, assistance, and con- 
gratulation), i, 268 

We set no special value on the possession of a virtue 
until we perceive that it is entirely lacking in our adver- 
sary. 1, 269 

We forget our pretensions when we are always con- 
scious of being amongst meritorious people; being alone 
implants presumption in us. The young are pretentious, 
for they associate with their equals, who are all ciphers 
but would fain have a great significance. 1, 271 

In warring against stupidity, the most just and gentle 
of men at last become brutal. They are thereby, per- 
haps, taking the proper course for defence; for the most 
appropriate argument for a stupid brain is the clenched 
fist. But because, as has been said, their character is 
just and gentle, they suffer more by this means of pro- 
tection than they injure their opponents by it. i, 2s* 
/ The perfect woman is a higher type of humanity than 
the perfect man, and also something much rarer. i, 295 

Every one bears within him an image of woman, in- 
herited from his mother: it determines his attitude to- 
wards woman as a whole, whether to honour, despise, or 
remain generally indifferent to them. 1, 295-296 

Mothers are readily jealous of the friends of sons who 
are particularly successful. As a rule mother loves her- 
self in her son more than the son. 1, 296 

If married couples did not live together, happy mar- 
riages would be more frequent. 1, 29 8 

As a rule women love a distinguished man to the extent 
that they wish to possess him exclusively. They would 
gladly keep him under lock and key, if their vanity did 
not forbid, but vanity demands that he should also appear 
distinguished before others. 1, 209 



66 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Those girls who mean to trust exclusively to their 
youthful charms for their provision in life, and whose 
cunning is further prompted by worldly mothers, have 
just the same aims as courtesans, only they are wiser and 
less honest, i, 3 oo 

For goodness' sake let us not give our classical educa- 
tion to girls ! i, 301 

The intellect of woman manifests itself as perfect mas- 
tery, presence of mind, and utilisation of all advantages. 
They transmit it as a fundamental quality to their chil- 
dren, and the father adds thereto the darker background 
of the will. His influence determines as it were the 
rhythm and harmony with which the new life is to be 
performed; but its melody is derived from the mother. 
For those who know how to put a thing properly : women 
have intelligence, men have character and passion. This 
does not contradict the fact that men actually achieve so 
much more with their intelligence : they have deeper and 
more powerful impulses; and it is these which carry their 
understanding (in itself something passive) to such an 
extent. Women are often silently surprised at the great 
respect men pay to their character. When, therefore, in 
the choice of a partner men seek specially for a being of 
deep and strong character, and women for a being of 
intelligence, brilliancy, and presence of mind, it is plain 
that at bottom men seek for the ideal man, and women 
for the ideal woman, — consequently not for the comple- 
ment but for the completion of their own excellence. 

1, 302-303. 

It is a sign of women's wisdom that they have almost 
always known how to get themselves supported, like 
drones in a bee-hive. Let us just consider what this 
meant originally, and why men do not depend upon 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 67 

women for their support. Of a truth it is because mas- 
culine vanity and reverence are greater than feminine 
wisdom ; for women have known how to secure for them- 
selves by their subordination the greatest advantage, in 
fact, the upper hand. Even the care of children may 
originally have been used by the wisdom of women as 
an excuse for withdrawing themselves as much as pos- 
sible from work. And at present they still understand 
when they are really active (as housekeepers, for in- 
stance) how to make a bewildering fuss about it, so that 
the merit of their activity is usually ten times over-esti- 
mated by men. 1, 303 

Marriage is a necessary institution for the twenties; a 
useful, but not necessary, institution for the thirties; for 
later life it is often harmful, and promotes the mental 
deterioration of the man. 1, 3 os 

Marriage regarded in its highest aspect, as the spiritual 
friendship of two persons of opposite sexes, and accord- 
ingly such as is hoped for in future, contracted for the 
purpose of producing and educating a new generation, — 
such marriage, which only makes use of the sensual, so to 
speak, as a rare and occasional means to a higher purpose, 
will, it is to be feared, probably need a natural auxiliary, 
namely, concubinage. For if, on the grounds of his 
health, the wife is also to serve, for the sole satisfaction 
of the man's sexual needs, a wrong perspective, opposed 
to the aims indicated, will have most influence in the 
choice of a wife. The aims referred to: the production 
of descendants, will be accidental, and their successful 
education highly improbable. 1, 309 

We always lose through too familiar association with 
women and friends; and sometimes we lose the pearl of 
of our life thereby, i, 312 



68 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Women always intrigue privately against the higher 
souls of their husbands; they want to cheat them out of 
their future for the sake of a painless and comfortable 
present, i, sis 

It is laughable when a company of paupers decree the 
abolition of the right of inheritance, and it is not less 
laughable when childless persons labour for the practical 
law-giving of a country: they have not enough ballast 
in their ship to sail safely over the ocean of the future. 
But it seems equally senseless if a man who has chosen 
for his mission the widest knowledge and estimation of 
universal existence, burdens himself with personal con- 
siderations of a family, with the support, protection, and 
care of wife and child, and in front of his telescope hangs 
that gloomy veil through which hardly a ray from the 
distant firmament can penetrate. Thus I, too, agree with 
the opinion that in matters of the highest philosophy all 
married men are to be suspected, i, 3 i6 

A higher culture can only originate where there are 
two distinct castes of society: that of the working class, 
and that of the leisured class who are capable of true leis- 
ure ; or, more strongly expressed, the caste of compulsory 
labour and the caste of free labour. 1, 319 

Against war it may be said that it makes the victor 
stupid and the vanquished revengeful. In favour of 
war it may be said that it barbarises in both its above- 
named results, and thereby makes more natural ; it is the 
sleep or the winter period of culture; man emerges from 
it with greater strength for good and for evil, t, 322 

As regards Socialism, in the eyes of those who always 
consider higher utility, if it is really a rising against their 
oppressors of those who for centuries have been oppressed 
and downtrodden, there is no problem of right involved 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 69 

(notwithstanding the ridiculous, effeminate question, 
"How far ought we to grant its demands?") but only a 
problem of power ("How far can we make use of its de- 
mands'?") . . . i, 322 

Well may noble (if not exactly very intelligent) repre- 
sentatives of the governing classes asseverate: "We 
will treat men equally and grant them equal rights" ; so 
far a socialistic mode of thought which is based on jus- 
tice is possible; but, as has been said, only within the 
ranks of the governing class, which in this case practises 
justice with sacrifices and abnegations. On the other 
hand, to demand equality of rights, as do the Socialists 
of the subject caste, is by no means the outcome of jus- 
tice, but of covetousness. If you expose bloody pieces 
of flesh to a beast, and withdraw them again, until it 
finally begins to roar, do you think that roaring implies 

jUStke? i, 326-327 

When the Socialists point out that the division of 
property at the present day is the consequence of count- 
less deeds of injustice and violence, and, in sum?na, re- 
pudiate obligation to anything with so unrighteous a 
basis, they only perceive something isolated. The entire 
past of ancient civilisation is built up on violence, slav- 
ery, deception, and error; we, however, cannot annul our- 
selves, the heirs of all these conditions, nay, the concres- 
cences of all this past, and are not entitled to demand the 
withdrawal of a single fragment thereof, i, 327 

Those who are bent on revolutionising society may be 
divided into those who seek something for themselves 
thereby and those who seek something for their children 
and grandchildren. The latter are the more dangerous, 
for they have the belief and the good conscience of dis- 
interestedness, i, 329 



70 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The fact that we regard the gratification of vanity as 
of more account than all other forms of well-being (se- 
curity, position, and pleasures of all sorts), is shown to 
a ludicrous extent by every one wishing for the abolition 
of slavery and utterly abhorring to put any one into this 
position. . . . We protest in the name of the "dignity of 
man"; but, expressed more simply, that is just our darling 
vanity which feels non-equality, and inferiority in public 
estimation, to be the hardest lot of all. i, 330 

In all institutions into which the sharp breeze of pub- 
lic criticism does not penetrate an innocent corruption 
grows up like a fungus (for instance, in learned bodies 
and senates). 1, 336 

The belief in a divine regulation of political affairs, 
in a mystery in the existence of the State, is of religious 
origin: if religion disappears, the State will inevita- 
bly lose its old veil of Isis, and will no longer arouse 
veneration. The sovereignty of the people, looked 
at closely, serves also to dispel the final fascination and 
superstition in the realm of these sentiments; modern 
democracy is the historical form of the decay of the 
State. 1, 342 

Socialism is the fantastic younger brother of almost 
decrepit despotism, which it wants to succeed; its efforts 
are, therefore, in the deepest sense reactionary. For it 
desires such an amount of State Power as only despotism 
has possessed, — indeed, it outdoes all the past, in that 
it aims at the complete annihilation of the individual, 
whom it deems an unauthorised luxury of nature, which 
is to be improved by it into an appropriate organ of the 
general community. Owing to its relationship, it al- 
ways appears in proximity to excessive developments of 
power, like the old typical socialist, Plato, at the court 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 71 

of the Sicilian tyrant; it desires (and under certain cir- 
cumstances furthers) the Caesarian despotism of this cen- 
tury, because, as has been said, it would like to become 
its heir. But even this inheritance would not suffice for 
its objects, it requires the most submissive prostration of 
all citizens before the absolute State, such as has never 
yet been realised, and as it can no longer even count upon 
the old religious piety towards the State, but must rather 
strive involuntarily and continuously for the abolition 
thereof, — because it strives for the abolition of all exist- 
ing States, — it can only hope for existence occasionally, 
here and there for short periods, by means of the ex- 
tremest terrorism. It is therefore silently preparing it- 
self for reigns of terror, and drives the word "justice" 
like a nail into the heads of the half-cultured masses in 
order to deprive them completely of their understanding 
(after they had already suffered seriously from the half- 
culture), and to provide them with a good conscience for 
the bad game they are to play. Socialism may serve to 
teach, very brutally and impressively, the danger of all 
accumulations of State power, and may serve so far to 
inspire distrust of the State itself. i, 343-344 

It is nothing but fanaticism and beautiful soulism to 
expect very much (or even, much only) from humanity 
when it has forgotten how to wage war. 1, 349 

Wealth necessarily creates an aristocracy of race, for 
it permits the choice of the most beautiful women and the 
engagement of the best teachers ; it allows a man cleanli- 
ness, time for physical exercises, and, above all, immunity 
from dulling physical labour. 1, 351 

Public opinion — private laziness, i, 354 

Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than 
lies, i, 355 



72 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The unreasonableness of a thing is no argument against 
its existence, but rather a condition thereof, i, 3 ei 

People who talk about their importance to mankind 
have a feeble conscience for common bourgeois rectitude, 
keeping of contracts, promises, etc. i, 363 

The demand to be loved is the greatest of presump- 
tions. 1, 363 

When a man roars with laughter he surpasses all the 
animals by his vulgarity. i, 369 

The first opinion that occurs to us when we are sud- 
denly asked about anything is not usually our own, but 
only the current opinion belonging to our caste, position, 
or family; our own opinions seldom float on the sur- 
face. 1, 372 

Nobody talks more passionately of his rights than he 
who, in the depths of his soul, is doubtful about them. 

1, 380. 

Unconsciously we seek the principles and opinions 
which are suited to our temperament, so that at last it 
seems as if these principles and opinions had formed our 
character and given it support and stability, whereas 
exactly the contrary has taken place. Our thoughts and 
judgments are, apparently, to be taken subsequently as 
the causes of our nature, but as a matter of fact our 
nature is the cause of our so thinking and judging, i, ss* 

The man of unpleasant character, full of distrust, 
envious of the success of fellow-competitors and neigh- 
bours, violent and enraged at divergent opinions, shows 
that he belongs to an earlier grade of culture, and is, there- 
fore, an atavism; for the way in which he behaves to 
people was right and suitable only for an age of club- 
law; he is an atavist. The man of a different character, 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 73 

rich in sympathy, winning friends everywhere, finding 
all that is growing and becoming amiable, rejoicing at 
the honours and successes of others and claiming no priv- 
ilege of solely knowing the truth, but full of a modest 
distrust, — he is a forerunner who presses upwards towards 
a higher human culture, i, 3 88 

He who has not passed through different phases of 
conviction, but sticks to the faith in whose net he was 
first caught, is, under all circumstances, just on account 
of this unchangeableness, a representative of atavistic 
culture. . . . 1, 400 

Opinions evolve out of passions; indolence of intellect 
allows those to congeal into convictions, i, 404 

He who has attained intellectual emancipation to any 
extent cannot, for a long time, regard himself otherwise 
than as a wanderer on the face of the earth — and not 
even as a traveller towards a final goal, for there is no 
such thing. i, 4 os 

If we make it clear to any one that, strictly, he can 
never speak of truth, but only of probability and of its 
degrees, we generally discover, from the undisguised joy 
of our pupil, how greatly men prefer the uncertainty of 
their intellectual horizon, and how in their heart of hearts 
they hate truth because of its definiteness. u, 15 

With all that enthusiasts say in favour of their gospel 
or their master they are defending themselves, however 
much they comport themselves as the judges and not the 
accused: because they are involuntarily reminded almost 
at every moment that they are exceptions and have to 
assert their legitimacy. 11, is 

The belief in truth begins with the doubt of all truths 
in which one has previously believed, u, 20 



74 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Philosophic brains will ... be distinguished from 
others by their disbelief in the metaphysical significance 
of morality, n, 29 

You hold that sacrifice is the hallmark of moral ac- 
tion 4 ? — Just consider whether in every action that is 
done with deliberation, in the best as in the worst, there 
be not a sacrifice, n, 30 

It is more convenient to follow one's conscience than 
one's intelligence, for at every failure conscience finds an 
excuse and an encouragement in itself. That is why 
there are so many conscientious and so few intelligent 
people, it, 33 

All moralists are shy, because they know they are con- 
founded with spies and traitors, so soon as their penchant 
is noticed. Besides, they are generally conscious of being 
impotent in action, for in the midst of work the motives 
of their activity almost withdraw their attention from 
the work. 11, 42 

No one accuses without an underlying notion of pun- 
ishment and revenge, even when he accuses his fate or 
himself. All complaint is accusation, all self -congratu- 
lation is praise. Whether we do one or the other, we 
always make some one responsible, a, a 

We must know how to emerge cleaner from unclean 
conditions, and, if necessary, how to wash ourselves even 
with dirty water. 11, a 

The origin of morality may be traced to two ideas: 
"The community is of more value than the individual," 
and "The permanent interest is to be preferred to the 
temporary." The conclusion drawn is that the perma- 
nent interest of the community is unconditionally to be 
set above the temporary interest of the individual, es- 
pecially his momentary well-being, but also his perma- 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 75 

nent interest and even the prolongation of his exist- 
ence. 11, 46-47 

We should not shrink from treading the road to a vir- 
tue, even when we see clearly that nothing but egotism, 
and accordingly utility, personal comfort, fear, consid- 
erations of health, reputation, or glory, are the impelling 
motives. These motives are styled ignoble and selfish. 
Very well, but if they stimulate us to some virtue — for 
example, self-denial, dutifulness, order, thrift, measure, 
and moderation — let us listen to them, whatever their 
epithets may be! u, 48 

The tendency of a talent towards moral subjects, char- 
acters, motives, towards the "beautiful soul" of the work 
of art, is often only a glass eye put on by the artist who 
lacks a beautiful soul, u, 78 

Art is above all and meant to embellish life, to make 
us ourselves endurable and if possible agreeable in the 
eyes of others. With this task in view, art moderates 
us and holds us in restraint, creates forms of intercourse, 
binds over the uneducated to laws of decency, cleanli- 
ness, politeness, well-timed speech and silence. Hence 
art must conceal or transfigure everything that is ugly — 
the painful, terrible, and disgusting elements which in 
spite of every effort will always break out afresh in ac- 
cordance with the very origin of human nature. Art 
has to perform this duty especially in regard to the pas- 
sions and spiritual agonies and anxieties, and to cause 
the significant factor to shine through unavoidable or 
unconquerable ugliness. To this great, super-great task 
the so-called art proper, that of works of art, is a mere 
accessory. A man who feels within himself a surplus of 
such powers of embellishment, concealment, and trans- 
figuration will finally seek to unburden himself of this 



76 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

surplus in works of art. The same holds good, under 
special circumstances, of a whole nation, n, 91-92 

On great minds is bestowed the terrifying all-too- 
human of their natures, their blindnesses, deformities, 
and extravagances, so that their more powerful, easily 
all-too-powerful influence may be continually held within 
bounds through the distrust aroused by such qualities. 
11, 100 

Original minds are distinguished not by being the first 
to see a new thing, but by seeing the old, well-known 
thing, which is seen and overlooked by every one, as 
something new. The first discoverer is usually that quite 
ordinary and unintellectual visionary — chance, a, 105 

The obvious satisfaction of the individual with his 
own form excites imitation and gradually creates the 
form of the many — that is, fashion, a, 107 

Who of us could dare to call himself a "free spirit" 
if he could not render homage after his fashion, by taking 
on his own shoulders a portion of that burden of public 
dislike and abuse, to men to whom this name is attached 
as a reproach? 11, ios 

Immediate self -observation is not enough, by a long 
way, to enable us to learn to know ourselves. We need 
history, for the past continues to flow through us in a 
hundred channels. We ourselves are, after all, nothing 
but our own sensation at every moment of this continued 

floW. ii, 117 

To young and fresh barbarian nations . . . Christian- 
ity is a poison, n, 120 

Faith, indeed, has up to the present not been able to 
move real mountains, although I do not know who as- 
sumed that it could. But it can put mountains where 
there was none. 11. 121 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 77 

Among travellers we may distinguish five grades. 
The first and lowest grade is of those who travel and are 
seen — they become really travelled and are, as it were, 
blind. Next come those who really see the world. The 
third class experience the results of their seeing. The 
fourth weave their experience into their life and carry it 
with them henceforth. Lastly, there are some men of 
the highest strength who, as soon as they have returned 
home, must finally and necessarily work out in their lives 
and productions all the things seen that they have experi- 
enced and incorporated in themselves. — Like these five 
species of travellers, all mankind goes through the whole 
pilgrimage of life, the lowest as purely passive, the high- 
est as those who act and live out their lives without keep- 
ing back any residue of inner experiences, n, 125 

To treat all men with equal good-humour, and to be 
kind without distinctions of persons, may arise as much 
from a profound contempt for mankind as from an in- 
grained love of humanity, n, 127 

Towards science women and self-seeking artists enter- 
tain a feeling that is composed of envy and sentimental- 
ity, il, 134 

The intellectual strength of a woman is best proved by 
the fact that she offers her own intellect as a sacrifice out 
of love for a man and his intellect, and that nevertheless 
in the new domain, which was previously foreign to her 
nature, a second intellect at once arises as an af tergrowth 5 
to which the man's mind impels her. n, u « 

By women Nature shows how far she has hitherto 
achieved her task of fashioning humanity, by man she 
shows what she has had overcome, and what she still 
proposes to do for humanity, n, 137 

Whence arises the sudden passion of a man for a 



78 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

woman, a passion so deep, so vital*? Least of all from 
sensuality only : but when a man finds weakness, need of 
help, and high spirits united in the same creature, he suf- 
fers a sort of overflowing of soul, and is touched and 
offended at the same moment. At this point arises the 
source of great love, u, i 4 o 

Profundity of thought belongs to youth, clarity of 
thought to old age. n, i 4 o 

The only remedy against Socialism that still lies in 
your power is to avoid provoking Socialism — in other 
words, to live in moderation and contentment, to prevent 
as far as possible all lavish display, and to aid the State 
as far as possible in its taxing of all superfluities and 
luxuries, n, 145 

Only a man of intellect should hold property: other- 
wise property is dangerous to the community. For the 
owner, not knowing how to make use of the leisure which 
his possessions might secure to him, will continue to 
strive after more property. ... It excites envy in the 
poor and uncultured — who at bottom always envy cul- 
ture and see no mask in the mask — and gradually paves 
the way for a social revolution. 11, 147-148 

Only up to a certain point does possession make men 
feel freer and more independent; one step farther, and 
possession becomes lord, the possessor a slave, u, 14? 

The governments of the great States have two instru- 
ments for keeping the people independent, in fear and 
obedience: a coarser, the army, and a more refined, the 
school. 11, 152 

To call a thing good not a day longer than it appears 
to us good, and above all not a day earlier — that is the 
only way to keep joy pure. 11, us 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 79 

To honour and acknowledge even the bad, when it 
pleases one, and to have no conception of how one could 
be ashamed of being pleased thereat, is the mark of sov- 
ereignty in things great and small, n, 158-159 

When life has treated us in true robber fashion, and 
has taken away all that it could of honour, joys, connec- 
tions, health, and property of every kind, we perhaps 
discover in the end, after the first shock, that we are 
richer than before. For now we know for the first time 
what is so peculiarly ours that no robber hand can touch 
it, and perhaps, after all the plunder and devastation, we 
come forward with the airs of a mighty real estate 
owner, n, 162 

You rank far below others when you try to establish 
the exception and they the rule. 11, v&i 

The most senile thought ever conceived about men lies 
in the famous saying, "The ego is always hateful," the 
most childish in the still more famous saying, "Love thy 
neighbour as thyself." — With the one knowledge of men 
has ceased, with the other it has not yet begun, n, 172 

You find your burden of life too heavy 4 ? Then you 
must increase the burden of your life. 11, its 

That the world is not the abstract essence of an eternal 
reasonableness is sufficiently proved by the fact that that 
bit of the world which we know — I mean our human rea- 
son — is none too reasonable. And if this is not eternally 
and wholly wise and reasonable, the rest of the world 
will not be so either, 11, is* 

There exists a simulated contempt for all things that 
mankind actually holds most important, for all everyday 
matters. For instance, we say "we only eat to live" — an 
abominable Me, like that which speaks of the procreation 



80 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of children as the real purpose of all sexual pleasure. 
Conversely, the reverence for "the most important 
things" is hardly ever quite genuine, n, iss 

The doctrine of free will is an invention of the ruling 
classes, u, i 90 

If a God created the world, he created man to be his 
ape, as a perpetual source of amusement in the midst of 
his rather tedious eternities, n, 193 

The robber and the man of power who promises to 
protect a community from robbers are perhaps at bottom 
beings of the same mould, save that the latter attains his 
ends by other means than the former — that is to say, 
through regular imposts paid to him by the community, 
and no longer through forced contributions, n, 200 

The sting of conscience, like the gnawing of a dog at a 
stone, is mere foolishness, n, 217 

Rights may be traced to traditions, traditions to mo- 
mentary agreements. 11, 217 

Morality is primarily a means of preserving the com- 
munity and saving it from destruction. Next it is a 
means of maintaining the community on a certain plane 
and in a certain degree of benevolence. Its motives are 
fear and hope, and these in a more coarse, rough, and 
powerful form, the more the propensity towards the per- 
verse, one-sided, and personal still persists. 11, 221 

Moral prohibitions, like those of the Decalogue, are 
only suited to ages when reason lies vanquished, u, 223 

It is difficult to explain why pity is so highly prized, 
just as we need to explain why the unselfish man, who is 
originally despised or feared as being artful, is praised. 

ii, 224 

The sum-total of our conscience is all that has regu- 
larly been demanded of us, without reason, in the days of 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 81 

our childhood, by people whom we respected or feared. 

il, 224 

Every word is a preconceived judgment, u, 225 
The fatalism of the Turk has this fundamental defect, 
that it contrasts man and fate as two distinct things. 
Man, says this doctrine, may struggle against fate and 
try to baffle it, but in the end fate will always gain the 
victory. Hence the most rational course is to resign 
oneself or to live as one pleases. As a matter of fact, 
every man is himself a piece of fate. When he thinks 
that he is struggling against fate in this way, fate is 
accomplishing its ends even in that struggle. The com- 
bat is a fantasy, but so is the resignation in fate — all 
these fantasies are included in fate. — The fear felt by 
most people of the doctrine that denies the freedom of 
the will is a fear of the fatalism of the Turk. They 
imagine that man will become weakly resigned and will 
stand before the future with folded hands, because he 
cannot alter anything of the future. Or that he will 
give a free rein to his caprices, because the predestined 
cannot be made worse by that course. The follies of 
men are as much a piece of fate as are his wise actions, 
and even that fear of belief in fate is a fatality. You 
yourself, you poor timid creature, are that indomitable 
Moira, which rules even the Gods; whatever may hap- 
pen, you are a curse or a blessing, and in any case the 
fetters wherein the strongest lies bound : in you the whole 
future of the human world is predestined, and it is no 
use for you to be frightened of yourself, n, 228-229 

In the first era of the higher humanity courage is ac- 
counted the most noble virtue, in the next justice, in the 
third temperance, in the fourth wisdom, n, 230 

Superficial, inexact observation sees contrasts every- 



82 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

where in nature (for instance, "hot and cold"), where 
there are no contrasts, only differences of degree, u, 231 

On two hypotheses alone is there any sense in 
prayer, that not quite extinct custom of olden times. It 
would have to be possible either to fix or alter the will 
of the godhead, and the devotee would have to know best 
himself what he needs and should really desire. Both 
hypotheses, axiomatic and traditional in all other re- 
ligions, are denied by Christianity, n, 235-236 

Distrust is the touchstone for the gold of certainty. 

ii, 266 

Wrath and punishment are our inheritance from the 
animals. Man does not become of age until he has re- 
stored to the animals this gift of the cradle. — Herein lies 
buried one of the mightiest ideas that men can have, the 
idea of a progress of all progresses. — Let us go forward 
together a few millenniums, my friends! There is still 
reserved for mankind a great deal of joy, the very scent 
of which has not yet been wafted to the men of our day ! 
Indeed, we may promise ourselves this joy, nay summon 
and conjure it up as a necessary thing, so long as the 
development of human reason does not stand still. Some 
day we shall no longer be reconciled to the logical sin 
that lurks in all wrath and punishment, whether exercised 
by the individual or by society — some day, when head 
and heart have learnt to live as near together as they now 
are far apart. That they no longer stand so far apart as 
they did originally is fairly palpable from a glance at 
the whole course of humanity. The individual who can 
review a life of introspective work will become conscious 
of the rapprochement arrived at, with a proud delight at 
the distance he has bridged, in order that he may there- 
upon venture upon more ample hopes, n, 284-285 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 83 

Natural death is independent of all reason and is 
really an irrational death, in which the pitiable sub- 
stance of the shell determines how long the kernel is to 
exist. . . . ii, 286 

The more fully and thoroughly we live, the more 
ready we are to sacrifice life for a single pleasurable 
emotion, u, 2 ss 

All intellectual movements whereby the great may 
hope to rob and the small to save, are sure to prosper. 

ii, 311-312 

The desire for victory and pre-eminence is an ineradi- 
cable trait of human nature, older and more primitive 
than any respect of or joy in equality, n, 312 

If all alms were given only out of compassion, the 
whole tribe of beggars would long since have died of 
starvation. . . . The greatest of almsgivers is cowardice. 

ii, 317 

The exertion of power is laborious and demands cour- 
age. That is why so many do not assert their most valid 
rights, because their rights are a kind of power, and they 
are too lazy or too cowardly to exercise them. Indul- 
gence and patience are the names given to the vir- 
tues that cloak these faults, n, 319-320 

"Stupid as a man," say the women; "Cowardly as a 
woman," say the men. Stupidity in a woman is un- 
feminine. n, 328 

All political work, even with great statesmen, is an im- 
provisation that trusts to luck, n, 332 

The so-called armed peace that prevails at present in 
all countries is a sign of a bellicose disposition, of a dis- 
position that trusts neither itself nor its neighbour, and, 
partly from hate, partly from fear, refuses to lay down 
its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and 



84 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

twice as far better to perish than to make oneself hated 
and feared — this must some day become the supreme 
maxim of every political community! . . . n, 336 

In order that property may henceforth inspire more 
confidence and become more moral, we should keep open 
all the paths of work for small fortunes, but should pre- 
vent the effortless and sudden acquisition of wealth. Ac- 
cordingly, we should take all the branches of transport 
and trade which favour the accumulation of large for- 
tunes — especially, therefore, the money market — out of 
the hands of private persons or private companies, and 
look upon those who own too much, just as upon those 
who own nothing, as types fraught with danger to the 
community. 11, 340 

If we try to determine the value of labour by the 
amount of time, industry, good or bad will, constraint, 
inventiveness or laziness, honesty or make-believe be- 
stowed upon it, the valuation can never be a just one. 
For the whole personality would have to be thrown into 
the scale, and this is impossible, n, 340 

The exploitation of the worker was, as we now under- 
stand, a piece of folly, a robbery at the expense of the 
future, a jeopardisation of society. We almost have the 
war now, and in any case the expense of maintaining 
peace, of concluding treaties and winning confidence, will 
henceforth be very great, because the folly of the ex- 
ploiters was very great and long-lasting, n, 8 «. 

The masses are as far as possible removed from Social- 
ism as a doctrine of altering the acquistion of property. 
If once they get the steering-wheel into their hands, 
through great majorities in their Parliaments, they will 
attack with progressive taxation the whole dominant sys- 
tem of capitalists, merchants, and financiers, and will in 



"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN" 85 

fact slowly create a middle class which may forget Social- 
ism like a disease that has been overcome. 11, 343 

The Two Principles of the New Life. — First Prin- 
ciple: to arrange one's life on the most secure and tan- 
gible basis, not as hitherto upon the most distant, unde- 
termined, and cloudy foundation. Second Principle: 
to establish the rank of the nearest and nearer things, 
and of the more and less secure, before one arranges one's 
life and directs it to a final end. 11, 351 

Through the certain prospect of death a precious, 
fragrant drop of frivolity might be mixed with every day 
life — and now, you singular druggist-souls, you have 
made of death a drop of poison, unpleasant to taste, 
which makes the whole of life hideous, u, 355 

We speak of Nature, and, in doing so, forget our- 
selves: we ourselves are Nature, quand meme. 11,356-357 

We should not let ourselves be burnt for our opinions 
— we are not so certain of them as all that. But we 
might let ourselves be burnt for the right of possessing 
and changing our opinions, u, 35s 

Man has been bound with many chains, in order that 
he may forget to comport himself like an animal. And 
indeed he has become more gentle, more intellectual, 
more joyous, more meditative than any animal. But 
now he still suffers from having carried his chains so 
long, from having been so long without pure air and free 
movement — these chains, however, are, as I repeat again 
and again, the ponderous and significant errors of moral, 
religious, and metaphysical ideas. Only when the dis- 
ease of chains is overcome is the first great goal reached — 
the separation of man from the brute, h, 362-363 



Ill 

"The Dawn of Day" 

THE first work to follow the transitional and pre- 
paratory criticism and comment of "Human, All- 
Too-Human" was "The Dawn of Day" ("Morgen- 
roten"). Such a treatise dealing with Nietzsche's con- 
structive and analytical thinking, was no doubt expected. 
No man could so effectively rattle the bones of the older 
gods, could so wantonly trample down the tenets 
strengthened by the teachings of centuries, could so ruth- 
lessly annihilate the accepted ethical standards and reli- 
gious formulae, unless there existed back of his bludgeon 
a positivity of will which implied creation and construc- 
tion. Nietzsche realised the significance of this new 
book, and at its completion, early in 1881, sent an urgent 
letter to his publisher requesting its immediate printing. 
The publisher, however, failing to attach any importance 
to the document, delayed its issuance until late in the 
summer, at which time its appearance caused no excite- 
ment and but little comment. 

"The Dawn of Day" nevertheless ranks among Nie- 
tzsche's best works. Its title, frankly symbolic, reflects 
the nature of its contents. It was the beginning of Nie- 
tzsche's positive philosophy. In it he begins his actual 
work of reconstruction. Many of its passages form the 
foundation of those later books wherein he augmented 
and developed his theories. However, there is here no 

radical change in his thought. The passages are logical 

86 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 87 

sequences to that simple nihilism of prevailing customs 
which occupied him in his former essays. In his earliest 
beginnings we can see evidences of the direction his 
teachings were to take. His books up to the last were 
mainly developments and elaborations of the thoughts 
which were in his mind from the first. Though often 
vaguely conceived and unco-ordinated, these thoughts 
were the undeniable property of his own thinking. Al- 
though there have been many attempts to trace eclectic 
influences to the men of his time, and especially to 
Schopenhauer, the results of such critical endeavours have 
been easily controverted by the plainest of internal evi- 
dence. The philosophical Nietzsche has his roots firmly 
implanted in the scholastic Nietzsche; and though in 
superficial and non-important phases of his thought he 
changed from time to time, the most diligent research 
fails to reveal direct contradictions in any of his funda- 
mental doctrines. 

In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche goes again into the 
origin of morality. He carries his analyses further and 
supports them by additional enquiries and by more com- 
plicated processes of reasoning. Having ascertained the 
place which morals assume in the human scale and de- 
termined their relation to racial necessities, he points out 
that their application as permanent and unalterable man- 
dates works havoc in any environment save that in which 
they were conceived. Inasmuch as all morality is at bot- 
tom but an expression of expediency, it follows that, since 
the means of expediency change under varying condi- 
tions, morality must change to meet the constantly meta- 
morphosing conditions of society. And since the condi- 
tions of life are never the same in all nations, moral codes 
must likewise adapt themselves to geography in order to 



88 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

fulfil their function. The existing code of morals, 
namely: the Christian doctrine, grew out of conditions 
which were not only different from those in which we live 
to-day, but in many instances diametrically opposed to 
them. Nietzsche saw a grave danger in adhering to an 
ethical system which was not relative to the modern 
man, and argues that the result of such a morality would 
produce effects which would have no intelligent bearing 
on the racial problems of the present day. Knowing the 
deep-rooted superstition in man regarding the "divine" 
origin of moral laws, he undertakes the task of relating 
all ancient codes to the racial conditions existent at their 
inception, thus constructing a human origin for them. 

Christianity, being the greatest moral force of the day, 
attracted Nietzsche's attention the most, and in "The 
Dawn of Day" much space is devoted to a consideration 
of it. While in tone these paragraphs are milder than 
those which followed in "The Antichrist," they never- 
theless are among the profoundest criticisms which Nie- 
tzsche made of Nazarene morality. Though only a por- 
tion of the aphorisms contained in this work are devoted 
to an evaluation of theological modes of conduct, stum- 
bling blocks are thrown in the path of an acceptance of 
Jewish ethics which the most sapient of modern ecclesi- 
astics have been unable to remove. Out of certain 
aphorisms found here grew "The Antichrist" which is 
the most terrible and effective excoriation that Christian- 
ity has ever called forth. Beginning on page 66 of "The 
Dawn of Day" there appears one of Nietzsche's most 
fundamental passages dealing with Christianity. It is 
called "The First Christian," and is an analysis of the 
Apostle Paul. No theological dialectician has been able 
to answer it. Here is an aphorism so illuminating, so 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 89 

profound, yet so brief, as to dazzle completely the lay 
mind. 

However, Christianity is but one of the subjects dealt 
with in "The Dawn of Day." The book covers the whole 
field of modern morality. Says Nietzsche in his intro- 
duction: "In this book we find a 'subterrestrial' at work, 
digging, mining, undermining. ... I went down into 
the deepest depths; I tunnelled to the very bottom; I 
started to investigate and unearth an old faith which for 
thousands of years we philosophers used to build on as 
the safest of all foundations. ... I began to undermine 
our faith in morals." It is true that from the beginning 
of history there has existed a ruling scale of values de- 
termining the acts of humanity. Morality implies the 
domination of certain classes which, in order to inspire 
reverence in arbitrary dictates, have invested their codes 
with an authority other than a human one. Thus has 
criticism been stifled. Morality has had the means of 
intimidation on its side, and has discouraged investigation 
by exercising severe penalties. Consequently morality 
has accumulated and grown, gathered power and swept 
on without its thinkers, its philosophers or its analysts. 
Of all the sciences, the science of conduct has been the 
last to attract investigators. 

The vogue of that style of philosophy which was 
founded on the tradition of speculation and honeycombed 
with presuppositions, did not pass out until the advent 
of Darwin's evolutionism. But even the inauguration 
of biology and sociology did not entirely eliminate the 
metaphysical assumption from constructive thinking. 
The scientists themselves, not excluding Darwin, hesi- 
tated to acknowledge the laws of natural selection and 
of the survival of the fit. Neo-Lamarckism was but one 



90 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of the reactions against this tough and unpleasant theory. 
Alfred Russel Wallace and, to take an even more sig- 
nificant figure, Herbert Spencer, endeavoured to refute 
the possibility of a biological basis in thought and thus 
to avoid an acquiescence to the Darwinian research. 
John Fiske, an avowed evolutionist, indirectly repudi- 
ated the scientific origin of philosophy; and likewise most 
of the lesser thinkers, following the exposition of Dar- 
win's theories, refused to apply to man the biological 
laws governing the animal kingdom. Balfour and Hux- 
ley sensed the incongruities and variances in this new 
mode of thinking, and strove to bridge the chasm between 
natural science and human conduct, and to construct a 
system of ethics which would possess a logical and natu- 
ralistic foundation. But in both cases the question was 
begged. We find Balfour building up a moral system 
which, while it did not deny Darwinism, had for its end 
the destruction, or at least the alteration, of natural laws. 
And Huxley defines human progress as an overcoming of 
biological principles. Thus, even in the most material- 
istic of physio-psychologists, the subjugation of natural 
laws was the primary thesis. Biology, therefore, instead 
of being used as a basis to further philosophy, was con- 
sidered an obstacle which philosophy had to overcome. 
Nietzsche saw that a science of conduct based on nat- 
ural and physiological laws was a possible and logical 
thing. And in him, for the first time in the history of 
philosophical thought, do we find a scholarly and at the 
same time an intellectual critic of authorised standards. 
The biological point of view was never lost sight of by 
him. If at times he seemed to abandon it, it was but for 
a brief period; he ever came back to it. Even his most 
abstract passages have their feet implanted in the fact 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 91 

that all phenomena are answerable to the law of vital 
fitness. Before the tribunal of biology Nietzsche ar- 
raigns and tries every phase of his thought, whether it 
deals with physical phenomena, ethical conduct or with 
abstract reasoning. Philosophy, for centuries divorced 
from science, is here clothed in the garments of scientific 
experimentation; a relationship is established between 
these two planes of rationalism and empiricism which 
have always been considered by other thinkers as detached 
and unrelated. Nor does Nietzsche ally himself, either 
consciously or unconsciously, with such philosophers as 
Bruno and Plato (who stood between the scientific 
thinkers on the one hand and the abstract dialecticians 
on the other), and attempt a formulation of a system of 
thought founded on intuitive processes. Such poetic 
conceptions had no fascination for him except as they 
were directly applicable to the problem of the universe. 
Those men who busied themselves with the mere theory 
of knowledge he held as supererogatory cobweb-spinners ; 
and even in the realm of metaphysicians such as Des- 
cartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, he dallied but casually. 
His aim was to relate all thought to determinable values 
of life. 

In his introduction Nietzsche calls morality the Circe 
of philosophies, and adds : "For, to what is it due that, 
from Plato onwards, all the philosophic architects in 
Europe have built in vain*?" Later beneath his analy- 
sis — which never assumes the negative qualities of the 
metaphysical — the moral phenomenon goes to pieces, not 
by a few simple strokes, nor yet by the effrontery of 
cynicism or pessimism, but by the most careful and in- 
tricate surgery. He points out the great heretics of his- 
tory as examples of the men who, looked at through 



92 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the eyes of contemporaries, were "wicked" men, but who, 
under different environmental circumstances, were con- 
sidered "good." He denies the static hypothesis on 
which morality is built, and postulates the theory that 
immorality is not without its place in the development 
of the reason. He is constantly attempting to translate 
the existing moral values into terms of their true nature, 
not necessarily into immoralities, but into natural un- 
moralities. The accepted virtues, such as pity, honesty, 
faith, obedience, service, loyalty and self-sacrifice, are 
questioned in their relation to racial needs; and modern 
attitudes toward all human activities are traced to their 
causes and judged as to their influence. 

The research work in the present book differs from 
that contained in previous volumes. Heretofore Nie- 
tzsche indulged in inquiry without speculation; he dealt 
mainly with generalities. His analyses were along broad 
lines of human conduct. He confined himself for the 
most part to principles. But in "The Dawn of Day" 
these principles are balanced with existent morality. 
Specific modes of moral and ethical endeavour are 
weighed against expediency. Nietzsche presents a diag- 
nosis of the fundamental nature of society to-day, and 
discovers many contradictions and inconsistencies be- 
tween modern social needs and those virtues held in the 
highest reverence. He finds that deportmental means 
made use of by weak and subjugated peoples of ancient 
times to protect themselves against hostile invaders, are 
retained and practised to-day by nations whose position 
has been reversed to one of domination. In short, he 
points out that certain moralities have, by the alteration 
of national and racial conditions, become irrelevancies. 
Consequently there is often a compromise between ethical 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 93 

beliefs and ethical practices — a compromise made neces- 
sary by the demands of social intercourse. Even when 
the practice of these ancient moralities is conscientiously 
indulged in, Nietzsche denies their adequacy in coping 
with modern conditions, pointing out specific instances 
in which necessity and habit are constantly impinging. 
For instance, the softer virtues of a democratic and so- 
cialistic morality are shown to be desirable only in weak- 
ened nations where the hardier virtues of egotism, cru- 
elty, efficiency, hard-mindedness, selfishness and retalia- 
tion would work directly against preservation. 

Out of these conclusions grows a plea for individual- 
ism, and out of this individualism the superman can be 
seen rearing his head above the horizon of present-day 
humanity. The qualities of this man of the future are 
defined, and a finger is pointed along the necessary lines 
of racial culture. Nietzsche's first, definite voicing of 
marriage ideals follows in the train of the superman's 
appearance, and the first comments of this philosopher in 
his criticism of woman are set down. In this latter re- 
gard Nietzsche has been unfairly interpreted by those 
who have considered his attitude toward woman super- 
ficially or without relating it to his general theories. It 
would be well therefore for the student to withhold judg- 
ment in this particular until the various elements of Nie- 
tzsche's philosophical system have been co-ordinated and 
understood. Woman plays an important, if small, part 
in his writings, and his passages dealing with women 
should be carefully weighed in conjunction with his 
theory of the superman. 

, In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche's conception of 
class distinction is defined and related to his later teach- 
ings. Throughout his analyses runs a subtle undercur- 



94 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

rent of his doctrine, of social segregation which finds 
definite expression toward the end of the volume where 
modern socialism, with its altruism and philanthropy, is 
traced to its birth in Nazarene morality. In place of 
this present popular form of ethics Nietzsche proposes a 
social regime in which aristocratic culture will be set 
apart from mere utilitarian culture by very definite boun- 
daries. He argues that not only is this disassociation in 
accord with the instincts of mankind, but that, as a work- 
able theorem, it adequately answers the needs of pres- 
ent conditions. The slave-morality and the master- 
morality which he develops in his later works are de- 
fined tentatively and suggested by inference in many of 
the aphorisms. Out of this conception grew his domi- 
nant principle of the "will to power," and in "The Dawn 
of Day" we find this principle set forth in adequate defi- 
nition for the first time, although the development of 
the idea is left till later. However, Nietzsche makes 
clear its point of divergence from the Schopenhauerian 
theory of the "will to live" as well as from the Darwinian 
theory of the survival of the fittest. 

But it is not alone abstract theory that occupies the 
pages of this book. Nietzsche is never the mere meta- 
physician battling in an unreal world. There are few 
dark closets and secret passageways in his thought. Be- 
yond a metaphysical hypothesis he does not go. He ad- 
heres to demonstrable formulas, and reasons along lines 
of strictest reality. The practical man he holds in high 
esteem, and constantly praises the advance of science. 
He devotes pages to the blowing to pieces of metaphysical 
air-castles. But, as I have previously pointed out, he is 
in no sense of the word a materialist; nor is his assump- 
tion of the world that of the realists. Life to Nietzsche 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 95 

is an eternal struggle toward — no goal. The lessons the 
world has to teach are as so much false doctrine. The 
meaning of life — the so-called absolute truth — is but a 
chimera. Intelligence is a process, not an ultimatum. 
The truth is mobile and dual, dependent on varying 
causes. In accepting the material world, Nietzsche does 
not grant it. In assuming natural laws, he denies them. 
In his adherence to logic and to the processes of cause 
and effect, he is accepting phantoms and inconsisten- 
cies, and yet it is along these lines that the race pro- 
gresses. 

In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche makes use of the 
same aphoristic style as that employed in "Human, All- 
Too-Human." (This broken, staccato form he uses 
throughout the remainder of his works, except in certain 
parts of "Thus Spake Zarathustra." ) Each paragraph 
is captioned and deals with a specific phase of morality 
or with a definite critical attitude toward human con- 
duct. Some of these paragraphs are scarcely a line in 
length — mere definitions or similes. Others extend over 
several pages. But they always pertain to a single idea. 
Occasionally they are in the form of a brief conversa- 
tion : at other times they are short queries. One of these 
aphorisms is entitled "The Battle Dispensary of the 
Soul," and this is what follows : "What is the most effi- 
cacious remedy 4 ? Victory." That is all — brief, and 
perhaps, on first reading, inconsequent. But study it a 
moment, and you will find in it the nucleus of a great 
revolutionary doctrine. On the other hand, turn to 
aphorism 142, called "Sympathy," and you will discover 
several pages of flashing commentary. Out of the chaos 
of his style springs a feeling of plastic form. These brief 
paragraphs are not detached and desultory. They are 



96 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

pyramided on one another, and beneath them runs an 
undercurrent of unified thinking. When the end of the 
book is reached we have a carefully fabricated edifice, 
and we realise that each paragraph has been some neces- 
sary beam or decoration in its construction. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE DAWN OF DAY" 

Morality is nothing else (and, above all, nothing 
more) than obedience to customs, of whatsoever nature 
they may be. But customs are simply the traditional 
way of acting and valuing. Where there is no tradition 
there is no morality ; and the less life is governed by tra- 
dition, the narrower the circle of morality. The free 
man is immoral, because it is his will to depend upon 
himself and not upon tradition : in all the primitive states 
of humanity "evil" is equivalent to "individual," "free," 
"arbitrary," "unaccustomed," "unforeseen," "incalcul- 
able." In such primitive conditions, always measured 
by this standard, any action performed — not because tra- 
dition commands it, but for other reasons (e.g., on ac- 
count of its individual utility), even for the same reasons 
as had been formerly established by custom — is termed 
immoral, and is felt to be so even by the very man who 
performs it, for it has not been done out of obedience to 
tradition. 14-15 

Popular medicines and popular morals are closely re- 
lated, and should not be considered and valued, as is still 
customary, in so different a way: both are most danger- 
ous and make-believe sciences. 19 

All those superior men, who felt themselves irresistibly 
urged on to throw off the yoke of some morality or other, 
had no other resource — if they were not really mad — 
than to feign madness, or actually to become insane. 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 97 

And this holds good for innovators in every department 
of life, and not only in religion and politics. 21 

Every one who has hitherto overthrown a law of es- 
tablished morality has always at first been considered as 
a wicked man: but when it was afterwards found impos- 
sible to re-establish the law, and people gradually be- 
came accustomed to the change, the epithet was changed 
by slow degrees. History deals almost exclusively with 
these wicked men, who later on came to be recognised as 
good men. 2s 

A man who is under the influence of the morality of 
custom comes to despise causes first of all, secondly con- 
sequences, and thirdly reality, and weaves all his higher 
feelings (reverence, sublimity, pride, gratitude, love) 
into an imaginary world: the so-called higher world. 
And even to-day we can see the consequences of this: 
wherever, and in whatever fashion, man's feelings are 
raised, that imaginary world is in evidence. 4 <> 

The history of the moral feelings is entirely different 
from the history of moral conceptions. The first-men- 
tioned are powerful before the action, and the latter espe- 
cially after it, in view of the necessity for making one's 
self clear in regard to them, « 

Trusting in our feelings simply means obeying our 
grandfather and grandmother more than the gods within 
ourselves: our reason and experience. 41 

The same impulse, under the impression of the blame 
cast upon it by custom, develops into the painful feeling 
of cowardice, or else the pleasurable feeling of humility, 
in case a morality, like that of Christianity, has taken it 
to its heart and called it good. 43 

The origin becomes of less significance in "proportion 
as we acquire insight into it; whilst things nearest to our- 



98 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

selves, around and within us, gradually begin to manifest 
their wealth of colours, beauties, enigmas, and diversity 
of meaning, of which earlier humanity never dreamed. 51 

Only when man shall have acquired a knowledge of 
all things will he be able to know himself. For things 
are but the boundaries of man. 53 

To whatever height mankind may have developed — 
and perhaps in the end it will not be so high as when 
they began ! — there is as little prospect of their attaining 
to a higher order as there is for the ant and the earwig 
to enter into kinship with God and eternity at the end 
of their career on earth. What is to come will drag be- 
hind it that which has passed : why should any little star, 
or even any little species on that star, form an exception 
to that eternal drama"? Away with such sentimentali- 
ties! 54 

Those earnest, able, and just men of profound feelings, 
who are still Christians at heart, owe it to themselves to 
make one attempt to live for a certain space of time with- 
out Christianity! They owe it to their faith that they 
should thus for once take up their abode "in the wilder- 
ness" — if for no other reason than that of being able to 
pronounce on the question as to whether Christianity is 
needful, es 

Christianity has the instinct of a hunter for finding out 
all those who may by hook or by crook be driven to de- 
spair — only a very small number of men can be brought 
to this despair. Christianity lies in wait for such as 
those, and pursues them. «s 

The "demon" Eros becomes an object of greater inter- 
est to mankind than all the angels and saints put together, 
thanks to the mysterious Mumbo-Jumboism of the 
Church in all things erotic : it is due to the Church that 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 99 

love stories, even in our own time, have become the one 
common interest which appeals to all classes of people 
— with an exaggeration which would be incomprehensible 
to antiquity, and which will not fail to provoke roars of 
laughter in coming generations. 7 s 

It is only those who never — or always — attend church 
that underestimate the dishonesty with which this sub- 
ject is still dealt in Protestant pulpits; in what a clumsy 
fashion the preacher takes advantage of his security from 
interruption ; how the Bible is pinched and squeezed ; and 
how the people are made acquainted with every form of 
the art of false reading. 85 

Christianity wants blindness and frenzy and an eternal 
swan-song above the waves under which reason has been 
drowned! ... 90 

What if God were not exactly truth, and if this were 
proved*? And if he were instead of vanity, the desire 
for power, the ambitious, the fear, and the enraptured 
and terrified folly of mankind? ... 93 

One Becomes Moral — but not because one is moral ! 
Submission to morals may be due to slavishness or vanity, 
egoism or resignation, dismal fanaticism or thoughtless- 
ness. It may, again, be an act of despair, such as sub- 
mission to the authority of a ruler; but there is nothing 
moral about it per se. 97 

Morals are constantly undergoing changes and trans- 
formations, occasioned by successful crimes. 97 

I deny morality in the same way as I deny alchemy, 
i.e., I deny its hypotheses; but I do not deny that there 
have been alchemists who believed in these hypotheses 
and based their actions upon them. I also deny immor- 
ality — not that innumerable people feel immoral, but that 
there is any true reason why they should feel so. I 



ioo WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

should not, of course, deny — unless I were a fool — that 
many actions which are called immoral should be avoided 
and resisted; and in the same way that many which are 
called moral should be performed and encouraged; but 
I hold that in both cases these actions should be per- 
formed from motives other than those which have pre- 
vailed up to the present time. We must learn anew in 
order that at last, perhaps very late in the day, we may 
be able to do something more : feel anew, ioo 

It is a prejudice to think that morality is more favour- 
able to the development of the reason than immorality. 
It is erroneous to suppose that the unconscious aim in the 
development of every conscious being (namely, animal, 
man, humanity, etc.) is its "great happiness"; on the con- 
trary, there is a particular and incomparable happiness 
to be attained at every stage of our development, one that 
is neither high nor low, but quite an individual happiness. 
Evolution does not make happiness its goal; it aims 
merely at evolution, and nothing else. It is only if hu- 
manity had a universally recognised goal that we could 
propose to do this or that: for the time being there is no 
such goal. It follows that the pretensions of morality 
should not be brought into any relationship with man- 
kind: this would be merely childish and irrational. It 
is quite another thing to recommend a goal to mankind: 
this goal would then be something that would depend 
upon our own will and pleasure. Provided that man- 
kind in general agreed to adopt such a goal, it could then 
impose a moral law upon itself, a law which would, at 
all events, be imposed by their own free will. 105 

Our duties are the claims which others have upon us. 
How did they acquire these claims'? By the fact that 
they considered us as capable of making and holding 



THE DAWN OF DAY" 101 

agreements and contracts, by assuming that we were their 
like and equals, and by consequently entrusting some- 
thing to us, bringing us up, educating us, and support- 
ing US. no 

My rights consist of that part of my power which 
others have not only conceded to me, but which they wish 
to maintain for me. m 

The desire for distinction is the desire to subject one's 
neighbor. . . .113 

On this mirror — and our intellect is a mirror — some- 
thing is going on that indicates regularity : a certain thing 
is each time followed by another certain thing. When 
we perceive this and wish to give it a name, we call it 
cause and effect, — fools that we are ! as if in this we had 
understood or could understand anything! For, of 
course, we have seen nothing but the images of causes 
and effects, and it is just this flgurativeness which ren- 
ders it impossible for us to see a more substantial relation 
than that of sequence ! ... 120 

Pity, in so far as it actually gives rise to suffering — 
and this must be our only point of view here — is a weak- 
ness, like every other indulgence in an injurious emotion. 
It increases suffering throughout the world, and although 
here and there a certain amount of suffering may be in- 
directly diminished or removed altogether as a conse- 
quence of pity, we must not bring forward these occa- 
sional consequences, which are on the whole insignifi- 
cant, to justify the nature of pity which, as has already 
been stated, is prejudicial. Supposing that it prevailed, 
even if only for one day, it would bring humanity to 
utter ruin. In itself the nature of pity is no better than 
that of any other craving; it is only where it is called for 
and praised — and this happens when people do not un- 



102 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

derstand what is injurious in it, but find in it a sort of 
joy — that a good conscience becomes attached to it; it 
is only then that we willingly yield to it, and do not 
shrink from acknowledging it. In other circumstances 
where it is understood to be dangerous, it is looked upon 
as a weakness; or, as in the case of the Greeks, as an 
unhealthy periodical emotion the danger of which might 
be removed by temporary and voluntary discharges. 144-145 

You say that the morality of pity is a higher morality 
than that of stoicism? Prove it! But take care not to 
measure the "higher" and "lower" degrees of morality 
once more by moral yardsticks ; for there are no absolute 
morals. So take your yardstick from somewhere else, 
and be on your guard ! ... 149 

If, in accordance with the present definition, only 
those actions are moral which are done for the sake of 
others, and for their sake only, then there are no moral 
actions at all ! If, in accordance with another defini- 
tion, only those actions are moral which spring from our 
own free will, then there are no moral actions in this 
case either! What is it, then, that we designate thus, 
which certainly exists and wishes as a consequence to 
be explained? It is the result of a few intellectual 
blunders; and supposing that we were able to free our- 
selves from these errors, what would then become of 
"moral actions" ? It is due to these errors that we have 
up to the present attributed to certain actions a value 
superior to what was theirs in reality : we separated them 
from "egoistic" and "non-free" actions. When we now 
set them once more in the latter categories, as we must 
do, we certainly reduce their value (their own estimate 
of value) even below its reasonable level, because "ego- 
istic" and "non-free" actions have up to the present been 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 103 

undervalued owing to that alleged profound and essen- 
tial difference. 158-159 

If I were a god, and a benevolent god, the marriages 
of men would cause me more displeasure than anything 
else. 162 

We ought publicly to declare invalid the vows of lov- 
ers, and to refuse them permission to marry: and this 
because we should treat marriage itself much more seri- 
ously, so that in cases where it is now contracted it would 
not usually be allowed in future! Are not the majority 
of marriages such that we should not care to have them 
witnessed by a third party? And yet this third party 
is scarcely ever lacking — the child — and he is more than 
the witness ; he is the whipping-boy and scapegoat. ies 

Shame ! You wish to form part of a system in which 
you must be a wheel, fully and completely, or risk being 
crushed by wheels ! where it is understood that each one 
will be that which his superiors make of him ! where the 
seeking for "connections" will form a part of one's nat- 
ural duties! where no one feels himself offended when 
he has his attention drawn to some one with the remark, 
"He may be useful to you some time" ; where people do 
not feel ashamed of paying a visit to ask for somebody's 
intercession,, and where they do not even suspect that by 
such a voluntary submission to these morals, they are 
once and for all stamped as the common pottery of na- 
ture, which others can employ or break up of their free 
will without feeling in any way responsible for doing 
so, — just as if one were to say, "People of my type will 
never be lacking, therefore, do what you will with me! 
Do not stand on ceremony !" ibq 

In the glorification of "work" and the never-ceasing 
talk about the "blessing of labour," I see the same secret 



104 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

arriere-pensee as I do in the praise bestowed on imper- 
sonal acts of a general interest, viz., a fear of everything 
individual, ne 

Behind the principle of the present moral fashion: 
"Moral actions are actions performed out of sympathy 
for others," I see the social instinct of fear, which thus 
assumes an intellectual disguise. ... 177 

Whatever may be the influence in high politics of 
utilitarianism and the vanity of individuals and nations, 
the sharpest spur which urges them onwards is their need 
for the feeling of power — a need which rises not only 
in the souls of princes and rulers, but also gushes forth 
from time to time from inexhaustible sources in the peo- 
ple. 186 

As the aristocrat is able to preserve the appearance of 
being possessed of a superior physical force which never 
leaves him, he likewise wishes by his aspect of constant 
serenity and civility of disposition, even in the most try- 
ing circumstances, to convey the impression that his mind 
and soul are equal to all dangers and surprises. . . . 

This indisputable happiness of aristocratic culture, 
based as it is on the feeling of superiority, is now be- 
ginning to rise to ever higher levels; for now, thanks to 
the free spirits, it is henceforth permissible and not dis- 
honourable for people who have been born and reared 
in aristocratic circles to enter the domain of knowledge, 
where they may secure more intellectual consecrations 
and learn chivalric services even higher than those of 
former times, and where they may look up to that ideal 
of victorious wisdom which as yet no age has been able 
to set before itself with so good a conscience as the period 
which is about to dawn. 203-205 

What induces one man to use false weights, another 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 105 

to set his house on fire after having insured it for more 
than its value, a third to take part in counterfeiting, 
while three-fourths of our upper classes indulge in legal- 
ised fraud, and suffer from the pangs of conscience that 
follow speculation and dealings on the Stock Exchange: 
what gives rise to all tins'? It is not real want, — for 
their existence is by no means precarious; perhaps they 
have even enough to eat and drink without worrying — 
but they are urged on day and night by a terrible impa- 
tience at seeing their wealth pile up so slowly, and by an 
equally terrible longing and love for these heaps of gold. 
In this impatience and love, however, we see re-appear 
once more that fanaticism of the desire for power which 
was stimulated in former times by the belief that we 
were in the possession of truth, a fanaticism which bore 
such beautiful names that we could dare to be inhuman 
with a good conscience (burning Jews, heretics, and good 
books, and exterminating entire cultures superior to ours, 
such as those of Peru and Mexico). The means of this 
desire for power are changed in our day, but the same 
volcano is still smouldering, impatience and intemperate 
love call for their victims, and what was once done "for 
the love of God" is now done for the love of money, i.e., 
for the love of that which at present affords us the high- 
est feeling of power and a good conscience. 209-210 

"Enthusiastic sacrifice," "self-immolation" — these are 
the catch-words of your morality. ... In reality . . . 
you only appear to sacrifice yourselves ; for your imagina- 
tion turns you into gods and you enjoy yourselves as 

SUCh. 226-227 

Ceremonies, official robes and court dresses, grave coun- 
tenances, solemn aspects, the slow pace, involved speech 
— everything, in short, known as dignity — are all pre- 



io6 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tences adopted by those who are timid at heart : they wish 
to make themselves feared (themselves or the things they 
represent). The fearless (i.e., originally those who nat- 
urally inspire others with awe) have no need of dignity 
and ceremonies. ... 230 

A strange thing, this punishment of ours ! It does not 
purify the criminal; it is not a form of expiation; but, 
on the contrary, it is even more defiling than the crime 
itself. 235 

When a vigorous nature has not an inclination towards 
cruelty, and is not always preoccupied with itself, it in- 
voluntarily strives after gentleness — this is its distinctive 
characteristic. Weak natures, on the other hand, have 
a tendency towards harsh judgments. . . . 23 6 

Kindness has been best developed by the long dis- 
simulation which endeavoured to appear as kindness: 
wherever great power existed the necessity for dissimula- 
tion of this nature was recognised — it inspires security 
and confidence, and multiplies the actual sum of our 
physical power. Falsehood, if not actually the mother, 
is at all events the nurse of kindness. In the same way, 
honesty has been brought to maturity by the need for a 
semblance of honesty and integrity: in hereditary aris- 
tocracies. The persistent exercise of such a dissimula- 
tion ends by bringing about the actual nature of the thing 
itself: the dissimulation in the long run suppresses itself, 
and organs and instincts are the unexpected fruits in this 
garden of hypocrisy. 242 

Neither necessity nor desire, but the love of power, is 
the demon of mankind. You may give men everything 
possible — health, food, shelter, enjoyment — but they are 
and remain unhappy and capricious, for the demon waits 
and waits; and must be satisfied. 243 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" 107 

It is probable that there are no pure races, but only 
races which have become purified, and even these are 
extremely rare. 253 

How many married men have some morning awak- 
ened to the fact that their young wife is dull, although 
she thinks quite the contrary! not to speak of those 
wives whose flesh is willing but whose intellect is 
weak ! 255 

Could there be anything more repugnant than the sen- 
timentality which is shown to plants and animals — and 
this on the part of a creature who from the very begin- 
ning has made such ravages among them as their most 
ferocious enemy — and who ends by even claiming affec- 
tionate feelings from his weakened and mutilated vic- 
tims ! Before this kind of "nature" man must above all 
be serious, if he is any sort of a thinking being. 2 ss 

Among cowards it is thought bad form to say anything 
against bravery, for any expression of this kind would 
give rise to some contempt; and unfeeling people are 
irritated when anything is said against pity. 259 

It is the most sensual men who find it necessary to 
avoid women and to torture their bodies. 2 ei 

A young man can be most surely corrupted when he 
is taught to value the like-minded more highly than the 
differently minded. 26 2 

The general knowledge of mankind has been furthered 
to a greater extent by fear than by love. 257 

The sum-total of those internal movements which 
come naturally to men, and which they can consequently 
set in motion readily and gracefully, is called the soul — 
men are looked upon as void of soul when they let it be 
seen that their inward emotions are difficult and painful 
to them. 263 



108 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

All rules have this effect: they distract our attention 
from the fundamental aim of the rule, and make us more 
thoughtless. 273 

We are most certain to find idealistic theories among 
unscrupulously practical men; for such men stand in 
need of the lustre of these theories for the sake of their 
reputation. They adopt them instinctively without by 
any means feeling hypocritical in doing so — -no more 
hypocritical than Englishmen with their Christianity and 
their Sabbath-keeping. 277 

It is not sufficient to prove a case, we must also tempt 
or raise men to it. 2 78 

Asceticism is the proper mode of thinking for those 
who must extirpate their carnal instincts, because these 
are ferocious beasts, — but only for such people ! 27s 

You refuse to be dissatisfied with yourselves or to 
suffer from yourselves, and this you call your moral 
tendency ! Very well ; another may perhaps call it your 
cowardice! One thing, however, is certain, and that is, 
that you will never take a trip round the world (and you 
yourselves are this world), and you will always remain 
in yourselves an accident and a clod on the face of the 
earth! 282 

The first effect of happiness is the feeling of power, 
and this feeling longs to manifest itself, whether towards 
ourselves or other men, or towards ideas and imaginary 
beings. Its most common modes of manifestation are 
making presents, derision, and destruction — all three be- 
ing due to a common fundamental instinct. 2 8e 

We approve of marriage in the first place because we 
are not yet acquainted with it, in the second place be- 
cause we have accustomed ourselves to it, and in the third 
place because we have contracted it — that is to say, in 



"THE DAWN CF DAY" 109 

most cases. And yet nothing has been proved thereby in 
favour of the value of marriage in general. 2 st 

The criminal who has been found out does not suffer 
because of the crime he has committed, but because of 
the shame and annoyance caused him either by some 
blunder which he has made or by being deprived of his 
habitual element. 2 89 

Where our deficiencies are, there also is our enthusiasm. 
The enthusiastic principle "love your enemies" had to 
be invented by the Jews, the best haters that ever ex- 
isted; and the finest glorifications of chastity have been 
written by those who in their youth led dissolute and 
licentious lives. 293 

Women turn pale at the thought that their lover may 
not be worthy of them; Men turn pale at the thought 
that they may not be worthy of the women they love. 
I speak of perfect women, perfect men. 300-301 

You wish to bid farewell to your passion 1 ? Very 
well, but do so without hatred against it! Otherwise 
you have a second passion. — The soul of the Christian 
who has freed himself from sin is generally ruined after- 
wards by the hatred for sin. Just look at the faces of 
the great Christians ! they are the faces of great haters. 302 

Men have become suffering creatures in consequence 
of their morals, and the sum-total of what they have ob- 
tained by those morals is simply the feeling that they 
are far too good and great for this world, and that they 
are enjoying merely a transitory existence on it. As yet 
the "proud sufferer" is the highest type of mankind. 309-310 

Rights can only be conferred by one who is in full 
possession of power. 317 

"The rule always appears to me to be more interest- 
ing than the exception" — whoever thinks thus has made 



no WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

considerable progress in knowledge, and is one of the 
initiated. ai9 

Through our love we have become dire offenders 
against truth, and even habitual dissimulators and 
thieves, who give out more things as true than seem to 
us to be true. 337-333 

All the great excellencies of ancient humanity owed 
their stability to the fact that man was standing side by 
side with man, and that no woman was allowed to put 
forward the claim of being the nearest and highest, nay 
even sole object of his love, as the feeling of passion 
would teach. 351 

Even if we were mad enough to consider all our opin- 
ions as truth, we should nevertheless not wish them alone 
to exist. I cannot see why we should ask for an autoc- 
racy and omnipotence of truth: it is sufficient for me 
to know that it is a great power. Truth, however, must 
meet with opposition and be able to fight, and we must 
be able to rest from it at times in falsehood — otherwise 
truth will grow tiresome, powerless, and insipid, and will 
render us equally so. 352-353. 

To hear every day what is said about us, or even to 
endeavour to discover what people think about us, will 
in the end kill even the strongest man. Our neighbours 
permit us to live only that they may exercise a daily 
claim upon us! They certainly would not tolerate us 
if we wished to claim rights over them, and still less if 
we wished to be right ! In short, let us offer up a sacri- 
fice to the general peace, let us not listen when they 
speak of us, when they praise us, blame us, wish for us, 
or hope for us — nay, let us not even think of it. 357 

How many really individual actions are left undone 
merely because before performing them we perceive or 



"THE DAWN OF DAY" m 

suspect that they will be misunderstood! — those actions, 
for example, which have some intrinsic value, both in 
good and evil. The more highly an age or a nation 
values its individuals, therefore, and the more right and 
ascendency we accord them, the more will actions of this 
kind venture to make themselves known. 359-360. 

Love wishes to spare the other to whom it devotes it- 
self any feeling of strangeness: as a consequence it is 
permeated with disguise and simulation; it keeps on de- 
ceiving continuously, and feigns an equality which in 
reality does not exist. And all this is done so instinc- 
tively that women who love deny this simulation and 
constant tender trickery, and have even the audacity to 
assert that love equalises (in other words that it per- 
forms a miracle) ! 8 ei 

Truth in itself is no power at all. . . . Truth must 
either attract power to its side, or else side with power, 
for otherwise it will perish again and again. 3 63 

We should . . . take the greatest precautions in re- 
gard to everything connected with old age and its judg- 
ment upon life. . . . The reverence which we feel for 
an old man, especially if he is an old thinker and sage, 
easily blinds us to the deterioration of his intellect. 368 

We must not make passion an argument for truth. 372 

Have you experienced history within yourselves, com- 
motions, earthquakes, long and profound sadness, and 
sudden flashes of happiness"? Have you acted foolishly 
with great and little fools'? Have you really undergone 
the delusions and woe of the good people? and also the 
woe and the peculiar happiness of the most evil? Then 
you may speak to me of morality, but not otherwise ! 37s 

"What do I matter*?" is written over the door of the 
thinker of the future. 379 



112 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The great man ever remains invisible in the greatest 
thing that claims worship, like some distant star : his vic- 
tory over power remains without witnesses, and hence 
also without songs and singers. The hierarchy of the 
great men in all the past history of the human race has 
not yet been determined. 3 so 

Whether what we are looking forward to is a thought 
or a deed, our relationship to every essential achievement 
is none other than that of pregnancy, and all our vain- 
glorious boasting about "willing" and "creating" should 
be cast to the winds! True and ideal selfishness con- 
sists in always watching over and restraining the soul, 
so that our productiveness may come to a beautiful ter- 
mination. . . . Still, these pregnant ones are funny peo- 
ple! Let us therefore dare to be funny also, and not 
reproach others if they must be the same. 384-385 

Honest towards ourselves, and to all and everything 
friendly to us; brave in the face of our enemy; generous 
towards the vanquished; polite at all times: such do the 
four cardinal virtues wish us to be. 3 87 

There is no "eternal justice" which requires that every 
fault shall be atoned and paid for, — the belief that such 
a justice existed was a terrible delusion, and useful only 
to a limited extent; just as it is also a delusion that every- 
thing is guilt which is felt as such. It is not the things 
themselves, but the opinions about things that do not 
exist, which have been such a source of trouble to man- 
kind. 391 

What is the most efficacious remedy 1 ? — Victory. 393 

The snake that cannot cast its skin perishes. So too 
with those minds which are prevented from changing 
their views : they cease to be minds. 394 



IV 

'The Joyful Wisdom" 

IN 1882 Nietzsche wrote and published "The Joyful 
Wisdom" ("La Gay a Scienza"). Although orig- 
inally intended as a supplement to "The Dawn of Day," 
under which title it was to have been issued in a later 
edition of this earlier work, it differs greatly, not only 
from "The Dawn of Day," but from everything else 
Nietzsche ever wrote. The destructive spirit of "Human, 
All-Too-Human" is nowhere to be found in it. The 
revolutionary doctrines of "The Dawn of Day" are but 
vaguely echoed. It is a book which shows Nietzsche in 
a unique and isolated mood — a mood which, through- 
out his whole life did not return to him. Tempera- 
mentally "The Joyful Wisdom" comes nearer being a 
parallel to "Thus Spake Zarathustra" than to any of his 
other writings. But even this comparison goes to pieces 
when pushed beyond the most superficial aspects of the 
two books. Nietzsche was at Naumburg at the time of 
writing this work. A long-standing stomach malady had 
suddenly shown signs of leaving him, and the period 
during which he wrote "The Joyful Wisdom" was one 
of the happiest of his life. Heretofore a sombre seri- 
ousness had marked both his thoughts and the expression 
of them. In the two volumes of "Human, All-Too- 
Human" he had attempted a complete devastation of all 
codes and ideals. In "The Dawn of Day" he waged a 

113 



114 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

bitter and serious warfare on modern moral standards 
and made attempts at supplanting them with new dogma. 
In "The Joyful Wisdom" he revealed an entirely new 
phase of his character — a lenient, jovial, almost buoyant 
attitude toward the world. 

Although "The Joyful Wisdom" may be considered 
in the light of an interpolation into Nietzsche's philo- 
sophical works, the book is nevertheless among the most 
interesting of his output — not so much because it gives 
us any additions to the sum of his thinking, but because 
it throws a light on the philosopher himself. It may be 
lifted bodily out of his works without leaving a gap in 
the development of his doctrines, but it cannot be set 
aside without closing up a very important and significant 
facet in the man's nature. Unfortunately Nietzsche is 
looked upon as a man who was entirely consumed with 
rancour and hatred — a man unconscious of the comic side 
of existence — a thinker with whom pessimism was 
chronic. But this is only a half truth, a conclusion 
founded on partial evidence. Nietzsche's very earnest- 
ness at times defeated his own ends. "The Joyful Wis- 
dom" is one of the most fundamentally hilarious books 
ever written. It deals with life as a supreme bit of 
humour. Yet there is little in it to provoke laughter. 
Nietzsche's humour is deeper than the externals. One 
finds no superficial jesting here, no smartness, no tran- 
sient buffoonery. The book is a glorification of that 
subtle joy which accompanies the experiencing of knowl- 
edge. In order to catch its spirit it is necessary that one 
be familiar with the serious and formulating Nietzsche, 
for on his most serious doctrines is founded that attitude 
which makes "The Joyful Wisdom" hilarious. Once fa- 
miliar with Nietzsche's earlier writings one may read 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 115 

the present book with a feeling of exhilaration unlike 
that produced by his more manifestly solemn writings. 

However, despite the buoyancy of this document, it 
is, beneath the surface, as serious as anything Nietzsche 
has ever written. His conception of the world and his 
assumption of the underlying aspects of existence are 
founded on deeply conceived formulas. It must be borne 
in mind that Nietzsche's thought is in a large measure 
personal, that the development of his doctrines is due 
to very definite biographical causes and to the flux and 
reflux of his own emotions. His system is not a spon- 
taneous and complete conception, the sudden fruit of his 
entire research given to the world in a unified body. To 
the contrary, it is an amassing of data, a constant build- 
ing up of ideas. No one book contains his entire teach- 
ings, logically thought out and carefully organised. 
Rather is his philosophy an intricate structure which be- 
gins with his earliest essays and does not reach comple- 
tion until the end of "The Will to Power." Each book 
has some specific place in his thought : each book assumes 
a position relative to all the rest. Thus in "The Joyful 
Wisdom" we have the turning point between the deny- 
ing and destructive Nietzsche and the asserting and fash- 
ioning Nietzsche. Says he in the fourth and most im- 
portant section called "Sanctus Januarius": "Amor 
fati: * let that henceforth be my love ! I do not want 
to wage war with the ugly. I do not want to accuse, 
I do not want even to accuse the accusers, hooking 
aside, let that be my sole negation! And all in all, to 
sum up: I wish to be at any time hereafter only a yea- 
sayer !" 

In "The Joyful Wisdom" begins Nietzsche's almost 

* Love of (one's) destiny. 



n6 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

fanatical joy in life. Here, too, we encounter for the 
first time the symbol of the dance. Nietzsche constantly 
makes use of this figure in his later writings. Especially 
in "Thus Spake Zarathustra" does he exhort his readers 
to indulge themselves in dancing. The blasphemies and 
hatreds characteristic of the philosopher in his more sol- 
emn moods are nowhere discernible in this new book. 
It is therefore of considerable importance to the student 
in forming a just estimate of Nietzsche. Here the hater 
has departed ; the idol-smasher has laid down his weapons ; 
the analyst has become the satyr; the logician has turned 
poet; the blasphemer has become the child. Only occa- 
sionally does the pendulum swing toward the sombre 
Apollonian pole: the Dionysian ideal of joy is dominant. 
The month of January inspired the book, and Nietzsche 
says in his Ecce Homo that it was the most wonderful 
month of January he had ever spent. This spirit of 
gaiety was to remain with him in some degree through- 
out the remainder of his life. He realised that his pre- 
paratory work was completed. He saw his way clear 
to forge ahead as his doctrines led him; and his exu- 
berance no doubt grew out of the satisfaction he took in 
this prospect. 

Although the contents of "The Joyful Wisdom" are 
not inherently a part of Nietzsche's philosophy, but only 
detached applications of his theories — ideas which floated 
to the surface of his doctrines — the material encountered 
here is of wide and varied interest. There are criticisms 
of German and Southern culture; valuations of modern 
authors; views on the developments of art; theories of 
music; analyses of Schopenhauer and an explanation of 
his vogue; judgments of the ancient and the modern thea- 
tre; excursions into philological fields; arraignments of 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 117 

contemporary classicism; doctrines of creative artistry; 
personal paragraphs on mental culture, politics and com- 
merce. . . . The book is, in fact, more critical than 
philosophical. 

Nietzsche never entirely dissevered himself from his 
time and from the habits, both of thought and action, 
which characterised his contemporaries. From his first 
academic essays to his last transvaluation of values, he 
remained the patient and analytical observer of the life 
about him. For this reason it has been argued among 
disciples of "pure" thinking that he was not, in the strict- 
est sense of the word, a "philosopher," but rather a crit- 
ically intellectual force. This diagnosis might carry 
weight had not Nietzsche avowedly built his philosoph- 
ical structure on a repudiation of abstract thinking. This 
misunderstanding of him arose from the adherents of 
rational thinking overlooking the fact that, where the 
older philosophers had detached themselves from reality 
because of the instability of natural hypotheses, Nie- 
tzsche re-established human bases on which he founded 
his syllogisms. Therefore one should not attempt to di- 
vorce the purely critical from the purely philosophical in 
his writings. Even in a book so frankly critical as "The 
Joyful Wisdom" there is a directing force of theoretical 
unity. 

This is especially true of the third section. This divi- 
sion is made up almost entirely of comments on men and 
affairs, short analyses of human attitudes, desultory ex- 
cursions into the sociological, brief remarks on man's emo- 
tional nature, apothegms dealing with human attri- 
butes, bits of racy philosophical gossip, religious and sci- 
entific maxims, and the like. Sometimes these observa- 
tions are cynical, sometimes gracious, sometimes bitter, 



n8 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

sometimes buoyant, sometimes merely witty. But all of 
them are welded together by a profound conception of 
humanity. 

The most stimulating division of the book is the 
fourth, in which Nietzsche's good humour is at its height. 
This section is a glorification of victory and of all those 
hardy qualities which go into the perfecting of the indi- 
vidual. Nietzsche reverses Schiller's famous doctrine ex- 
pressed in "Die Braut von Messina" : "Life is not of all 
good the highest." He sees no good over and beyond 
that of human relationships. The normal instincts to 
him are the ones which affirm life; the abnormal instincts 
are those which deny it. The former are summed up in 
the ethics of Greece under the sway of Dionysus; the 
latter are epitomised in the Christian religion. 

The fifth book, called "We Fearless Ones," and the 
appendix of "Songs of Prince Free-as-a-Bird" were writ- 
ten four years later than the other material and added 
with an introduction in a later edition of the book. 
These addenda, while less specific and of a more dialectic 
nature than the preceding parts, are in spirit manifestly 
the same as the rest of the book. 

In "The Joyful Wisdom" we have again an aphoristic 
style of writing, although it has become keener and more 
sure of itself since "Human, All-Too-Human" and "The 
Dawn of Day." In making selections from this book I 
have chosen those passages which are more general in 
tone. The connection between the various aphorisms is 
here even slighter than is Nietzsche's wont, and for that 
reason no attempt has been made to present a continuous 
perception of the work. However, the excerpts which 
follow, though of a less popular nature, are more inti- 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 119 

mately related to his thoughts than the ones omitted, and 
consequently are of more interest to the student. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 

Whether I look with a good or an evil eye upon men, 
I find them always at one problem, each and all of them : 
to do that which conduces to the conservation of the 
human species. 31 

To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in 
order to laugh out of the veriest truths — to do this the 
best have not hitherto had enough of the sense of truth, 
and the most endowed have had far too little genius! 
There is perhaps still a future even for laughter ! 32 

The ignoble nature is distinguished by the fact that it 
keeps its advantage steadily in view, and that this thought 
of the end and advantage is even stronger than its strong- 
est impulse: not to be tempted to inexpedient activities 
by its impulses — that is its wisdom and inspiration. In 
comparison with the ignoble nature the higher nature is 
more irrational: — for the noble, magnanimous, and self- 
sacrificing person succumbs in fact to his impulses, and 
in his best moments his reason lapses altogether. 37 

The strongest and most evil spirits have hitherto ad- 
vanced mankind the most: they always rekindled the 
sleeping passions — all orderly arranged society lulls the 
passions to sleep. 39 

The lust of property and love : what different associa- 
tions each of these ideas evokes ! — and yet it might be the 
same impulse twice named. 51 

The poison by which the weaker nature is destroyed 
is strengthening to the strong individual — and he does 
not call it poison. 56-57 



120 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The virtues of a man are called good, not in respect 
of the results they have for himself, but in respect of 
the results which we expect therefrom for ourselves and 
for society. . . . The praise of the virtues is the praise 
of something which is privately injurious to the individ- 
ual; it is praise of impulses which deprive man of his 
noblest self-love, and the power to take the best care of 
himself. . . . The "neighbour" praises unselfishness be- 
cause he profits by it! If the neighbour were "un- 
selfishly" disposed himself, he would reject that destruc- 
tion of power, that injury for his advantage, he would 
thwart such inclinations in their origin, and above all 
he would manifest his unselfishness just by not giving it 
a good name! ss-eo 

Living — that is to be cruel and inexorable towards all 
that becomes weak and old in ourselves, and not only 
in ourselves. 6 s 

It is probable that the manufacturers and great mag- 
nates of commerce have hitherto lacked too much all 
those forms and attributes of a superior race, which alone 
make persons interesting; if they had had the nobility of 
the newly-born in their looks and bearing, there would 
perhaps have been no socialism in the masses of the peo- 
ple. For these are really ready for slavery of every 
kind, provided that the superior class above them con- 
stantly shows itself legitimately superior, and born to 
command — by its noble presence ! 7 s 

When one continually prohibits the expression of the 
passions as something to be left to the "vulgar," to 
coarser, bourgeois, and peasant natures — that is, when 
one does not want to suppress the passions themselves, 
but only their language and demeanour, one neverthe- 
less realises therewith just what one does not want: the 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 121 

suppression of the passions themselves, or at least their 
weakening and alteration. . . . 8 s 

In magnanimity there is the same amount of egoism 
as in revenge. . . . se-si 

Where bad eyesight can no longer see the evil impulse 
as such, on account of its refinement, — there man sets 
up the kingdom of goodness. . . . ss 

To become the advocate of the rule — that may perhaps 
be the ultimate form and refinement in which nobility of 
character will reveal itself on earth. 90 

Women are all skilful in exaggerating their weak- 
nesses, indeed they are inventive in weaknesses, so as to 
seem quite fragile ornaments to which even a grain of 
dust does harm; their existence is meant to bring home 
to man's mind his coarseness, and to appeal to his con- 
science. 101 

There is something quite astonishing and extraor- 
dinary in the education of women of the higher class; 
indeed, there is perhaps nothing more paradoxical. All 
the world is agreed to educate them with as much ig- 
norance as possible in erotics, and to inspire their soul 
with a profound shame of such things, and the extremest 
impatience and horror at the suggestion of them. It is 
really here only that all the " honour " of women is at 
stake; what would one not forgive in them in other re- 
spects! But here they are intended to remain ignorant 
to the very backbone : — they are intended to have neither 
eyes, ears, words, nor thoughts for this, their "wicked- 
ness"; indeed knowledge here is already evil. And 
then ! To be hurled as with an awful thunderbolt into 
reality and knowledge with marriage — and indeed by 
him whom they most love and esteem: to have to en- 
counter love and shame in contradiction, yea, to have to 



122 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

feel rapture, abandonment, duty, sympathy, and fright 
at the unexpected proximity of God and animal, and 
whatever else besides! all at once! — There, in fact, a 
psychic entanglement has been effected which is quite 
unequalled! Even the sympathetic curiosity of the 
wisest discerner of men does not suffice to divine how this 
or that woman gets along with the solution of this enigma 
and the enigma of this solution ; what dreadful, far-reach- 
ing suspicions must awaken thereby in the poor unhinged 
soul; and forsooth, how the ultimate philosophy and 
scepticism of the woman casts anchor at this point! — 
Afterwards the same profound silence as before: and 
often even a silence to herself, a shutting of her eyes to 
herself. — Young wives on that account make great efforts 
to appear superficial and thoughtless; the most ingenious 
of them simulate a kind of impudence. — Wives easily 
feel their husbands as a question-mark to their honour, 
and their children as an apology or atonement, — they re- 
quire children, and wish for them in quite another spirit 
than a husband wishes for them. — In short, one cannot 
be gentle enough towards women ! 104-105 

Of what consequence is all our art in artistic products, 
if that higher art, the art of the festival, be lost by 

US'? 124 

The best thing I could say in honour of Shakespeare, 
the ?nan, is that he believed in Brutus and cast not a 
shadow of suspicion on the kind of virtue which Brutus 
represents! 131 

We must rest from ourselves occasionally by contem- 
plating and looking down upon ourselves, and by laugh- 
ing or weeping over ourselves from an artistic remote- 
ness: we must discover the hero, and likewise the fool, 
that is hidden in our passion for knowledge ; we must now 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 123 

and then be joyful in our folly, that we may continue to 
be joyful in our wisdom! And just because we are 
heavy and serious men in our ultimate depth, and are 
rather weights than men, there is nothing that does us 
so much good as the fool's cap and bells: we need them 
in presence of ourselves — we need all arrogant, soaring, 
dancing, mocking, childish and blessed Art, in order not 
to lose the free dominion over tilings which our ideal de- 
mands Of US. 146 

The general character of the world ... is to all 
eternity chaos ; not by the absence of necessity, but in the 
sense of the absence of order, structure, form, beauty, 
wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic humanities are 
called. Judged by our reason, the unlucky casts are far 
oftenest the rule, the exceptions are not the secret pur- 
pose ; and the whole musical box repeats eternally its air, 
which can never be called a melody, — and finally the 
very expression, "unlucky cast" is already an anthropo- 
morphising which involves blame. But how could we 
presume to blame or praise the universe ! Let us be on 
our guard against ascribing to it heartlessness and un- 
reason, or their opposites ; it is neither perfect, nor beauti- 
ful, nor noble; nor does it seek to be anything of the 
kind, it does not at all attempt to imitate man! It is 
altogether unaffected by our aesthetic and moral judg- 
ments! Neither has it any self-preservative instinct, 
nor instinct at all; it also knows no law. Let us be on 
our guard against saying that there are laws in nature. 
There are only necessities: there is no one who com- 
mands, no one who obeys, no one who transgresses. 
When you know that there is no design, you know also 
that there is no chance: for it is only where there is a 
world of design that the word "chance" has a meaning. 



124 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Let us be on our guard against saying that death is con- 
trary to life. The living being is only a species of dead 
being, and a very rare species. — Let us be on our guard 
against thinking that the world eternally creates the new. 
There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is 
just another such error as the God of the Eleatics. 152-153. 

Man has been reared by his errors : firstly, he saw him- 
self always imperfect; secondly, he attributed to himself 
imaginary qualities ; thirdly, he felt himself in a false po- 
sition in relation to the animals and nature; fourthly, he 
always devised new tables of values, and accepted them 
for a time as eternal and unconditioned, so that at one 
time this, and at another time that human impulse or 
state stood first, and was ennobled in consequence. 
When one has deducted the effect of these four errors, 
one has also deducted humanity, humaneness, and "hu- 
man dignity." ieo 

Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual. iei 

There is no such thing as health in itself, and all at- 
tempts to define a thing in that way have lamentably 
failed. It is necessary to know thy aim, thy horizon, 
thy powers, thy impulses, thy errors, and especially the 
ideals and fantasies of thy soul, in order to determine 
what health implies even for thy body. ies 

Mystical explanations are regarded as profound; the 
truth is that they do not even go the length of being 
superficial, ieo 

I set the following propositions against those of Scho- 
penhauer : — Firstly, in order that Will may arise, an idea 
of pleasure and pain is necessary. Secondly, that a vig- 
orous excitation may be felt as pleasure or pain, is the 
affair of the interpreting intellect, which, to be sure, oper- 
ates thereby for the most part unconsciously to us, and 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 125 

one and the same excitation may be interpreted as pleas- 
ure or pain. Thirdly, it is only in an intellectual being 
that there is pleasure, displeasure and Will ; the immense 
majority of organisms have nothing of the kind. 171 

Prayer has been devised for such men as have never 
any thoughts of their own, and to whom an elevation of 
the soul is unknown, or passes unnoticed. 171 

Sin, as it is at present felt wherever Christianity pre- 
vails or has prevailed, is a Jewish feeling and a Jewish 
invention. 174 

A Jesus Christ was only possible in a Jewish landscape 
— I mean in one over which the gloomy and sublime 
thunder-cloud of the angry Jehovah hung continually, ne 

Where there is ruling there are masses: where there 
are masses there is need of slavery. Where there is 
slavery the individuals are but few, and have the in- 
stincts and conscience of the herd opposed to them, iss 

We love the grandeur of Nature and have discovered 
it; that is because human grandeur is lacking in our 
minds. i 8 e 

Egoism is the perspective law of our sentiment, ac- 
cording to which the near appears large and momentous, 
while in the distance the magnitude and importance of 
all things diminish. i8 7 

He who knows that he is profound strives for clear- 
ness; he who would like to appear profound to the multi- 
tude strives for obscurity. The multitude thinks every- 
thing profound of which it cannot see the bottom; it is 
so timid and goes so unwillingly into the water. 190 

Thoughts are the shadows of our sentiments — always, 
however, obscurer, emptier, and simpler. 192 

To laugh means to love mischief, but with a good con- 
science. 196 



126 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Virtue gives happiness and a state of blessedness only 
to those who have a strong faith in their virtue:— not, 
however, to the more refined souls whose virtue consists 
of a profound distrust of themselves and of all virtue. 
After all, therefore, it is "faith that saves" here also! — 
and be it well observed, not virtue! ios 

Although the most intelligent judges of the witches, 
and even the witches themselves, were convinced of the 
guilt of witchcraft, the guilt, nevertheless, was not there. 
So it is with all guilt. 205 

It makes me happy to see that men d'o not want to 
think at all of the idea of death ! I would fain do some- 
thing to make the idea of life even a hundred times more 
worthy of their attention. 215-216 

~ I greet all the signs indicating that a more manly and 
warlike age is commencing, which will, above all, bring 
heroism again into honour! For it has to prepare the 
way for a yet higher age, and gather the force which the 
latter will one day require, — the age which will carry 
heroism into knowledge, and wage war for the sake of 
ideas and their consequences. 218-219 

They are disagreeable to me, those men in whom every 
natural inclination forthwith becomes a disease, some- 
thing disfiguring, or even disgraceful. They have se- 
duced us to the opinion that the inclinations and impulses 
of men are evil; they are the cause of our great injustice 
to our own nature, and to all nature ! There are enough 
of men who may yield to their impulses gracefully and 
carelessly: but they do not do so, for fear of that imag- 
inary "evil thing" in nature! That is the cause why 
there is so little nobility to be found among men : the in- 
dication of which will always be to have no fear of one- 
self, to expect nothing disgraceful from oneself, to fly 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 127 

without hesitation whithersoever we are impelled — we 
free-born birds! Wherever we come, there will always 
be freedom and sunshine around us. 229 

Every one knows at present that the ability to endure 
contradiction is a high indication of culture. Some peo- 
ple even know that the higher man courts opposition, and 
provokes it, so as to get a cue to his hitherto unknown 
partiality. But the ability to contradict, the attainment 
of good conscience in hostility to the accustomed, the tra- 
ditional and the hallowed, — that is more than both the 
above-named abilities, and is the really great, new and 
astonishing thing in our culture, the step of all steps of 
the emancipated intellect: who knows that? 232 

In the main all those moral systems are distasteful to 
me which say: "Do not do this! Renounce! Over- 
come thyself!" On the other hand I am favourable to 
those moral systems which stimulate me to do something, 
and to do it again from morning till evening, and dream 
of it at night, and think of nothing else but to do it well, 
as well as it is possible for me alone ! . . . 23s 

In pain there is as much wisdom as in pleasure: like 
the latter it is one of the best self-preservatives of a spe- 
cies. Were it not so, pain would long ago have been 
done away with ; that it is hurtful is no argument against 
it, for to be hurtful is its very essence. 247 

One form of honesty has always been lacking among 
founders of religions and their kin: — they have never 
made their experiences a matter of the intellectual con- 
science. . . . But we who are different, who are thirsty 
for reason, want to look as carefully into our experi- 
ences, as in the case of a scientific experiment, hour by 
hour, day by day! We ourselves want to be our own 
experiments, and our own subjects of experiment. 24s 



128 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Let us no longer think so much about punishing, blam- 
ing, improving! We shall seldom be able to alter an 
individual, and if we should succeed in doing so, some- 
thing else may also succeed, perhaps unawares: we may 
have been altered by him! Let us rather see to it that 
our own influence on all that is to come outweighs and 
overweighs his influence! Let us not struggle in direct 
conflict! — all blaming, punishing, and desire to improve 
comes under this category. 249 

Who could know how to laugh well and live well, who 
did not first understand the full meaning of war and vic- 
tory*? ... 250 

That delightful animal, man, seems to lose his good- 
humour whenever he thinks well ; he becomes "serious" ! 
And "where there is laughing and gaiety, thinking cannot 
be worth anything:" — so speaks the prejudice of this seri- 
ous animal against all "Joyful Wisdom." 252-253 

If you had thought more acutely, observed more ac- 
curately, and had learned more, you would no longer 
under all circumstances call this and that your "duty" 
and your "conscience": the knowledge how moral judg- 
ments have in general always originated, would make 
you tired of these pathetic words. . . . 2 ei 

We would seek to become what we are, — the new, the 
unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and 
creating ourselves! And for this purpose we must be- 
come the best students and discoverers of all the laws and 
necessities in the world. We must be physicists in order 
to be creators in that sense, — whereas hitherto all ap- 
preciations and ideals have been based on ignorance of 
physics, or in contradiction to it. 263 

Our "benefactors" lower our value and volition more 
than our enemies. 205 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 129 

It is always a metaphysical belief on which our belief 
in science rests, — and that even we knowing ones of to- 
day, the godless and anti-metaphysical, still take our fire 
from the conflagration kindled by a belief a millennium 
old, the Christian belief, which was also the belief of 
Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine. 279 

Belief is always most desired, most pressingly needed 
where there is a lack of will : for the will, as emotion of 
command, is the distinguishing characteristic of sover- 
eignty and power. That is to say, the less a person 
knows how to command, the more urgent is his desire for 
one who commands, who commands sternly, — a God, a 
prince, a caste, a physician, a confessor, a dogma, a party 
conscience. 2 s6 

To seek self-preservation merely, is the expression of 
a state of distress, or of limitation of the true, funda- 
mental instinct of life, which aims at the extension of 
power, and with this in view often enough calls in ques- 
tion self-preservation and sacrifices it. 289 

The subtlety and strength of consciousness are always 
in proportion to the capacity for communication of a man 
(or an animal), the capacity for communication in its 
turn being in proportion to the necessity for communica- 
tion. . . . Consciousness generally has only been de- 
veloped under the pressure of the necessity for communi- 
cation, — that from the first it has been necessary and 
useful only between man and man (especially between 
those commanding and those obeying), and has only de- 
veloped in proportion to its utility. 296-297 

The Church is under all circumstances a nobler insti- 
tution than the State. 314 

It seems to me one of my most essential steps and ad- 
vances that I have learned to distinguish the cause of 



130 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the action generally from the cause of action in a par- 
ticular manner, say, in this direction, with this aim. The 
first kind of cause is a quantum of stored-up force, which 
waits to be used in some manner, for some purpose; the 
second kind of cause, on the contrary, is something quite 
unimportant in comparison with the first, an insignificant 
hazard for the most part, in conformity with which the 
quantum of force in question "discharges" itself in some 
unique and definite manner : the lucifer-match in relation 
to the barrel of gunpowder, sn 

I will never admit that we should speak of equal rights 
in the love of man and woman: there are no such equal 
rights. The reason is that man and woman understand 
something different by the term love, — and it belongs to 
the conditions of love in both sexes that the one sex does 
not presuppose the same feeling, the same conception of 
"love," in the other sex. What woman understands by 
love is clear enough : complete surrender (not merely de- 
votion) of soul and body, without any motive, without 
any reservation, rather with shame and terror at the 
thought of a devotion restricted by clauses or associated 
with conditions. In this absence of conditions her love 
is precisely a faith: woman has no other. — Man, when 
he loves a woman, wants precisely this love from her; 
he is consequently, as regards himself, furthest removed 
from the prerequisites of feminine love; granted, how- 
ever, that there should also be men to whom on their side 
the demand for complete devotion is not unfamiliar, — 
well, they are really — not men. A man who loves like 
a woman becomes thereby a slave: a woman, however, 
who loves like a woman becomes thereby a more perfect 
woman. . . . Woman wants to be taken and accepted as 
a possession, she wishes to be merged in the conceptions 



"THE JOYFUL WISDOM" 131 

of "possession" and "possessed"; consequently she wants 
one who takes, who does not offer and give himself away, 
but who reversely is rather to be made richer in "himself" 
— by the increase of power, happiness and faith which 
the woman herself gives to him. Woman gives herself, 
man takes her. — I do not think one will get over this nat- 
ural contrast by any social contract, or with the very 
best will to do justice, however desirable it may be to 
avoid bringing the severe, frightful, enigmatical, and un- 
moral elements of this antagonism constantly before our 
eyes. For love, regarded as complete, great, and full, 
is nature, and as nature, is to all eternity something "un- 
moral." — Fidelity is accordingly included in woman's 
love, it follows from the definition thereof; with man 
fidelity may readily result in consequence of his love, per- 
haps as gratitude or idiosyncrasy of taste, and so-called 
elective affinity, but it does not belong to the essence of 
his love — and indeed so little, that one might almost be 
entitled to speak of a natural opposition between love 
and fidelity in man, whose love is just a desire to pos- 
sess, and not a renunciation and giving away; the desire 
to possess, however, comes to an end every time with the 
possession. 321-323 

Everything that is thought, versified, painted and com- 
posed, yea, even built and moulded, belongs either to 
monologic art, or to art before witnesses. Under the 
latter there is also to be included the apparently mono- 
logic art which involves the belief in God, the whole 
lyric of prayer; because for a pious man there is no soli- 
tude, — we, the godless, have been the first to devise this 
invention. 32s 

A "scientific" interpretation of the world as you under- 
stand it might consequently still be one of the stupidest, 



132 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

that is to say, the most destitute of significance, of all 
possible world-interpretations. . . . An essentially me- 
chanical world would be an essentially meaningless 

WOrld! 339-340 

We, the new, the nameless, the hard-to-understand, we 
firstlings of a yet untried future — we require for a new 
end also a new means, namely, a new healthiness, 
stronger, sharper, tougher, bolder and merrier than any 
healthiness hitherto. 351 

Another ideal runs on before us, a strange, tempting 
ideal, full of danger, to which we should not like to per- 
suade any one, because we do not so readily acknowledge 
any one's right thereto; the ideal of a spirit who plays 
naively (that is to say involuntarily and from overflow- 
ing abundance and power) with everything that has 
hitherto been called holy, good, inviolable, divine; to 
whom the loftiest conception which the people have rea- 
sonably made their measure of value, would already im- 
ply danger, ruin, abasement, or at least relaxation, blind- 
ness, or temporary self-forgetf ulness ; the ideal of a hu- 
manly superhuman welfare and benevolence, which may 
often enough appear inhuman. . . . 352-353 



"Thus Spake Zarathustra" 

THE student of Nietzsche can well afford to leave 
the reading of "Thus Spake Zarathustra" ("Also 
Sprach Zarathustra") until he has prepared himself for 
the task by studying Nietzsche's other and less obscure 
books. In both its conception and execution it differs 
markedly from all the works which preceded and fol- 
lowed it. It is written in an archaic and poetical style, 
and in many places is purposely obscure. Nietzsche did 
not intend it for the general public, and the fourth part 
was not published until seven years after its completion. 
It would have been better had "Zarathustra" been with- 
held from the presses until Nietzsche's other works had 
gained a wider recognition, for it unfortunately lays itself 
open to all manner of misunderstanding and misinter- 
pretation. In fact, it is impossible to read "Thus Spake 
Zarathustra" comprehendingly until several of the other 
books of this philosopher, such as "The Dawn of Day," 
"The Genealogy of Morals" and "Beyond Good and 
Evil," have been consumed and assimilated. 

Unfortunately this book, because of the attractive 
medium of its style, was one of the first to fall into the 
hands of English speaking people. For many years it 
was the principal source of the many false accusations 
against Nietzsche which gained wide circulation. The 
figures of speech contained in it and the numerous para- 
bles which are used to set forth its ideas lend themselves 

J 33 



134 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

all too easily to falsities of judgment and erroneous eval- 
uations. Reading the book unpreparedly one may find 
what appear to be unexplainable contradictions and eth- 
ical sophistries. Above all, one may wrongly sense the 
absence of that higher ethical virtue which is denied Nie- 
tzsche in quarters where he is least understood, but which 
every close student of his works knows to form the basis 
of his thought. 

Nietzsche began the writing of "Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra" early in the year 1883, an< ^ ne did not finish it 
until the middle of February, 1885. The actual con- 
ception of the book came much before this time even, as 
far back as the summer of 1881. This is when the idea 
of eternal recurrence first took possession of him. At 
once he began making notes, using this idea as the basis 
of Zarathustra's teachings. At this time Nietzsche was 
just recovering from a siege of ill health which had ex- 
tended over many years, and no doubt the buoyant and 
rhapsodic form in which he conceived this work was due 
to his sudden acquisition of bodily health. The first 
part was written in ten days, the second part a few 
months later, and the third part in the autumn of the 
same year. But it was not until after a lapse of eighteen 
months that the fourth and last section was completed. 
Because of this long interval we see a radical difference 
between the first three parts of the book and the last 
part. The language remains very much the same 
throughout — spectacular, poetic and symbolic — but the 
form is changed. The epigrammatic and non-sequacious 
mandates give way to a long connected parable. The 
psalmodic brevity of the utterances of the first three sec- 
tions is supplanted by description and narrative. A 
story runs through the entire fourth part; and it is in 



'THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 135 

the obscurities of this fable, rather than in any specific 
statements, that we must seek the gist of Nietzsche's 
doctrines. This would be an impossible task were we 
not more or less familiar with his other books. Yet, 
once we understand the general trend of his thought, we 
can penetrate at once to the meanings hidden in the fan- 
tastic divagations of his story and can understand the 
dithyrambic utterances of both Zarathustra and the 
"higher men" in the cave. 

"Thus Spake Zarathustra" is unique for the reason 
that there are few points in Nietzsche's system of ethic 
— and for the most part they are the unimportant ones — 
which we cannot find somewhere in its pages. But do 
not think that one can grasp an idea of the sweep of his 
entire thought merely by reading this book. Even in 
the most simply worded and most lucidly phrased pas- 
sages one would find difficulty in following the steps in 
his philosophy, unless there had been considerable pre- 
paratory study. To be sure, there are numerous isolated 
epigrams and bits of observation which are easily under- 
stood, but their mere isolation very often robs them of 
the true meaning they hold when related to the other 
precepts. The very literalness with which these pas- 
sages have been taken by those who have read "Zara- 
thustra" before studying any of the other works of Nie- 
tzsche, accounts in a large measure for the ignorance in 
which he is held even by those who profess to have read 
him and understood him. A philosophy such as his, the 
outposts of which are so far removed from the routine 
of our present social life, is naturally hampered by the 
restricted connotation of current words — even those tech- 
nical words used to express abstract and infinite things. 
For this reason it is inevitable that false meanings should 



136 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

attach to many of his statements, and that misunder- 
standings should arise in quarters where there does not 
exist a previous general knowledge of the co-ordinated 
structure of his teachings. This general knowledge can- 
not be gained from "Thus Spake Zarathustra." Many 
of its pages are entirely without significance to the reader 
not already acquainted with Nietzsche's thought. And 
much of its nomenclature is meaningless without the ex- 
planations to be found in the main body of his work. 

For the reader, however, who picks up this book after 
having equipped himself for an understanding of it, there 
is much of fascination and stimulation. Nietzsche re- 
garded it as his most intimate and personal, and there- 
fore his most important, work. He even had plans for 
two more parts which were to be included in it. But 
these were never finished. The indifference with which 
the book was received, even by those on whose sympathy 
and understanding he had most counted, reacted unfa- 
vourably upon him. It is nevertheless, just as it stands, 
one of the most remarkable pieces of philosophic litera- 
ture of modern times. Its form alone makes it unique. 
Instead of stating his beliefs directly and without circum- 
locution, as was always his method both before and after 
the writing of this book, Nietzsche chose for his mouth- 
piece a poet and philosopher borrowed from the Per- 
sians, namely: Zoroaster. This sage of the ancients was 
used as a symbol of the higher man. Into his mouth 
were put Nietzsche's own ideas in the form of parables, 
admonitions, exhortations and discourses. The wander- 
ings and experiences of this Zoroaster are chronicled, and 
each event in his life embodies a meaning in direct ac- 
cord with the Nietzschean system of conduct. 

Because of the Persian origin of Zoroaster one might 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 137 

imagine that influences of Persian philosophy would be 
discoverable in the teachings of this nomadic poet. But 
with the name all similarity between the spokesman and 
his doctrines ends. Nietzsche's choice of Zoroaster as 
his mouthpiece grew out of his early admiration for the 
Persians who, he declared, "were the first to take a broad 
and comprehensive view of history." As we see Zoroas- 
ter in this book we recognise him at once as none other 
than Nietzsche himself; and the experiences through 
which he goes in his wanderings are but picturesquely 
stated accounts of Nietzsche's own sufferings, raptures, 
aspirations and disappointments. To those familiar with 
Nietzsche's life, many of the characters introduced in the 
book will be recognised as portraitures of men whose 
lives crossed that of the philosopher. Likewise, many 
of the parables and fables are thinly disguised accounts 
of the incidents in his own life. In the last part of the 
book we find Nietzsche creating a fantastic poet to rep- 
resent Wagner, and holding him up to severe and un- 
compromising criticism. 

Zoroaster, as he appears in this book, is an itinerant 
law-giver and prophet who seeks the waste places of the 
earth, the mountains, plains and sea shores, avoiding 
mankind and carrying with him two symbolic animals, 
an eagle and a snake. At the end of his wanderings he 
discovers a lion which is for him the sign that his jour- 
ney is drawing to a close, for this lion represents all that 
is best and most powerful in nature. The book is com- 
prised of the discourses and sermons which Zoroaster de- 
livers from day to day to the occasional disciples and 
unbelievers who cross the path of his wanderings. There 
are conversations between him and his accompanying ani- 
mals; and in the last part of the book he gathers together 



138 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

in his cave a number of men representing types of the 
higher man and talks with them. In all his discourses 
he makes use of a rhapsodic and poetic style, not unlike 
that found in the Psalms of David. The text telling of 
Zoroaster's wanderings and experiences is cast in the man- 
ner of the early religious books of the Orientals. 

"Thus Spake Zarathustra" was the first book to follow 
"Human, All-Too-Human," "The Dawn of Day" and 
"The Joyful Wisdom," and many of Nietzsche's con- 
structive ideas are presented here for the first time. Part 
I is more lucid and can be more easily understood than 
the parts which follow. In it Nietzsche designates the 
classes of humanity and differentiates between them. 
His three famous metamorphoses of the spirit — sym- 
bolised by the camel, the lion and the child — are stated 
and explained. Here we find the philosopher's most 
widely quoted passages pertaining to marriage and child- 
bearing; his doctrine of war and peace; and those pas- 
sages wherein he reverses the beatitudes. The passions 
and preferences of the individual are criticised in their 
relation to the higher man, and the more obvious instincts 
are analysed. Nietzsche outlines methods of conduct, 
and dissects the actions and attitudes of his disciples, 
praising them or blaming them in accordance with his 
own values. He presents an illuminating analysis of 
charity, and outlines in his chapter, "The Bestowing Vir- 
tue," the conditions under which it may become a means 
to existence. He poses the problem of relative morality, 
and suggests the lines along which his thesis will be de- 
veloped at a later date. The superman is defined briefly 
but with a completeness sufficient for us to sense his rela- 
tion to the philosophical scheme of which he is a part. 
The conception of the superman was founded on Dar- 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 139 

win's doctrine of organic evolution, and Nietzsche seeks 
to bring this superman about by the application of the 
law of natural selection and by giving the law of the 
survival of the fittest an open field for operation. Here, 
too, we have the statement of Nietzsche's racial ideal: 
the highest exemplars of the race, and not a standardized 
goal, is the aim of his philosophy. 

In Part II the doctrine of the will to power is clearly 
set forth in its framework. The chapter wherein this 
appears — "Self-Surpassing" — is merely a brief exposi- 
tion founded on observation. The development of this 
idea is not to be found until toward the end of Nie- 
tzsche's life; but that the theory was clearly conceived 
in his mind is evidenced by the fact that it is constantly 
being applied throughout the remainder of his works. 
In its present form it is no more than a statement, but so 
clearly is it presented that one is able to grasp its sig- 
nificance and to determine in just what manner it differed 
from the Darwinian and Spencerian doctrines. In this 
same section are contained many personal chapters, in- 
cluding an excoriation of his early critics, a comparison 
between himself and Schopenhauer, an account of his 
early anti-scholastic warfare, a criticism of modern scien- 
tific methods, a reference to his friendship with Wagner, 
and an expression of regret at the misunderstanding 
which greeted his earlier works. One of the final chap- 
ters offers a definition of "profundity" which goes deep 
into the very undercurrents of his philosophy. 

The most important material to be found in the book 
is encountered in Part III. Under the caption, "The 
Old and the New Tables," we have an important sum- 
ming up of the principal teachings in the Nietzschean 
philosophical scheme. Here also we meet the doctrine 



140 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of eternal recurrence which, as I have said, generated 
the conception of this book. Its present statement is 
limited to a few tentative speculations; later on it was 
developed and set forth with greater force and certainty. 
But despite the fact that in his autobiography Nietzsche 
calls this speculative philosophic doctrine "the highest 
of all possible formulae of a Yea-saying philosophy," too 
much importance must not be attached to it in its relation 
to his writings. In the first place it was by no means 
new with him: he himself reconnoitred a bit in one of 
his early essays looking for its possible origin. And in 
the second place it had little influence on his main doc- 
trine of the superman. Although he spent considerable 
time and space in its elucidation, it never became an in- 
tegral part of any of his teachings. Rather was it some- 
thing superimposed on his other formulae — a condition 
introduced into the actualities of his conception of the 
universe. I am inclined to think that he flirted with this 
idea of recurrence largely because it was the most dis- 
heartening obstacle he could conceive in the path of the 
superman ; and as no obstacle was too great to be faced 
triumphantly by this man of the future, he imposed this 
condition of eternal recurrence upon him as an ultimate 
test of fortitude. This idea would have added the final 
touch of futility to ambition, and Nietzsche could not 
conceive of true greatness in man unless futility was at 
the bottom of all ambitions. However, it is possible to 
eliminate the entire idea of eternal recurrence from Nie- 
tzsche's work without altering fundamentally any of his 
main teachings, for it is, in his very conception of it, a 
deputy condition of existence. 

Part IV, the narrative section, answers the query often 
raised: For whom is Nietzsche's philosophy intended? 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 141 

It does away once and for all with the assumption of cer- 
tain critics that his writings were for all classes. In 
fact, this assumption, constantly posited by scholars — 
even those who claim to possess an intimate knowledge 
of Nietzsche's work — is nowhere borne out in his text. 
As far back as "Thoughts out of Season" the reverse of 
this supposition was inferentially stated; and in "The 
Antichrist" and "The Will to Power" we have definite 
denials that his doctrines were intended for every one. 
Yet one is constantly encountering critical refutations of 
his philosophy based on the theory that he addressed his 
teachings to all men. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. He held no vision of a race of supermen: a 
millennium founded on the exertion of power was neither 
his aim nor his hope. His philosophy was entirely aris- 
tocratic. It was a system of ethics designed for the mas- 
ters of the race; and his books were gifts for the intelli- 
gent man alone. Locke, Rousseau and Hume are often 
brought forward by critics as answers to his attempts at 
transvaluation ; but a close inspection of Nietzsche's defi- 
nition of slave-morality, which was an important factor 
in his ethical scheme, will show that it is possible to ac- 
cept the philosophy of the superman without abrogating 
the softer ethics of these three other thinkers. Nietzsche's 
stand in regard to his audience is made obvious in the 
fable of Zarathustra. The poet-philosopher experiences 
the instinct for pity, but on going out into the world, he 
recognises this instinct as pertaining only to the "higher 
men." When he finds numerous of these men in danger 
from the ignorance of the populace and from the restric- 
tions of environment, he leads them to his cave, and there, 
isolated from the inferior man, discourses with them 
on the problems of life and points out to them the 



142 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

course they must take in order to bring about the super- 
man. 

Because of the nature of the book it is extremely diffi- 
cult to select detached passages from it which will give 
an entirely adequate idea of its contents. Often a single 
philosophical point will be contained in a long parable, 
and the only way to present that point in Nietzsche's own 
words would have been to embody the whole parable in 
this chapter. That, of course, would have been impos- 
sible. Therefore, many of the ideas set forth in the book 
have not been included in the following excerpts. Part 
IV does not lend itself at all to mutilation, and I have 
been unable to take anything save a few general passages 
from this section. However, "Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra" is not a book to which one should go to become 
familiar with Nietzsche's teachings. When one sits down 
to read it, my advice is that the notes of Mr. Anthony 
M. Ludovici which are to be found in the appendix of 
the standard English edition, be followed closely. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 

I teach you the Superman. . . Man is something that is 
to be surpassed. 6 

What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing 
of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Super- 
man : a laughing-stock, a thing of shame. 6 

Ye have made your way from the worm to man, and 
much within you is still worm. Once were ye apes, and 
even yet man is more of an ape than any of the apes. ? 

I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth. 
and believe not those who speak unto you of super- 
earthly hopes! Poisoners are they, whether they know 
it or not. ? 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 143 

To blaspheme the earth is now the dreadfulest 
sin. ... 7 

Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the 
Superman — a rope over an abyss. 9 

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a 
goal. ... 9 

I tell you: one must still have chaos in one, to give 
birth to a dancing star. ... 12 

Three metamorphoses of the spirit do I designate to 
you: how the spirit becometh a camel, the camel a lion, 
and the lion at last a child. 

Many heavy things are there for the spirit, the strong 
load-bearing spirit in which reverence dwelleth: for the 
heavy and the heaviest longeth its strength. 

What is heavy"? so asketh the load-bearing spirit; then 
kneeleth it down like the camel, and wanteth to be well 
laden. 

What is the heaviest thing, ye heroes'? asketh the load- 
bearing spirit, that I may take it upon me and rejoice in 
my strength. 

Is it not this: To humiliate oneself in order to mor- 
tify one's pride? To exhibit one's folly in order to 
mock at one's wisdom? 

Or is it this : To desert our cause when it celebrateth 
its triumph? To ascend high mountains to tempt the 
tempter? 

Or is it this: To feed on the acorns and grass of 
knowledge, and for the sake of truth to suffer hunger of 
soul? 

Or is it this: To be sick and dismiss comforters, and 
make friends of the deaf, who never hear thy requests ? 

Or is it this: To go into foul water when it is the 
water of truth, and not disclaim cold frogs and hot toads ? 



144 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Or is it this: To love those who despise us, and give 
one's hand to the phantom when it is going to frighten 
us? 

All these heaviest things the load-bearing spirit taketh 
upon itself: and like the camel, which, when laden, 
hasteneth into the wilderness, so hasteneth the spirit into 
its wilderness. 

But in the loneliest wilderness happeneth the second 
metamorphosis: here the spirit becometh a lion; free- 
dom will it capture, and lordship in its own wilderness. 

Its last Lord it here seeketh : hostile will it be to him, 
and to its last God; for victory will it struggle with the 
great dragon. 

What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer 
inclined to call Lord and God"? "Thou shalt," is the 
great dragon called. But the spirit of the lion saith, 
"I will." 

"Thou shalt," lieth in its path, sparkling with gold — 
a scale-covered beast; and on every scale glittereth 
golden, "Thou shalt!" 

The values of a thousand years glitter on those scales, 
and thus speaketh the mightiest of all dragons: "All 
the values of things — glitter on me." 

"All values have already been created, and all created 
values — do I represent. Verily, there shall be no 'I will' 
any more." Thus speaketh the dragon. 

My brethren, wherefore is there need of the lion in 
the spirit'? Why sufficeth not the beast of burden, which 
renounceth and is reverent 1 ? 

To create new values — that, even the lion cannot yet 
accomplish: but to create itself freedom for new creat- 
ing — that can the might of the lion do. 

To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 145 

unto duty: for that, my brethren, there is need of the 
lion. 

To assume the right to new values — that is the most 
formidable assumption for a load-bearing and reverent 
spirit. Verily, unto such a spirit it is preying, and the 
work of a beast of prey. 

As its holiest, it once loved "Thou shalt": now is it 
forced to find illusion and arbitrariness even in the holi- 
est things, that it may capture freedom from its love : the 
lion is needed for this capture. 

But tell me, my brethren, what the child can do, which 
even the lion could not do 1 ? Why hath the preying lion 
still to become a child ? 

Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new be- 
ginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, 
a holy Yea. 

Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is 
needed a holy Yea unto life: its own will, willeth now 
the spirit; his own world winneth the world's outcast. 

Three metamorphoses of the spirit have I designated 
to you : how the spirit became a camel, the camel a lion, 
and the lion at last a child. 25-27 

A new pride . . . teach I unto men: no longer to 
thrust the head into the sand of celestial things, but to 
carry it freely, a terrestrial head, which giveth meaning 
to the earth! 

A new will teach I unto men : to choose that path which 
man hath followed blindly, and to approve of it — and 
no longer to slink aside from it, like the sick and per- 
ishing ! 

The sick and perishing— it was they who despised the 
body and the earth, and invented the heavenly world, 
and the redeeming blood-drops ; but even those sweet and 



146 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

sad poisons they borrowed from the body and the 
earth . 33-34 

The awakened one, the knowing one, saith: "Body 
am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the 
name of something in the body." 35 

The body is a big sagacity, a plurality with one sense, 
a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd. 

An instrument of thy body is also thy little sagacity, 
my brother, which thou callest "spirit" — a little instru- 
ment and plaything of thy big sagacity. 

Instruments and playthings are sense and spirit: be- 
hind them there is still the Self. The Self seeketh with 
the eyes of the senses, it hearkeneth also with the ears of 
the spirit. 3 e 

Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is 
a mighty lord, an unknown sage — it is called Self; it 
dwelleth in thy body, it is thy body, se 

When thou hast a virtue, and it is thine own virtue, 
thou hast it in common with no one. ss 

If thou be fortunate, then wilt thou have one virtue 
and no more : thus goest thou easier over the bridge. 39 

"Enemy" shall ye say but not "villain," "invalid" shall 
ye say but not "wretch," "fool" shall ye say but not 
"sinner." 41 

Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath 
written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou 
wilt find that blood is spirit. 43 

Ye look aloft when ye long for exaltation; and I look 
downward because I am exalted. 

Who among you can at the same time laugh and be 
exalted? 

He who climbeth on the highest mountains, laugheth 
at all tragic plays and tragic realities. 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 147 

Courageous, unconcerned, scornful, coercive — so wis- 
dom wisheth us ; she is a woman, and ever loveth a war- 
rior, a 

It is true we love life; not because we are wont to 
live, but because we are wont to love, 44 

I should only believe in a God that would know how 
to dance. 45 

Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, 
let us slay the spirit of gravity! 45 

Full is the earth of the superfluous; marred is life by 
the many-too-many. May they be decoyed out of this 
life by the "life eternal" ! 49 

Ye are not great enough not to know of hatred and 
envy. Then be great enough not to be ashamed of 
them! 51 

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars — and the 
short peace more than the long. 

You I advise not to work, but to fight. You, I ad- 
vise not to peace, but to victory. Let your work be a 
fight, let your peace be a victory! 52 

Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war 1 ? 
I say unto you : it is the good war which halloweth every 
cause. 52. 

"What is good?" ye ask. To be brave is good. 52 

Ye shall only have enemies to be hated, but not ene- 
mies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your ene- 
mies; then, the successes of your enemies are also your 
successes. 53 

A state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. 
Coldly lieth it also ; and this lie creepeth from its mouth : 
"I, the state, am the people." 54 

Just see these superfluous ones ! They steal the works 
of the inventors and the treasures of the wise. Culture, 



148 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

they call their theft — and everything becometh sickness 
and trouble unto them! ss 

Around the devisers of new values revolveth the 
world: — invisibly it revolveth. But around the actors 
revolve the people and the glory: such is the course of 
things. 58 

Would that ye were perfect — at least as animals! 
But to animals belongeth innocence, ei 

Chastity is a virtue with some, but with many almost 
a vice, ei 

To whom chastity is difficult, it is to be dissuaded: 
lest it become the road to hell — to filth and lust of soul. 62 

If one would have a friend, then must one also be 
willing to wage war for him : and in order to wage war, 
one must be capable of being an enemy. 63 

In one's friend one shall have one's best enemy. Thou 
shalt be closest unto him with thy heart when thou with- 
standest him. 63 

Art thou a slave? Then thou canst not be a friend. 
Art thou a tyrant*? Then thou canst not have friends. 

Far too long hath there been a slave and a tyrant con- 
cealed in woman. On that account woman is not yet 
capable of friendship: she knoweth only love. 

In woman's love there is injustice and blindness to all 
she doth not love. And even in woman's conscious love, 
there is still always surprise and lightning and night, 
along with the light, es 

Values did man only assign to things in order to main- 
tain himself — he created only the significance of things, 
a human significance! Therefore, calleth he himself 
"man," that is, the valuator. 6 t 

A thousand goals have there been hitherto, for a thou- 
sand peoples have there been. Only the fetter for the 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 149 

thousand necks is still lacking; there is lacking the one 
goal. As yet humanity hath not a goal. 6 s 

Do I advise you to neighbour-love'? Rather do I ad- 
vise you to neighbour-flight and to furthest love! 

Higher than love to your neighbour is love to the 
furthest and future ones; higher still than love to men, 
is love to things and phantoms. 

The phantom that runneth on before thee, my brother, 
is fairer than thou; why dost thou not give unto it thy 
flesh and thy bones'? ... 69 

Art thou one entitled to escape from a yoke"? Many 
a one hath cast away his final worth when he hath cast 
away his servitude. 

Free from what? What doth that matter to Zara- 
thustra! Clearly, however, shall thine eye show unto 
me : free for what? 71 

Everything in woman is a riddle, and everything in 
woman hath one solution — it is called pregnancy. 

Man is for woman, a means : the purpose is always the 
child. But what is woman for man? 

Two different things wanteth the true man: danger 
and diversion. Therefore wanteth he woman, as the 
most dangerous plaything. 

Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recre- 
ation of the warrior: all else is folly. 

Two sweet fruits — these the warrior liketh not. 
Therefore liketh he woman; — bitter is ever the sweetest 
woman. 

Better than man doth woman understand children, but 
man is more childish than woman. 

In the true man there is a child hidden : it wanteth to 
play. Up then, ye women, and discover the child in 
man! 



150 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

A plaything let woman be, pure and fine like the pre- 
cious stone, illumined with the virtues of a world not yet 
come. 

Let the beam of a star shine in your love ! Let your 
hope say: "May I bear the Superman!" 

In your love let there be valour! With your love 
shall ye assail him who inspireth you with fear ! 

In your love be your honour ! Little doth woman un- 
derstand otherwise about honour. But let this be your 
honour : always to love more than ye are loved, and never 
be the second. 

Let man fear woman when she loveth: then maketh 
she every sacrifice, and everything else she regardeth as 
worthless. 

Let man fear woman when she hateth : for man in his 
innermost soul is merely evil ; woman, however, is mean. 

Whom hateth woman most 4 ? — Thus spake the iron to 
the loadstone: "I hate thee most, because thou attract- 
est, but art too weak to draw unto thee." 

The happiness of man is, "I will." The happiness of 
woman is, "He will." 76 

Thou goest to women 1 ? Do not forget thy whip! 77 

When ... ye have an enemy, then return him not 
good for evil: for that would abash him. But prove 
that he hath done something good to you. 

And rather be angry than abash any one ! And when 
ye are cursed, it pleaseth me not that ye should then de- 
sire to bless. Rather curse a little also ! 73 

Tell me: where find we justice, which is love with see- 
ing eyes? 73 

Thou art young, and desirest child and marriage. But 
I ask thee: Art thou a man entitled to desire a child*? 

Art thou the victorious one, the self-conqueror, the 






"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 151 

ruler of thy passions, the master of thy virtues'? Thus 
do I ask thee. 

Or doth the animal speak in thy wish, and necessity? 
Or isolation? Or discord in thee? 

I would have thy victory and freedom long for a child. 
Living monuments shalt thou build to thy victory and 
emancipation. 

Beyond thyself shalt thou build. But first of all must 
thou be built thyself, rectangular in body and soul. 79 

Marriage : so call I the will of the twain to create the 
one that is more than those who created it. so 

That which the many-too-many call marriage, those 
superfluous ones — ah, what shall I call it? 

Ah, the poverty of soul in the twain! Ah, the filth 
of soul in the twain ! Ah, the pitiable self-complacency 
in the twain! 

Marriage they call it all ; and they say their marriages 
are made in heaven. 

Well, I do not like it, that heaven of the superfluous ; 
No, I do not like them, those animals tangled in the 
heavenly toils! 

Far from me also be the God who limpeth thither to 
bless what he hath not matched ! 

Laugh not at such marriages! What child hath not 
had reason to weep over its parents? so 

Every one regardeth dying as a great matter: but as 
yet death is not a festival. Not yet have people learned 
to inaugurate the finest festivals. 8 2 

My death, praise I unto you, the voluntary death, 
which cometh unto me because I want it. 

And when shall I want it? — He that hath a goal and 
an heir, wanteth death at the right time for the goal and 
the heir, ss 



152 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

It is your thirst to become sacrifices and gifts your- 
selves: and therefore have ye the thirst to accumulate 
all riches in your soul. 

Insatiably striveth your soul for treasures and jewels, 
because your virtue is insatiable in desiring to bestow. 

Ye constrain all things to flow towards you and into 
you, so that they shall flow back again out of your foun- 
tain as the gifts of your love. 

Verily, an appropriator of all values must such be- 
stowing love become; but healthy and holy, call I this 
selfishness. 86 

When ye are exalted above praise and blame, and your 
will would command all things, as a loving one's will: 
there is the origin of your virtue. 8 t 

Remain true to the earth, my brethren, with the power 
of your virtue! Let your bestowing love and your 
knowledge be devoted to be the meaning of the earth! 
Thus do I pray and conjure you. 

Let it not fly away from the earthly and beat against 
eternal walls with its wings ! 8 & 

The man of knowledge must be able not only to love 
his enemies, but also to hate his friends. » 

Once did people say God, when they looked out upon 
distant seas; now, however, have I taught you to say, 
Superman, os 

Could ye conceive a. God"? — But let this mean Will to 
Truth unto you, that everything be transformed into the 
humanly conceivable, the humanly visible, the humanly 
sensible! Your own discernment shall ye follow out to 
the end ! 99 

Creating — that is the great salvation from suffering, 
and life's alleviation. But for the creator to appear, 
suffering itself is needed, and much transformation. 100 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 153 

What would there be to create if there were — ■ 
Gods! ioi 

Man himself is to the discerning one : the animal with 
red cheeks. 102 

Verily, I like them not, the merciful ones, whose bliss 
is in their pity : too destitute are they of bashfulness. 

If I must be pitiful, I dislike to be called so; and if I 
be so, it is preferably at a distance. 102 

Since humanity came into being, man hath enjoyed 
himself too little : that alone, my brethren, is our original 
sin ! 103 

Great obligations do not make grateful, but revenge- 
ful; and when a small kindness is not forgotten, it be- 
cometh a gnawing worm. 103 

The sting of conscience teacheth one to sting. 103 

Ah, where in the world have there been greater follies 
than with the pitiful? And what in the world hath 
caused more suffering than the follies of the pitiful 1 ? 

Woe unto all loving ones who have not an elevation 
which is above their pity ! 

Thus spake the devil unto me, once a time: "Even 
God hath his hell : it is his love for man." 105 

All great love is above all its pity: for it seeketh — 
to create what is loved ! 

"Myself do I offer unto my love, and my neighbour 
as myself — such is the language of all creators. 105 

"Here are priests : but although they are mine enemies, 
pass them quietly and with sleeping swords!" 

Even among them there are heroes ; many of them have 
suffered too much: — so they want to make others suffer. 

Bad enemies are they : nothing is more revengeful than 
their meekness. ioe 

When a person goeth through fire for his teaching — 



154 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

what doth that prove ! It is more, verily, when out of 
one's own burning cometh one's own teaching ! ios 

That your very Self be in your action, as the mother 
is in the child : let that be your formula of virtue ! n 2 

Life is a well of delight; but where the rabble also 
drink, there all fountains are poisoned, us 

Ye who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of equality! 
Tarantulas are ye unto me, and secretly revengeful 
ones! u« 

Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of im- 
potence crieth thus in you for "equality" : your most se- 
cret tyrant-longings disguise themselves thus in virtue- 
words ! 

Fretted conceit and suppressed envy — perhaps your 
fathers' conceit and envy: in you break they forth as 
flame and frenzy of vengeance, in 

Distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is power- 
ful! 

They are people of bad race and lineage ; out of their 
countenances peer the hangman and the sleuth-hound. 

Distrust all those who talk much of their justice! 
Verily, in their souls not only honey is lacking. 

And when they call themselves "the good and just," 
forget not, that for them to be Pharisees, nothing is lack- 
ing but — power ! u 8 

With these preachers of equality will I not be mixed 
up and confounded. For thus speaketh justice unto me: 
"Men are not equal." 

And neither shall they become so ! us 

Good and evil, and rich and poor, and high and low, 
and all names of values: weapons shall they be, and 
sounding signs, that life must again and again surpass 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 155 

Steadfast and beautiful, let us also be enemies, my 
friends ! Divinely will we strive against one another ! 120 

Hungry, fierce, lonesome, God-forsaken: so doth the 
lion-will wish itself. 

Free from the happiness of slaves, redeemed from Dei- 
ties and adorations, fearless and fear-inspiring, grand 
and lonesome : so is the will of the conscientious. 122 

Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to 
Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the 
will to be master. 

That to the stronger the weaker shall serve — thereto 
persuadeth he his will who would be master over a still 
weaker one. That delight alone he is unwilling to 
forego. 

And as the lesser surrendereth himself to the greater 
that he may have delight and power over the least of all, 
so doth even the greatest surrender himself, and staketh 
— life, for the sake of power. 

It is the surrender of the greatest to run risk and dan- 
ger, and play dice for death, tse 

Good and evil which would be everlasting — it doth 
not exist ! Of its own accord must it ever surpass itself 
anew. 137 

He who hath to be a creator in good and evil — verily, 
he hath first to be a destroyer, and break values in 
pieces. 13s 

Ye tell me, friends, that there is to be no dispute about 
taste and tasting 4 ? But all life is a dispute about taste 
and tasting. 

Taste : that is weight at the same time, and scales and 
weigher; and alas for every living thing that would 
live without dispute about weight and scales and 
weigher! 139 



156 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Alien to me, and a mockery, are the present-day men, 
to whom of late my heart impelled me; and exiled am I 
from fatherlands and motherlands. 

Thus do I love only my children's land, the undiscov- 
ered in the remotest sea: for it do I bid my sails search 
and search. 

Unto my children will I make amends for being the 
child of my fathers: and unto all the future — for this 
present-day! 145 

Where is innocence? Where there is will to procrea- 
tion. And he who seeketh to create beyond himself, hath 
for me the purest will. 

Where is beauty 1 ? Where I must will with my whole 
Will; where I will love and perish, that an image may 
not remain merely an image. 

Loving and perishing: these have rhymed from eter- 
nity. Will to love : that is to be ready also for death. 147 

Dare only to believe in yourselves — in yourselves and 
in your inward parts ! He who doth not believe in him- 
self always lieth. 147 

All Gods are poets-symbolisations, poet-sophistica- 
tions! 153 

"Freedom" ye all roar most eagerly: but I have un- 
learned the belief in "great events," when there is much 
roaring and smoke about them. 

And believe me, friend Hollaballoo! The greatest 
events — are not our noisiest, but our stillest hours. 

Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the 
inventors of new values, doth the world revolve; inaudi- 
bly it revolveth. iss 

To redeem what is past, and to transform every "It 
was" into "Thus would have it!" — that only do I call 
redemption! i 6 s 






"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 157 

The spirit of revenge: my friends, that hath hitherto 
been man's best contemplation ; and where there was suf- 
fering, it was claimed there was always penalty. 

"Penalty," so calleth itself revenge. With a lying 
word it feigneth a good conscience. 159 

This is my first manly prudence, that I allow myself 
to be deceived, so as not to be on my guard against de- 
ceivers. 172 

He who would not languish amongst men, must learn 
to drink out of all glasses ; and he who would keep clean 
amongst men, must know how to wash himself even with 
dirty water. 172 

Verily, there is still a future even for evil! And the 
warmest south is still undiscovered by man. 

How many things are now called the worst wicked- 
ness, which are only twelve feet broad and three months 
long! Some day, however, will greater dragons come 
into the world. 

For that the Superman may not lack his dragon, the 
superdragon that is worthy of him, there must still much 
warm sun glow on moist virgin forests ! 

Out of your wild cats must tigers have evolved, and 
out of your poison-toads, crocodiles : for the good hunter 
shall have a good hunt ! 

And verily, ye good and just! In you there is much 
to be laughed at, and especially your fear of what hath 
hitherto been called "the devil" ! 

So alien are ye in your souls to what is great, that to 
you the Superman would be frightful in his goodness ! 

And ye wise and knowing ones, ye would flee from the 
solar-glow of the wisdom in which the Superman joy- 
fully batheth his nakedness ! 

Ye highest men who have come within my ken! this 



158 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

is my doubt of you, and my secret laughter: I suspect ye 
would call my Superman — a devil ! 

Ah, I became tired of those highest and best ones: 
from their "height" did I long to be up, out, and away 
to the Superman! 

A horror came over me when I saw those best ones 
naked : then there grew for me the pinions to soar away 
into distant futures. 

Into more distant futures, into more southern souths 
than ever artist dreamed of: thither, where Gods are 
ashamed of all clothes! 

But disguised do I want to see you, ye neighbours and 
fellowmen, and well-attired and vain and estimable, as 
"the good and just"; — - 

And disguised will I myself sit amongst you — that I 
may mistake you and myself: for that is my last manly 
prudence. 174-175 

He who would become a child must surmount even 
his youth. i 7 s 

Thou goest the way to thy greatness: here shall no 
one steal after thee! Thy foot itself hath effaced the 
path behind thee, and over it standeth written: Im- 
possibility. 184 

From the gateway, This Moment, there runneth a long 
eternal lane backwards: behind us lieth an eternity. 

Must not whatever can run its course of all things, 
have already run along that lane*? Must not whatever 
can happen of all things have already happened, re- 
sulted, and gone by? 

And if everything have already existed, what thinkest 
thou, dwarf, of This Moment? Must not this gateway 
also — have already existed? 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 159 

And are not all things closely bound together in such 
wise that This Moment draweth all coming things after 
it 1 ? Consequently — itself also*? 

For whatever can run its course of all things, also in 
this long lane outward — must it once more run ! — 

And this slow spider which creepeth in the moonlight, 
and this moonlight itself, and thou and I in this gate- 
way whispering together, whispering of eternal things — 
must we not all have already existed? ise 

And must we not return and run in that other lane 
out before us, that long weird lane — must we not eter- 
nally return 1 ? 190-191 

All things are baptised at the font of eternity, and be- 
yond good and evil; good and evil themselves, however, 
are but fugitive shadows and damp afflictions and pass- 
ing clouds. 

Verily, it is a blessing and not a blasphemy when I 
teach that "above all things there standeth, the heaven 
of chance, the heaven of innocence, the heaven of hazard, 
the heaven of wantonness." 

"Of Hazard" — that is the oldest nobility in the world; 
that gave I back to all things; I emancipated them from 
bondage under purpose. 

This freedom and celestial serenity did I put like an 
azure bell above all things, when I taught that over them 
and through them, no "eternal will" — willeth. 

This wantonness and folly did I put in place of that 
will, when I taught that "In everything there is one 
thing impossible — rationality!" 201 

I pass through this people and keep mine eyes open: 
they do not forgive me for not envying their virtues. 

They bite at me, because I say unto them that for 



160 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

small people, small virtues are necessary — and because 
it is hard for me to understand that small people are 
necessary! 203 

Only he who is man enough, will — save the woman 
in woman. 205 

So much kindness, so much weakness do I see. So 
much justice and pity, so much weakness. 

Round, fair, and considerate are they to one another, 
as grains of sand are round, fair, and considerate to 
grains of sand. 

Modestly to embrace a small happiness — that do they 
call "submission" ! and at the same time they peer mod- 
estly after a new small happiness. 

In their hearts they want simply one thing most of 
all: that no one hurt them. Thus do they anticipate 
every one's wishes and do well unto every one. 

That, however, is cowardice, though it be called "vir- 
tue." 

And when they chance to speak harshly, those small 
people, then do I hear therein only their hoarseness — 
every draught of air maketh them hoarse. 

Shrewd indeed are they, their virtues have shrewd fin- 
gers. But they lack fists: their fingers do not know how 
to creep behind fists. 

Virtue for them is what maketh modest and tame: 
therewith have they made the wolf a dog, and man him- 
self man's best domestic animal. 

"We set our chair in the midst" — so saith their smirk- 
ing unto me — "and as far from dying gladiators as from 
satisfied swine." 

That, however, is — mediocrity, though it be called 
moderation. 206 

Those teachers of submission! Wherever there is 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 161 

aught puny, or sickly, or scabby, there do they creep like 
lice; and only my disgust preventeth me from cracking 
them. 207 

Too tender, too yielding: so is your soil! But for a 
tree to become great, it seeketh to twine hard roots around 
hard rocks ! 2 os 

Do ever what ye will — but first be such as can will. 20s 

Love ever your neighbour as yourselves — but first be 
such as love themselves. 2 os 

Out of love alone shall my contempt and my warning 
bird take wing; but not out of the swamp ! 2 ie 

In indulging and pitying lay ever my greatest danger; 
and all human hubbub wisheth to be indulged and tol- 
erated. 226 

He who liveth amongst the good — pity teacheth him 
to lie. Pity maketh stifling air for all free souls. For 
the stupidity of the good is unfathomable. 227 

Voluptuousness: to free hearts, a thing innocent and 
free, the garden-happiness of the earth, all the future's 
thanks overflow to the present. 

Voluptuousness: only to the withered a sweet poison; 
to the lion-willed, however, the great cordial, and the 
reverently saved wine of wines. 

Voluptuousness: the great symbolic happiness of a 
higher happiness and highest hope. For to many is mar- 
riage promised, and more than marriage. 

To many that are more unknown to each other than 
man and woman : — and who hath fully understood have 
unknown to each other are man and woman ! 

Voluptuousness: — but I will have hedges around my 
thoughts, and even around my words, lest swine and lib- 
ertine should break into my gardens ! 230 

Passion for power : the earthquake which breaketh and 



162 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

upbreaketh all that is rotten and hollow; the rolling, 
rumbling, punitive demolisher of whited sepulchres; the 
flashing interrogative-sign beside premature answers. 

Passion for power: before whose glance man creepeth 
and croucheth and drudgeth, and becometh lower than 
the serpent and the swine : — until at last great contempt 
crieth out of him, — 

Passion for power: the terrible teacher of great con- 
tempt, which preacheth to their face to cities and em- 
pires: "Away with thee!" — until a voice crieth out of 
themselves: "Away with me!" 

Passion for power: which; however, mounteth allur- 
ingly even to the pure and lonesome, and up to self- 
satisfied elevations, glowing like a love that painteth 
purple felicities alluringly on earthly heavens. 

Passion for power: but who would call it passion, 
when the height longeth to stoop for power! Verily, 
nothing sick or diseased is there in such longing and de- 
scending ! 

That the lonesome height may not for ever remain 
lonesome and self-sufficing: that the mountains may 
come to the valleys and the winds of the heights to the 
plains : 

Oh, who could find the right prenomen and honour- 
ing name for such longing! "Bestowing virtue" — thus 
did Zarathustra once name the unnamable. 

And then it happened also, — and verily, it happened 
for the first time! — that his word blessed selfishness, the 
wholesome, healthy selfishness, that springeth from the 
powerful soul: — 

From the powerful soul, to which the high body ap- 
pertaineth, the handsome, triumphing, refreshing body, 
around which everything becometh a mirror: 



"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 163 

The pliant, persuasive body, the dancer, whose symbol 
and epitome is the self-enjoying soul. Of such bodies 
and souls the self -enjoyment calleth itself "virtue." 232 

He who wisheth to become light, and be a bird, must 
love himself: — thus do I teach. 

Not, to be sure, with the love of the sick and infected, 
for with them stinketh even self-love! 

One must learn to love oneself — thus do I teach — 
with a wholesome and healthy love: that one may en- 
dure to be with oneself, and not go roving about. 

Such roving about christeneth itself "brotherly love"; 
with these words hath there hitherto been the best lying 
and dissembling, and especially by those who have been 
burdensome to every one. 

And verily, it is no commandment for to-day and to- 
morrow to learn to love oneself. Rather is it of all arts 
the finest, subtlest, last and patientest. 235 

No one yet knoweth what is good and bad : — unless it 
be the creating one ! 

It is he however createth man's goal, and giveth to 
the earth its meaning and its future: he only ejfecteth 
it that aught is good and bad. 240 

Man is a bridge and not a goal. 241 

Be not considerate of thy neighbour! Man is some- 
thing that must be surpassed. 243 

He who cannot command himself shall obey. And 
many a one can command himself, but still sorely lacketh 
self-obedience! 243 

He who is of the populace wisheth to live gratui- 
tously; we others, however, to whom life hath given itself 
— we are ever considering what we can best give in re- 
turn! 243 

One should not wish to enjoy where one doth not con- 



164 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tribute to the enjoyment. And one should not wish to 
enjoy! 243 

"Thou shalt not rob! Thou shalt not slay!" — such 
"precepts were once called holy; before them did one bow 
the knee and the head, and took off one's shoes. 

But I ask you: Where have there ever been better 
robbers and slayers in the world than such holy precepts'? 

Is there not even in all life — robbing and slaying"? 
And for such precepts to be called holy, was not truth 
itself thereby — slain? 2 *6 

Let it not be your honour henceforth whence ye come, 
but whither ye go ! Your Will and your feet which seek 
to surpass you — let these be your new honour ! 2 48 

The best shall rule, the best also willeth to rule ! And 
where the teaching is different, there — the best is lack- 
ing. 257 

Thus would I have man and woman : fit for war, the 
one, fit for maternity, the other; both, however, fit for 
dancing with head and legs. 

And lost be the day to us in which a measure hath not 
been danced. And false be every truth which hath not 
had laughter along with it ! 257 

The stupidity of the good is unfathomably wise. 

The good must crucify him who deviseth his own vir- 
tue ! That is the truth ! 

The second one, however, who discovered their coun- 
try — the country, heart and soil of the good and just, 
— it was he who asked: "Whom do they hate most?" 

The creator, hate they most, him who breaketh the 
tables and old values, the breaker, — him they call the 
law-breaker. 

For the good — they cannot create; they are always 
the beginning of the end: — 






"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" 165 

They crucify him who writeth new values on new 
tables, they sacrifice unto themselves the future — they 
crucify the whole human future ! 2 eo 

This new table, O my brethren, put I up over you: 
Become hard! 262 

Everything goeth, everything returneth; eternally 
rolleth the wheel of existence. Everything dieth, 
everything blossometh forth again; eternally runneth on 
the year of existence. 

Everything breaketh, everything is integrated anew; 
eternally buildeth itself the same house of existence. All 
things separate, all things again greet one another; eter- 
nally true to itself remaineth the ring of existence. 

Every moment beginneth existence, around every 
"Here" rolleth the ball "There." The middle is every- 
where. 266 

For man his baddest is necessary for his best. 

That all that is baddest is the best power, and the 
hardest stone for the highest creator; and that man must 
become better and badder : — 26? 

The plexus of causes returneth in which I am inter- 
twined, — it will again create me! I myself pertain to 
the causes of the eternal return. 

I come again with this sun, with this earth, with this 
eagle, with this serpent — not to a new life, or a better 
life, or a similar life: 

I come again eternally to this identical and selfsame 
life, in its greatest and its smallest, to teach again the 
eternal return of all things, — 

To speak again the word of the great noontide of 
earth and man, to announce again to man the Super- 
man. 270-271 

"Ye higher men," — so blinketh the populace — "there 



166 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

are no higher men, we are all equal; man is man, before 
God — we are all equal!" 

Before God! — Now, however, this God hath died. 
Before the populace, however, we will not be equal. Ye 
higher men, away from the market-place ! 351 

Have a good distrust to-day, ye higher men, ye en- 
heartened ones! Ye open-hearted ones! And keep 
3^our reasons secret ! For this to-day is that of the popu- 
lace. 

What the populace once learned to believe without 
reasons, who could — refute it to them by means of rea- 
sons'? 

And on the market-place one convinceth with gestures. 
But reasons make the populace distrustful. 

And when truth hath once triumphed there, then ask 
yourselves with good distrust : "What strong error hath 
fought for it?" 355 

Unlearn, I pray you, this "for," ye creating ones: 
your very virtue wisheth you to have naught to do with 
"for" and "on account of" and "because." Against these 
false little words shall ye stop your ears. 

"For one's neighbour," is the virtue only of the petty 
people : there it is said "like and like" and "hand washeth 
hand": — they have neither the right nor the power for 
your self-seeking ! 356-357 

What hath hitherto been the greatest sin here on 
earth? Was it not the word of him who said: "Woe 
unto them that laugh now !" 

Did he himself find no cause for laughter on the earth? 
Then he sought badly. A child even findeth cause for 

it. 359-360 



VI 

"The Eternal Recurrence" 

THE following excerpts from Nietzsche's notes re- 
lating to eternal recurrence are set down here 
merely as supplementary passages to "Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra," in which book this doctrine of the eternally re- 
curring irrationality of all things first made its appear- 
ance. Nietzsche's notations on this subject were un- 
doubtedly written in the latter part of 1881, when the 
idea of Zarathustra first came to him. They were not 
published, however, until years later, and now form a 
section of Volume XVI of Nietzsche's complete works 
in English, along with "The Twilight of the Idols," 
"The Antichrist" and some explanatory notes on "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra." This is the only material in Nie- 
tzsche's writings which I have not put in chronological 
order, and my reason for placing these extracts here, and 
not between "The Dawn of Day" and "The Joyful Wis- 
dom," is due to the fact that after conceiving this doc- 
trine and making notes pertaining to it, Nietzsche put 
the idea aside and wrote "The Joyful Wisdom" in which 
this doctrine was not embodied. Not until "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra" appeared did he make use of this 
principle of recurrence, and inasmuch as this was the 
first published statement of it, I have placed that book 
first and have followed it with these explanatory notes. 
Another section of Nietzsche's works also deals with 
eternal recurrence, namely: the last part of the second 

volume of "The Will to Power." But here too we find 

167 



168 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

but fragmentary jottings which contain no material not 
found in the present quotations. It is true that Nietzsche 
intended to elaborate these notes, but even had he done 
so I doubt if this doctrine would have assumed a differ- 
ent aspect from the one it at present possesses, or would 
have become more closely allied with the main structure 
of his thought; for, even though it is not fully elucidated 
in its present form, it at least is complete in its conclu- 
sions. 

In my introduction to the quotations from "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra" in the preceding chapter will be 
found a statement relating to this doctrine, in which I 
have endeavoured to point out just what influence it had 
on Nietzsche's philosophy, and to offer an explanation 
for its appearance in his thought. 

A reading of the following notes is not at all neces- 
sary for an understanding of the Nietzschean ethic, and 
I have placed these passages here solely for the student 
to whom every phase of Nietzsche's philosophy is of 
interest. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE" 

The extent of universal energy is limited; it is not 
"infinite" : we should beware of such excesses in our con- 
cepts! Consequently the number of states, changes, 
combinations, and evolutions of this energy, although it 
may be enormous and practically incalculable, is at any 
rate definite and not unlimited. The time, however, in 
which this universal energy works its changes is infinite 
—that is to say, energy remains eternally the same and 
is eternally active: — at this moment an infinity has al- 
ready elapsed, that is to say, every possible evolution 
must already have taken place. Consequently the pres- 



"THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE" 169 

ent process of evolution must be a repetition, as was also 
the one before it, as will also be the one which will fol- 
low. And so on forwards and backwards! Inasmuch 
as the entire state of all forces continually returns, every- 
thing has existed an infinite number of times. 237 

Energy remains constant and does not require to be 
infinite. It is eternally active but it is no longer able 
eternally to create new forms, it must repeat itself: that 
is my conclusion. 23s 

The energy of the universe can only have a given num- 
ber of possible qualities. 23s 

The assumption that the universe is an organism con- 
tradicts the very essence of the organic. 239 

We are forced to conclude : ( 1 ) either that the universe 
began its activity at a given moment of time and will 
end in a similar fashion, — but the beginning of activity 
is absurd; if a state of equilibrium had been reached it 
would have persisted to all eternity; (2) or there is no 
such thing as an endless number of them which continu- 
ally recurs: activity is eternal, the number of the prod^ 
ucts and states of energy is limited. 239 

The last physical state of energy which we can imag- 
ine must necessarily be the first also. The absorption 
of energy in latent energy must be the cause of the pro- 
duction of the most vital energy. For a highly positive 
state must follow a negative state. Space like matter 
is a subjective form, time is not. The notion of space 
first arose from the assumption that space could be empty. 
But there is no such thing as empty space. Everything 
is energy. 240 

Anything like a static state of energy in general is im- 
possible. If stability were possible it would already 
have been reached. 241 



170 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Physics supposes that energy may be divided up: but 
every one of its possibilities must first be adjusted to 
reality. There can therefore be no question of dividing 
energy into equal parts; in every one of its states it mani- 
fests a certain quality, and qualities cannot be subdi- 
vided: hence a state of equilibrium in energy is impos- 
sible. 241 

If equilibrium were possible it would already have 
been reached. — And if this momentary state has already 
existed then that which bore it and the previous one also 
would likewise have existed and so on backwards, — and 
from this it follows that it has already existed not only 
twice but three times, — just as it will exist again not 
only twice but three times, — in fact an infinite number 
of times backwards and forwards. That is to say, the 
whole process of Becoming consists of a repetition of a 
definite number of precisely similar states. 242 

Imaginic matter, even though in most cases it may 
once; have been organic, can have stored up no experi- 
-it is always without a past ! If the reverse were 
a repetition would be impossible — for then mat- 
ter would for ever be producing new qualities with new 

paStS. 247 

Let us guard against believing that the universe has 
a tendency to attain to certain forms, or that it aims at 
becoming more beautiful, more perfect, more compli- 
cated! All that is anthropomorphism! 243 

Our whole world consists of the ashes of an incalcu- 
lable number of living creatures : and even if living mat- 
ter is ever so little compared with the whole, everything 
has already been transformed into life once before and 
thus the process goes on. If we grant eternal time we 
must assume the eternal change of matter. 249 




"THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE" 171 

The world of energy suffers no diminution: otherwise 
with eternal time it would have grown weak and finally 
have perished altogether. The world of energy surfers 
no stationary state, otherwise this would already have 
been reached, and the clock of the universe would be at 
a standstill. The world of energy does not therefore 
reach a state of equilibrium; for no instant in its career 
has it had rest; its energy and its movement have been 
the same for all time. Whatever state this world could 
have reached must ere now have been attained, and not 
only once but an incalculable number of times. 249 

My doctrine is: Live so that thou mayest desire to 
live again, — that is thy duty, — for in any case thou wilt 
live again ! He unto whom striving is the greatest hap- 
piness, let him strive ; he unto whom peace is the greatest 
happiness, let him rest; he unto whom subordination, 
following, obedience, is the greatest happiness, let him 
obey. 251 

The mightiest of all thoughts absorbs a good deal, of 
energy which formerly stood at the disposal of other as- 
pirations, and in this way it exercises a modifying influ- 
ence ; it creates new laws of motion in energy, though ic 
new energy. 252 

Ye fancy that ye will have a long rest ere your second 
birth takes place, — but do not deceive yourselves! 
'Twixt your last moment of consciousness and the' first 
ray of the dawn of your new life no time will elapse, — 
as a flash of lightning will the space go by, even though 
living creatures think it is millions of years. ... 253 

Are ye now prepared*? Ye must have experienced 
every form of scepticism and ye must have wallowed 
with voluptuousness in ice-cold baths, — otherwise ye 
have no right to this thought; I wish to protect myself 



172 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

against those who gush over anything! I would defend 
my doctrine in advance. It must be the religion of the 
freest, most cheerful and most sublime souls, a delight- 
ful pastureland somewhere between golden ice and a 
pure heaven ! 2 56 



VII 
"Beyond Good and Evil" 

A DOUBLE purpose animated Nietzsche in his 
writing of "Beyond Good and Evil" ("Jenseits 
von Gute und Bose"). It is at once an explanation and 
an elucidation of "Thus Spake Zarathustra," and a pre- 
paratory book for his greatest and most important work, 
"The Will to Power." In it Nietzsche attempts to de- 
fine the relative terms of "good" and "evil," and to 
draw a line of distinction between immorality and un- 
morality. He saw the inconsistencies evolved in the at- 
tempt to harmonise an ancient moral code with the needs 
of modern life, and recognised the compromises which 
were constantly being made between moral theory and 
social practice. His object was to establish a relation- 
ship between morality and necessity, and to formulate 
a workable basis for human conduct. Consequently 
"Beyond Good and Evil" is one of his most important 
contributions to a new system of ethics, and touches on 
many of the deepest principles of his philosophy. As it 
stands, it is by no means a complete expression of Nie- 
tzsche's doctrines, but it is sufficiently profound and sug- 
gestive to be of valuable service in an understanding of 
his later works. The book was begun in the summer 
of 1885 and finished the following winter. Again there 
was difficulty with publishers, and finally the book was 
issued at the author's own expense in the autumn of 
1886. 

173 



174 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Nietzsche opens "Beyond Good and Evil" with a long 
chapter headed "Prejudices of Philosophers," in which 
he outlines the course to be taken by his dialectic. The 
exposition is accomplished by two methods: first, by an 
analysis and a refutation of the systems of thinking made 
use of by antecedent doctrinaires, and secondly, by de- 
fining the hypotheses on which his own philosophy is 
built. This chapter is a most important one, setting 
forth, as it does, the rationale of his doctrine of the will 
to power. It has been impossible to make extracts of 
any unified sequence from this chapter because of its 
intricate and compact reasoning, and the student would 
do well to read it in its entirety. It establishes Nie- 
tzsche's philosophic position and presents a closely knit 
explanation of the course pursued in the following chap- 
ters. The relativity of all truth — the hypothesis so 
often assumed in his previous work — Nietzsche here de- 
fends by analogy and argument. Using other leading 
forms of philosophy as a ground for exploration, he ques- 
tions the absolutism of truth and shows wherein lies the 
difficulty of a final definition. Here we become con- 
scious of that plasticity of mind which was the dominat- 
ing quality of his thinking. It is not, however, that 
form of plasticity which on inspection resolves itself into 
amorphic and unstable reasoning, but a logical, almost 
scientific, method of valuing. The mercurial habits of 
the metaphysicians who deny absolutism are nowhere 
discernible in Nietzsche's thought. His mind is definite 
without being static. The basis of his argumentation is 
what one might call floating. It rises and falls with the 
human tide of causation; yet the structure built upon 
it remains at all times upright and unchanged. 

Nietzsche points out that the numerous "logical" con- 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 175 

elusions of philosophers have been for the most part a 
priori propositions, the results of prejudices or desires, 
and that the syllogistic structures reared to them came as 
explanations and defences, rather than as dialectic pre- 
ambles. In their adopting a hypothetical truth as a 
premise, he sees only the advocacy for a point of view, 
arguing that in order to erect a system of logic the initial 
thesis must be proved. Therefore he questions the fun- 
damental worth of certainty as opposed to uncertainty, 
and of truth as opposed to falsity, thus striking at the 
very foundations reared by those philosophers who have 
assumed, without substantiation, that only certainty and 
truth are valuable. Nietzsche calls these absolutists as- 
tute defenders of prejudices, and characterises the ver- 
balistic prestidigitation of Kant as a highly developed 
form of prejudice-defending. Spinoza, with his mathe- 
matical system of reasoning, likewise falls in the cate- 
gory of those thinkers who first assume conclusions and 
then prepare explanations for them by a process of in- 
verted reasoning. Nietzsche proceeds to pose the in- 
stinctive functions against conscious thinking. He as- 
serts that the channels taken by thought are defined by 
the thinker's nature, and that even logic is influenced by 
physiological considerations. The whole fabric of philo- 
sophic thought is held up to the light of immediate neces- 
sity. 

Going further, he inquires into the "impulse to knowl- 
edge." He finds that a specific purpose has always been 
the actuating force of any philosophy, and that conse- 
quently philosophy, even in its most abstract form, has 
had a residuum of autobiography in it. In fine, that 
philosophy, far from being a search, has been an aim 
toward a definite preconceived result. The moral or eth- 



176 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ical impulse, being always imperious, has not infre- 
quently resulted in philosophising, and in all such cases 
knowledge has been used as an instrument. Thus knowl- 
edge which led to a philosophical conclusion has been the 
outgrowth of a personal instinct. In those cases where 
an impersonal "impulse to knowledge" may have existed, 
it has led, not into philosophical channels, but into prac- 
tical and often commercial activities. The scholar has 
ever remained personal in his quest for philosophical 
formulas. In Kant's "Table of Categories," wherein 
that philosopher claimed to have found the faculty of 
synthetic judgment a priori, Nietzsche finds only a circle 
of reasoning which begins and ends in personal instinct. 
And in Kant's discovery of a new moral faculty, Nie- 
tzsche sees only sophistical invention, and accounts for 
its widespread acceptance by the moral state of the Ger- 
mans at that period. Ignoring the possibility of syn- 
thetic judgments a "priori, Nietzsche advances the query 
as to their necessity, and lays stress on the impractica- 
bility of truth without belief. The inherent falsity or 
truth of a proposition has no bearing on philosophical 
doctrines so long as a contrary belief is present, a beliei 
such as we exert toward the illusions of the world oi 
reality when we make practical use of that world's per- 
spective. 

The schemes of personal philosophy, such, for instance, 
as we find in Schopenhauer, are dealt with by Nietzsche 
in a single paragraph: "When I analyse the process 
that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole 
series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of 
which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for in- 
stance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarib 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 177 

be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and 
operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a 
cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that it is already 
determined what is to be designated by thinking — that 
I know what thinking is. For if I had not already de- 
cided within myself what it is, by what standard could 
I determine whether that which is just happening is not 
perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling"? In short, the assertion 'I 
think,' assumes that I compare my state at the present 
moment with other states of myself which I know, in 
order to determine what it is: on account of this retro- 
spective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has at 
any rate no immediate certainty for me." Thus the 
smug materialistic philosopher finds himself necessitated 
to fall back on purely metaphysical explanations for an- 
swers to the questions arising out of his definition of 
truth. 

Locke falls under a critical survey in this chapter. In 
answer to this thinker's theory regarding the origin of 
ideas, Nietzsche names the great cycles of philosophical 
systems and calls attention to the similarity of processes 
in such cycles. Furthermore, he shows that the founda- 
tions of all previous philosophies are discoverable in the 
new styles of contemporaneous thought. And in those 
national schools of philosophy conceived in languages 
which stem from the same origin, he finds an undeniable 
resemblance. All of which leads to a conclusion incom- 
patible with Locke's theory. Nietzsche attacks the con- 
clusions of the physicists, denying them any place in 
philosophy because their research consists solely in inter- 
pretations of natural laws in accordance with their own 
prejudices and beliefs. The theories which might be de- 



178 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

duced from natural phenomena are not discoverable in 
their doctrines; their activities have consisted in twisting 
natural events to suit preconceived valuations. 

Finally Nietzsche inquires into the habits and prac- 
tices of psychologists. Not even among these workers 
does he find a basis for philosophy. Psychology, he ar- 
gues, has been guided, not by a detached and lofty desire 
to ascertain truth in its relation to the human mind, but 
by prejudices and fears grounded in moral considerations. 
He finds a constant desire on the part of experimenters 
to account for "good" impulses as distinguished from 
"bad" ones. And in this desire lies the superimposing 
of moral prejudices on a science which, more than all 
others, deals with problems farthest removed from moral 
influences. These prejudices in psychology, as well as 
in all branches of philosophy, are the obstacles which 
stand in the way of any deep penetration into the mo- 
tives beneath human conduct. Nietzsche, in his analy- 
ses and criticisms, is not solely destructive: he is sub- 
terraneously constructing his own philosophical system 
founded on the will to power. This phrase is used many 
times in the careful research of the first chapter. As the 
book proceeds, this doctrine develops. 

Nietzsche's best definition of what he calls the "free 
spirit," namely: the thinking man, the intellectual aris- 
tocrat, the philosopher and ruler, is contained in the 
twenty-six pages of the second chapter of "Beyond Good 
and Evil." In a series of paragraphs — longer than is 
Nietzsche's wont — the leading characteristics of this su- 
perior man are described. The "free spirit," however, 
must not be confused with the superman. The former 
is the "bridge" which the present-day man must cross 
in the process of surpassing himself. In the delineation 



' 'BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 179 

and analysis of him, as presented to us here, we can 
glimpse his most salient mental features. Heretofore, 
as in "Thus Spake Zarathustra," he has been but par- 
tially and provisionally denned. Now his instincts and 
desires, his habits and activities are outlined. Further- 
more, we are given an explanation of his relation to the 
inferior man and to the organisms of his environment. 
The chapter is an important one, for at many points it 
is a subtle elucidation of many of Nietzsche's dominant 
philosophic principles. By inference, the differences of 
class distinction are strictly drawn. The slave-morality 
(sklavmoral) and the master-morality (herrenmoral), 
though as yet undefined, are balanced against each other; 
and the deportmental standards of the masters and slaves 
are defined by way of differentiating between these two 
opposing human factions. While the serving class is 
constantly manifesting its need of a guiding dogma, the 
ruling class is constantly approaching the state wherein 
the arbitrary moral mandates are denied. Nietzsche sees 
a new order of philosophers appearing — men who will 
stand beyond good and evil, who will be not only free 
spirits, "but something more, higher, greater, and funda- 
mentally different." In describing these men of the fu- 
ture, of which the present free men are the heralds and 
forerunners, Nietzsche establishes an individualistic ideal 
which he develops fully in later chapters. 

A keen and far-reaching analysis of the various aspects 
assumed by religious faith constitutes a third section of 
"Beyond Good and Evil." Though touching upon vari- 
ous influences of Christianity, this section is more general 
in its religious scope than even "The Antichrist," many 
indications of which are to be found here. This chapter 
has to do with the numerous inner experiences of man, 



i8o WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

which are directly or indirectly attributable to religious 
doctrines. The origin of the instinct for faith itself is 
sought, and the results of this faith are balanced against 
the needs of the individuals and of the race. The rela- 
tion between religious ecstasy and sensuality ; the attempt 
on the part of religious practitioners to arrive at a nega- 
tion of the will ; the transition from religious gratitude to 
fear; the psychology at the bottom of saint-worship; — 
to problems such as these Nietzsche devotes his energies 
in his inquiry of the religious mood. The geographical 
considerations which enter into the character and inten- 
sity of religious faith form an important basis for study ; 
and the differences between Comte's sociology and Sainte- 
Beuve's anti-Jesuit utterances are explained from a stand- 
point of national influences. Nietzsche examines the 
many phases of atheism and the principal anti-Christian 
tendencies of all philosophy since Descartes. There is 
an illuminating exposition of the important stages in re- 
ligious cruelty and of the motives underlying the various 
forms of religious sacrifices. Again we run upon the doc- 
trine of eternal recurrence, but here, as elsewhere, it may 
be regarded, not as a basic element in Nietzsche's philo- 
sophical scheme, but as a by-product of his thought. 
Nietzsche emphasises the necessity of idleness in all reli- 
gious lives, and shows how the adherence to the religious 
mood works against the activities, both of mind and of 
body, which make for the highest efficiency. 

A very important phase of Nietzsche's teaching is con- 
tained in this criticism of the religious life. The detrac- 
tors of the Nietzschean doctrine, almost without excep- 
tion, base their judgments on the assumption that the 
universal acceptation of his theories would result in social 
chaos. As I have pointed out before, Nietzsche desired 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 181 

no such general adoption of his beliefs. In his bitterest 
diatribes against Christianity, his object was not to shake 
the faith of the great majority of mankind in their idols. 
He sought merely to free the strong men from the restric- 
tions of a religion which fitted the needs of only the 
weaker members of society. He neither hoped nor de- 
sired to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or 
any similar dogmatic comfort. On the contrary, he de- 
nounced those superficial atheists who endeavoured to 
weaken the foundations of religion. He saw the positive 
necessity of such religions as a basis for his slave moral- 
ity, and in the present chapter he exhorts the rulers to 
preserve the religious faith of the serving classes, and to 
use it as a means of government — as an instrument in 
the work of disciplining and educating. In paragraph 
61 he says: "The selecting and disciplining influence — 
destructive as well as creative and fashioning — which can 
be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, 
according to the sort of people placed under its spell and 
protection." Not only is this an expression of the utili- 
tarian value of religious formulas, but a definite voicing 
of one of the main factors in his philosophy. His entire 
system of ethics is built on the complete disseverance of 
the dominating class and the serving class; and his doc- 
trine of "beyond good and evil" should be considered 
only as it pertains to the superior man. To apply it to 
all classes would be to reduce Nietzsche's whole system 
of ethics to impracticability, and therefore to an ab- 
surdity. 

Passing from a consideration of the religious mood, 
Nietzsche enters a broader sphere of ethical research, and 
endeavours to trace the history and development of 
morals. He accuses the philosophers of having avoided 



182 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the real problem of morality, namely: the testing of the 
faith and motives which lie beneath moral beliefs. This 
is the task he sets for himself, and in his chapter, "The 
Natural History of Morals," he makes an examination of 
moral origins — an examination which is extended into an 
exhaustive treatise in "The Genealogy of Morals." How- 
ever, his dissection here is carried out on a broader and 
far more general scale than in his previous books, such 
as "Human, All-Too-Human" and "The Dawn of Day." 
Heretofore he had confined himself to codes and systems, 
to acts of morality and immorality, to judgments of con- 
ducts. In "Beyond Good and Evil" he treats of moral 
prejudices as forces working hand in hand with human 
progress. In addition, there is a definite attitude of con- 
structive thinking here which is absent from his earlier 
work. He outlines the course to be taken by the men 
of the future, and points to the results which have ac- 
crued from the moralities of modern nations. He offers 
the will to power in place of the older "will to belief," 
and characterises the foundations of acceptance for all 
moral codes as "fictions" and "premature hypotheses." 
He defines the racial ideals which have grown up out of 
moral influences, and, applying them to the needs of the 
present day, finds them inadequate and dangerous. The 
conclusion to which his observations and analyses point 
is that, unless the rulers of the race take a stand beyond 
the outposts of good and evil and govern on a basis of 
expediency divorced from all moral influences, the indi- 
vidual is in constant danger of being lowered to the level 
of the gregarious conscience. 

In the chapter, "We Scholars," Nietzsche continues his 
definition of the philosopher, whom he holds to be the 
highest type of man. Besides being a mere description 



'•BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 183 

of the intellectual traits of this "free spirit," the chapter 
is also an exposition of the shortcomings of those modern 
men who pose as philosophers. In the path of these new 
thinkers Nietzsche sees many difficulties both from within 
and from without, and points out methods whereby these 
obstacles may be overcome. Also the man of science and 
the man of genii is are analyzed and weighed as to their 
relative importance in the community. In fact, we have 
here Nietzsche's most concise and complete definition of 
the individuals upon whom rests the burden of progress. 
These valuations of the intellectual leaders are impor- 
tant to the student, for by one's understanding them, 
along with the reasons for such valuations, a compre- 
hension of the ensuing volumes is facilitated. Nietzsche 
hereby establishes the qualities of those entitled to the 
master-morality code; and, by thus drawing the line of 
demarcation in humanity, he defines at the same time 
that class whose constitutions and predispositions demand 
the slave-morality. In addition, he affixes, according 
to his philosophical formula, a scale of values to such 
mental attributes as objectivity, power to will, scepti- 
cism, positivity and constraint. 

Important material touching on many of the funda- 
mental points of Nietzsche's philosophy is embodied in 
the chapter entitled "Our Virtues." The more general 
inquiries into conduct and the research along the broader 
lines of ethics are supplanted by inquiries into specific 
moral attributes. The current virtues are questioned, and 
their historical significance is determined. The value of 
such virtues is tested in their relation to different types 
of men. Sacrifice, sympathy, brotherly love, service, 
loyalty, altruism and similar ideals of conduct are exam- 
ined, and the results of such virtues are shown to be in- 



184 WHAT NIETZSCHE 1 4UGHT 

compatible with the demands of modern social inter- 
course. Nietzsche poses against these virtues the sterner 
and more rigid forms of conduct, pointing out wherein 
they meet with the present requirements of human prog- 
ress. The chapter is a preparation fo.- his establishment 
of a new morality and also an explar ation of the dual 
ethical code which is one of the main p liars in his philo- 
sophical structure. Before presenting his precept of 
a dual morality, Nietzsche endeavours to determine 
woman's place in the political and social scheme, and 
points out the necessity, not only of individual feminine 
functioning, but of the preservation of a distinct polarity 
in sexual relationship. 

In the final chapter many of Nietzsche's philosophical 
ideas take definite shape. The doctrine of slave-morality 
and master-morality, prepared for and partially denned 
in preceding chapters, is here directly set forth, and those 
virtues and attitudes which constitute the "nobility" of 
the master class are specifically denned. Nietzsche desig- 
nates the duty of his aristocracy, and segregates the hu- 
man attributes according to the rank of individuals. The 
Dionysian ideal, which underlies all the books that follow 
"Beyond Good and Evil," receives its first direct exposi- 
tion and application. The hardier human traits such as 
egotism, cruelty, arrogance, retaliation and appropriation 
are given ascendency over the softer virtues such as sym- 
pathy, charity, forgiveness, loyalty and humility, and are 
pronounced necessary constituents in the moral code of a 
natural aristocracy. At this point is begun the transvalua- 
tion of values which was to have been completed in "The 
Will to Power." The student should read carefully this 
chapter, for it is an introduction as well as an explanation 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 185 

for what follows, and was written with that purpose in 
view. 

EXCERPTS FROM "BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 

To recognise untruth as a condition of life: that is 
certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a 
dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to 
do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and 
evil. 9 

Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting 
down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal in- 
stinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above 
all to discharge its strength — life itself is Will to Power; 
self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most fre- 
quent results thereof. 20 

It is the business of the very few to be independent; it 
is the privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, 
even with the best right, but without being obliged to do 
so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but also 
daring beyond measure. 43 

The virtues of the common man w6uld perhaps mean 
vice and weakness in a philosopher; it might be possible 
for a highly developed man, supposing him to degenerate 
and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone, for the 
sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in 
the lower world into which he had sunk. 44 

Books for the general reader are always ill-smelling 
books, the odour of paltry people clings to them. Where 
the populace eat and drink, and even where they rev- 
erence, it is accustomed to stink. One should not go into 
churches if one wishes to breathe pure air. 44 

"Will" can naturally only operate on "will" — and 



186 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

not on "matter" (not on "nerves," for instance) : in 
short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does 
not operate on will wherever "effects" are recognised — 
and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power 
operates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect 
of will. Granted, finally, that we succeed in explaining 
our entire instinctive life as the development and rami- 
fication of one fundamental form of will — namely, the 
Will to Power, as my thesis puts it; granted that all 
organic functions could be traced back to this Will to 
Power, and that the solution of the problem of genera- 
tion and nutrition — it is one problem — could also be 
found therein: one would thus have acquired the right 
to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power. 
The world seen from within, the world defined and desig- 
nated according to its "intelligible character" — it would 
simply be "Will to Power," and nothing else. 52 

Happiness and virtue are no arguments. It is will- 
ingly forgotten, however, even on the part of thoughtful 
minds, that to make unhappy and to make bad are just 
as little counter-arguments. A thing could be true, al- 
though it were in the highest degree injurious and dan- 
gerous; indeed, the fundamental constitution of existence 
might be such that one succumbed by a full knowledge 
of it — so that the strength of a mind might be measured 
by the amount of "truth" it could endure — or to speak 
more plainly, by the extent to which it required truth 
attenuated, veiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified. 53-54 

Everything that is profound loves the mask; the pro- 
foundest things have a hatred even of figure and like- 
ness. Should not the contrary only be the right disguise 
for the shame of a God to go about in*? 54-55 

One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 187 

with many people. "Good" is no longer good when one's 
neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there 
be a "common good." The expression contradicts itself; 
that which can be common is always of small value. In 
the end things must be as they are and have always been 
— the great things remain for the great, the abysses for 
the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, 
and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare. 57-58 

In every country of Europe, and the same in America, 
there is at present ... a very narrow, prepossessed, en- 
chained class of spirits. . . . Briefly and regrettably, 
they belong to the levellers, these wrongly named "free 
spirits" — as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the 
democratic taste and its "modern ideas"; all of them men 
without solitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest 
fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct 
ought to be denied; only, they are not free, and are ludi- 
crously superficial, especially in their innate partiality for 
seeing the cause of almost all human misery and failure 
in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed — a 
notion which happily inverts the truth entirely. 53-59 

We believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in 
the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter's 
art and develry of every kind, — that everything wicked, 
terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, 
serves as well for the elevation of the human species as 
its opposite. ... 59 

The Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice: 
the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence 
of spirit; it is at the same time subjection, self -derision, 
and self-mutilation. 65 

The mightiest men have hitherto always bowed rev- 
erently before the saint, as the enigma of self-subjugation 



188 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

and utted voluntary privation. — Why did they thus bow *? 
They divined in him — and as it were behind the question- 
ableness of his frail and wretched appearance — the su- 
perior force which wished to test itself by such a subjuga- 
tion; the strength and love of power, and knew how to 
honour it: they honoured something in themselves when 
they honoured the saint. . . . The mighty ones of the 
world learned to have a new fear before him, they divined 
a new power, a strange, still unconquered enemy: — it 
was the "Will to Power" which obliged them to halt be- 
fore the saint. 70-71 

Perhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused 
the most fighting and suffering, the conceptions "God" 
and "sin," will one day seem to us of no more importance 
than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems to an old 
man. ... 75 

To love mankind for God's sake — this has so far been 
the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has 
attained. 79 

For those who are strong and independent, destined 
and trained to command, in whom the judgment and skill 
of a ruling race is incorporated, religion is an additional 
means for overcoming, betraying and surrendering to the 
former the conscience of the latter, their inmost heart, 
which would fain escape obedience. 8 o 

Asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable 
means of educating and ennobling a race which seeks to 
rise above its hereditary baseness and work itself upward 
to future supremacy. And finally, to ordinary men, to 
the majority of the people, who exist for service and gen- 
eral utility, and are only so far entitled to exist, religion 
gives invaluable contentedness with their lot and condi- 
tion, peace of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 189 

social happiness and sympathy, with something of trans- 
figuration and embellishment, something of justification 
of all the commonplaceness, all the meanness, all the 
semi-animal poverty of their souls. 8 i 

"Knowledge for its own sake" — that is the last snare 
laid by morality : we are thereby completely entangled in 
morals once more. 85 

He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses 

it. 86 

Sympathy for all — would be harshness and tyranny 
for thee^ my good neighbour ! 88 

To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the lad- 
der at the end of which one is ashamed also of one's 
morality. 8 9 

A discerning one might easily regard himself at present 
as the animalisation of God. 90 

Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their 
love, prevents the Christians of to-day — burning us. „i 

There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a 
moral interpretation of phenomena. 91 

The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed : he 
extenuates and maligns it. 91 

The great epochs of our life are at the points when we 
gain courage to rebaptise our badness as the best in us. 92 

It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he 
wished to turn author — and that he did not learn it bet- 
ter. 93 

Even concubinage has been corrupted — by marriage. 93 

A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven 
great men — Yes, and then to get round them. 94 

From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good 
conscience, all evidence of truth. 95 

Our vanity would like what we do best to pass pre- 



iqo WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

cisely for what is most difficult to us. — Concerning the 
origin of many systems of morals. 8 a 

When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is 
generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Bar- 
renness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, 
indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal." 9 6 

That which an age considers evil is usually an unseas- 
onable echo of what was formerly considered good — the 
atavism of an old ideal. 97 

What is done out of love always takes place beyond 
good and evil. 98 

Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony 
are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pa- 
thology. 98 

The Jews — -a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus 
and the whole ancient world say of them; "the chosei 
people among the nations," as they themselves say anc 
believe — the Jews performed the miracle of the inversioi 
of valuations, by means of which life on earth obtained 
a new and dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. 
Their prophets fused into one the expressions "rich, 
"godless," "wicked," "violent," "sensual," and for the 
first time coined the word "world" as a term of reproach. 
In this inversion of valuations (in which is also included 
the use of the word "poor" as synonymous with "saint' 
and "friend") the significance of the Jewish people is 
to be found; it is with them that the slave-insurrection h 
morals commences, m 

The beast of prey and the man of prey (for instance, 
Csesar Borgia) are fundamentally misunderstood, "na- 
ture" is misunderstood, so long as one seeks a "morbid- 
ness" in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical 
monsters and growths. . . . us 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 191 

All the systems of morals which address themselves to 
individuals with a view to their "happiness," as it is 
called — what else are they but suggestions for behaviour 
adapted to the degree of danger from themselves in which 
the individuals live ; recipes for their passions, their good 
and bad propensities in so far as such have the Will to 
Power and would like to play the master; small and great 
expediencies and elaborations, permeated with the musty 
odour of old family medicines and old-wife wisdom; all 
of them grotesque and absurd in their form — because 
they address themselves to "all," because they generalise 
where generalisation is not authorised ; all of them speak- 
ing unconditionally, and taking themselves uncondition- 
ally; all of them flavoured not merely with one grain of 
salt, but rather endurable only, and sometimes even se- 
ductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to smell 
dangerously, especially of "the other world." ns-no 

In view ... of the fact that obedience has been most 
practised and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may 
reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need 
thereof is now innate in every one, as a kind of formal 
conscience. ... 120 

The history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the 
history of the higher happiness to which the entire 
century has attained in its worthiest individuals and 
periods. 121 

As long as the utility which determines moral estimates 
is only gregarious utility, as long as the preservation of 
the community is only kept in view, and the immoral is 
sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous 
to the maintenance of the community, there can be no 
"morality of love to one's neighbour." 123 

"Love of our neighbour," is always a secondary matter, 



192 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation 
to our fear of our neighbour. 123 

Everything that elevates the individual above the herd, 
and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth 
called evil; the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self- 
equalising disposition, the mediocrity of desires, attains 
to moral distinction and honour. 125 

The democratic movement is the inheritance of the 
Christian movement. 127 

We, who regard the democratic movement, not only 
as a degenerating form of political organisation, but as 
equivalent to a degenerating, a waning type of man, as 
involving his mediocrising and depreciation: where have 
we to fix our hopes? In new 'philosophers — there is no 
other alternative: in minds strong and original enough 
to initiate opposite estimates of value, to transvalue and 
invert "eternal valuations"; in forerunners, in men of 
the future, who in the present shall fix the constraints 
and fasten the knots which will compel millenniums to 
take new paths. To teach men the future of humanity 
as his will, as depending on human will, and to make 
preparation for vast hazardous enterprises and collective 
attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to 
put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance 
which has hitherto gone by the name of "history" (the 
folly of the "greatest number" is only its last form) — 
for that purpose a new type of philosophers and com- 
manders will some time or other be needed, at the very 
idea of which everything that has existed in the way of 
occult, terrible, and benevolent beings might look pale 
and dwarfed. 128-129 

The universal degeneracy of mankind to the level of 
the "man of the future" — as idealised by the socialistic 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 193 

fools and shallow-pates — this degeneracy and dwarfing 
of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they 
call it, to a man of "free society"), this brutalising of 
man into a pigmy with equal rights and claims, is un- 
doubtedly possible! He who has thought out this possi- 
bility to its ultimate conclusion knows another loathing 
unknown to the rest of mankind — and perhaps also a 
new mission! 130-131 

Supposing . . . that in the picture of the philosophers 
of the future, some trait suggests the question whether 
they must not perhaps be sceptics in the last-mentioned 
sense, something in them would only be designated 
thereby — and not they themselves. With equal right 
they might call themselves critics; and assuredly they 
will be men of experiments. . . . They will be sterner 
(and perhaps not always towards themselves only) . . . 
they will not deal with the "truth" in order that it may 
"please" them, or "elevate" and "inspire" them — they 
will rather have little faith in "truth" bringing with it 
such revels for the feelings. They will smile, those 
rigorous spirits, when any one says in their presence: 
"that thought elevates me, why should it not be true*?" 
or; "that artist enlarges me, why should he not be great ?" 
Perhaps they will not only have a smile, but a genuine 
disgust for all that is thus rapturous, idealistic, feminine 
and hermaphroditic; and if any one could look into their 
inmost heart, he would not easily find therein the inten- 
tion to reconcile "Christian sentiments" with "antique 
taste," or even with "modern parliamentarism" (the kind 
of reconciliation necessarily found even amongst philoso- 
phers in our very uncertain and consequently very con- 
ciliatory century). Critical discipline, and every habit 
that conduces to purity and rigour in intellectual matters, 



194 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

will not only be demanded from themselves by these 
philosophers of the future ; they may even make a display 
thereof as their special adornment — nevertheless they will 
not want to be called critics on that account. It will 
seem to them no small indignity to philosophy to have it 
decreed, as is so welcome nowadays, that "philosophy it- 
self is criticism and critical science — and nothing else 
whatever !" 149-151 

The real philosophers . . . are commanders and law- 
givers; they say: "Thus shall it be." They determine 
first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby 
set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, 
and all subjugators of the past — they grasp at the fu- 
ture with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, 
becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and 
a hammer. Their "knowing" is creating, their creat- 
ing is a law-giving, their will to truth is — Will to 
Power. ... 52 

At present . . . when throughout Europe the herding 
animal alone attains to honours, and dispenses honours, 
when "equality of right" can too readily be transformed 
into equality in wrong: I mean to say into general war 
against everything rare, strange, and privileged, against 
the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the 
higher responsibility, the creative plenipotence and lord- 
liness — at present it belongs to the conception of "great- 
ness" to be noble, to wish to be apart, to be capable of 
being different, to stand alone, to have to live by personal 
initiative; and the philosopher will betray something of 
his own ideal when he asserts: "He shall be the great- 
est who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the 
most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the mas- 
ter of his virtues, and of superabundance of will; pre- 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 195 

cisely this shall be called greatness: as diversified as can 
be entire, as ample as can be full." 154-155 

Morality as attitude is opposed to our taste nowadays. 
This is also an advance, as it was an advance in our 
fathers that religion as an attitude finally became opposed 
to their taste. . . . iei 

The practice of judging and condemning morally is 
the favourite revenge of the intellectually shallow on 
those who are less so. . . . i 62 

Whoever has really offered sacrifice knows that he 
wanted and obtained something for it — perhaps some- 
thing from himself for something from himself; that he 
relinquished here in order to have more there, perhaps in 
general to be more, or even feel himself "more." i6 4 

Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached 
nowadays ... let the psychologist have his ears open: 
through all the vanity, through all the noise which is 
natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will 
hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine note of self -contempt. i 65 

We are prepared as no other age has ever been for a 
carnival in the grand style, for the most spiritual festival- 
laughter and arrogance, for the transcendental height of 
supreme folly and Aristophanic ridicule of the world. 
Perhaps we are still discovering the domain of our inven- 
tion just here, the domain where even we can still be 
original, probably as parodists of the world's history and 
as God's Merry-Andrews, — perhaps, though nothing else 
of the present have a future, our laughter itself may have 
a future! i 6 e 

The discipline of suffering, of great suffering — know 
ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all 
the elevations of humanity hitherto'? 171 

It is desirable that as few people as possible should 



196 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

reflect upon morals, and consequently it is very desirable 
that morals should not some day become interesting ! 174 

Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herd- 
ing-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of ego- 
ism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have 
any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the "general 
welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all 
grasped, but is only a nostrum, — that what is fair to one 
may not at all be fair to another, that the requirement of 
one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, 
in short, that there is a distinction of rank between man 
and man, and consequently between morality and moral- 
ity. 175 

That which constitutes the painful delight of tragedy 
is cruelty; that which operates agreeably in so-called 
tragic sympathy, and at the basis even of everything sub- 
lime, up to the highest and most delicate thrills of meta- 
physics, obtains its sweetness solely from the intermingled 
ingredient of cruelty. 177 

Enlightenment hitherto has fortunately been men's af- 
fair, men's gift — we remained therewith " among our- 
selves" ; and in the end, in view of all that women write 
about "woman," we may well have considerable doubt as 
to whether woman really desires enlightenment about 
herself — and can desire it. If woman does not thereby 
seek a new ornament for herself — I believe ornamenta- 
tion belongs to the eternally feminine 1 ? — why, then, she 
wishes to make herself feared ; perhaps she thereby wishes 
to get the mastery. But she does not want truth — what 
does woman care for truth. From the very first nothing 
is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to 
woman than truth — her great art is falsehood, her chief 
concern is appearance and beauty. i 8 s 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 197 

It betrays corruption of the instincts — apart from the 
fact that it betrays bad taste — when a woman refers to 
Madame Roland, or Madame de Stael, or Monsieur 
George Sand, as though something were proved thereby 
in favour of "woman as she is." Among men, these are 
the three comical women as they are — nothing more — 
and just the best involuntary counter-arguments against 
feminine emancipation and autonomy, is* 

Stupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the terrible 
thoughtlessness with which the feeding of the family and 
the master of the house is managed. Woman does not 
understand what food means, and she insists on being 
cook. If woman had been a thinking creature, she 
should certainly, as cook for thousands of years, have dis- 
covered the most important physiological facts, and 
should likewise have got possession of the healing art. 
Through bad female cooks — through the entire lack of 
reason in the kitchen — the development of mankind has 
been longest retarded and most interfered with. i 8 4-i85 

To be mistaken in the fundamental problem of "man 
and woman," to deny here the profoundest antagonism 
and the necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream 
here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal claims 
and obligations: that is a typical sign of shallow-mind- 
edness ; and a thinker who has proved himself shallow at 
this dangerous spot — shallow in instinct — may generally 
be regarded as suspicious, nay more, as betrayed, as dis- 
covered: he will probably prove too "short" for all 
fundamental questions of life, future as well as present, 
and will be unable to descend into any of the depths. 
On the other hand, a man who has depth of spirit as well 
as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence which 
is capable of severity and harshness, and easily con- 



198 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

founded with them, can only think of woman as Orien- 
tals do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as con- 
finable property, as a being predestined for service and 
accomplishing her mission therein. . . . ise-m 

The weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with 
so much respect by men as at present — this belongs to the 
tendency and fundamental taste of democracy, in the 
same way as disrespectfulness to old age — what wonder 
is it that abuse should be immediately made of this re- 
spect'? They want more, they learn to make claims, the 
tribute of respect is at last felt to be well-nigh galling. 

... 187 

Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the 
military and aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the 
economic and legal independence of a clerk: "woman as 
clerkess" is inscribed on the portal of the modern society 
which is in course of formation. While she thus appro- 
priates new rights, aspires to be "master," and inscribes 
"progress" of woman on her flags and banners, the very 
opposite realises itself with terrible obviousness: woman 
retrogrades. Since the French Revolution the influence 
of woman in Europe has declined in proportion as she has 
increased her rights and claims; and the "emancipation 
of woman," in so far as it is desired and demanded by 
women themselves (and not only by masculine shallow- 
pates), thus proves to be a remarkable symptom of the 
increased weakening and deadening of the most womanly 
instincts. There is stupidity in this movement, an al- 
most masculine stupidity, of which a well-reared woman 
— who is always a sensible woman — might be heartily 
ashamed, m-iss 

Every elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been 
the work of an aristocratic society — and so will it always 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 199 

be — a society believing in a long scale of gradations of 
rank and differences of worth among human beings, and 
requiring slavery in some form or other. 223 

The essential thing ... in a good and healthy aris- 
tocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function 
either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the 
significance and highest justification thereof — that it 
should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacri- 
fice of a legion of individuals, who, for its sake, must be 
suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and 
instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely 
that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but 
only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which 
a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves 
to their higher duties, and in general to a higher exist' 
ence. ... 225 

Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest 
of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion 
of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting 
it mildest, exploitation. ... 226 

People now rave everywhere, even under the guise of 
science, about coming conditions of society in which "the 
exploiting character" is to be absent : — that sounds to my 
ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which 
should refrain from all organic functions. "Exploita- 
tion" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and 
primitive society; it belongs to the nature of the living 
being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence 
of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the 
Will to Life. 228 

In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities 
which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, 
I found certain traits recurring regularly together and 



. 



200 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

connected with one another, until finally two primary 
types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinc- 
tion was brought to light. There is master-morality and 
slave-morality; — I would at once add, however, that in 
all higher and mixed civilisations, there are also attempts 
at the reconciliation of the two moralities; but one finds 
still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding 
of them, indeed, sometimes their close juxtaposition — 
even in the same man, within one soul. 227 

The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner 
of values ; he does not require to be approved of ; he passes 
the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in 
itself"; he knows that it is he himself only who confers 
honour on things; he is a creator of values. He honours 
whatever he recognises in himself: such morality is self- 
glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of 
plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happi- 
ness of high tension, the conscientiousness of a wealth 
which would fain give and bestow : — the noble man also 
helps the unfortunate, but not — or scarcely — out of pity, 
but rather from an impulse generated by the superabund- 
ance of power. The noble man honours in himself the 
powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who 
knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes 
pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, 
and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. 229 

A morality of the ruling class . . . is . . . especially 
foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the stern- 
ness of its principle that one has duties only to one's 
equals ; that one may act towards beings of a lower rank, 
towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or 
"as the heart desires," and in any case "beyond good and 
evil": it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 201 

can have a place. The ability and obligation to exercise 
prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge — both only 
within the circle of equals, — artfulness in retaliation, 
raffinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity 
to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, 
quarrelsomeness, arrogance — in fact, in order to be a good 
friend: all these are typical characteristics of the noble 
morality. 229-230 

Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. 
Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis 
"good and "evil": — power and dangerousness are as- 
sumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, sub- 
tlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. 
According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man 
arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely 
the "good" man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, 
while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. 
The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance 
with the logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade 
of depreciation — it may be slight and well-intentioned — 
at last attaches itself even to the "good" man of this 
morality; because, according to the servile mode of 
thought, the good man must in any case be the safe man : 
he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, 
un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave-morality gains 
the ascendency, language shows a tendency to approxi- 
mate the significations of the words "good" and "stupid." 
— A last fundamental difference : the desire for freedom, 
the instinct for happiness and the refinements of the feel- 
ing of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and 
morality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and 
devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode 
of thinking and estimating. 231 



202 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

A species originates, and a type becomes established 
and strong in the long struggle with essentially constant 
unfavourable conditions. On the other hand, it is known 
by the experience of breeders that species which receive 
superabundant nourishment, and in general a surplus of 
protection and care, immediately tend in the most marked 
way to develop variations, and are fertile in prodigies and 
monstrosities (also in monstrous vices). 234 

I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble 
soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such 
as "we," other beings must naturally be in subjection, 
and have to sacrifice themselves. 240 

Woman would like to believe that love can do every- 
thing — it is the superstition peculiar to her. Alas, he 
who knows the heart finds out how poor, helpless, pre- 
tentious, and blundering even the best and deepest love is 
— he finds that it rather destroys than saves ! 2 *6 

Signs of nobility : never to think of lowering our duties 
to the rank of duties for everybody; to be unwilling to 
renounce or to share our responsibilities; to count our 
prerogatives, and the exercise of them, among our du- 
ties, 249 

A man strives after great things, looks upon every one 
whom he encounters on his way either as a means of ad- 
vance, or a delay and hindrance — or as a temporary rest- 
ing-place. 249 

If one wishes to praise at all, it is a delicate and at the 
same time a noble self-control, to praise only where one 
does not agree. ... 254 

All society makes one somehow, somewhere, or some- 
times — "commonplace." 254-255 

The noble soul has reverence for itself. 25 e 

A man who can conduct a case, carry out a resolution, 



"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL" 203 

remain true to an opinion, keep hold of a woman, punish 
and overthrow insolence; a man who has his indignation 
and his sword, and to whom the weak, the suffering, the 
oppressed, and even the animals willingly submit and 
naturally belong; in short, a man who is a master by na- 
ture — when such a man has sympathy, well, that sym- 
pathy has value ! 259 

I would even allow myself to rank philosophers ac- 
cording to the quality of their laughing — up to those who 
are capable of golden laughter. 2 eo 



VIII 

"The Genealogy of Morals" 

"JTpHE Genealogy of Morals" ("Zur Genealogie 
JL der Moral") was written by Nietzsche pri- 
marily as an elaboration and elucidation of the philo- 
sophic points which were merely sketched in "Beyond 
Good and Evil." This former work had met with small 
success, and the critics, failing to understand its doc- 
trines, read converse meanings in it. One critic hailed 
Nietzsche at once as an anarchist, and this review went 
far in actuating him in drawing up the three essays which 
comprise the present book. As will be remembered, sev- 
eral of Nietzsche's most important principles were stated 
and outlined in "Beyond Good and Evil," especially his 
doctrine of slave-morality and master-morality. Now 
he undertakes to develop this proposition, as well as 
many others which he set forth provisionally in his ear- 
lier work. This new polemic may be looked upon both 
as a completing of former works and as a further prep- 
aration for "The Will to Power." The book, a com- 
paratively brief one (it contains barely 40,000 words), 
was written in a period of about two weeks during the 
early part of 1887. In July the manuscript was sent 
to the publisher, but was recalled for revisions and ad- 
denda; and most of Nietzsche's summer was devoted to 
correcting it. Later that same year the book appeared; 

and thereby its author acquired another friendly reader, 

204 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 205 

Georg Brandes, to whom, more than to any other critic, 
Nietzsche owes his early recognition. 

The style of "The Genealogy of Morals" is less aphor- 
istic than any of the books which immediately preceded 
or followed it. Few new doctrines are propounded in 
it; and since it was for the most part an analytic com- 
mentary on what had gone before, its expositional needs 
were best met by Nietzsche's earlier style of writing. I 
have spoken before of the desultory and sporadic manner 
in which Nietzsche was necessitated to present his 
philosophy. Nowhere is his method of work better ex- 
emplified than in this new work. Nearly every one of 
his books overlaps another. Propositions are sketchily 
stated in one essay, which receive elucidation only in 
future volumes. "Beyond Good and Evil" was a com- 
mentary on "Thus Spake Zarathustra" ; "The Genealogy 
of Morals" is a commentary on the newly propounded 
theses in "Beyond Good and Evil" and is in addition an 
elaboration of many of the ideas which took birth as 
far back as "Human, All-Too-Human." Out of "The 
Genealogy of Morals" in turn grew "The Antichrist" 
which dealt specifically with the theological phase of 
the former's discussion of general morals. And all of 
these books were but preparations for "The Will to 
Power." For this reason it is difficult to acquire a com- 
plete understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy unless one 
follows it consecutively and chronologically. The book 
at present under discussion is a most valuable one from 
an academic standpoint, for, while it may not set forth 
any new and important doctrines, it goes deep into the 
origins and history of moral concepts, and explains many 
of the important conclusions in Nietzsche's moral code. 
It brings more and more into prominence the main pil- 



206 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

lars of his ethical system and explains at length the steps 
in the syllogism which led to his doctrine of master- 
morality. It ascertains the origin of the concept of sin, 
and describes the racial deterioration which has followed 
in the train of Christian ideals. 

In many ways this book is the profoundest of all the 
writings Nietzsche left us. For the first time he sepa- 
rates theological and moral prejudices and traces them 
to different origins. This is one of the most important 
steps taken by him. By so doing he became an explorer 
of entirely new fields. The moral historians and psy- 
chologists who preceded him had considered moral pre- 
cepts and Christian injunctions as stemming from the 
same source: their genealogies had led them to the same 
common spring. Nietzsche entered the search with new 
methods. He applied the philologic test to all moral 
values. He brought to his task, in addition to a his- 
torical sense, what he calls "an innate faculty of psycho- 
logical discrimination par excellence" He posed the 
following questions, and endeavoured to answer them 
by inquiring into the minutest aspects of historical con- 
ditions: "Under what conditions did Man invent for 
himself those judgments of value, 'good' and 'evil"? 
And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves? 
Have they up to the present hindered or advanced human 
well-being"? Are they a symptom of the distress, im- 
poverishment, and degeneration of Human Life*? Or, 
conversely, is it in them that is manifested the fulness, 
the strength, and the will of Life, its courage, its self- 
confidence, its future 4 ?" In his research, Nietzsche first 
questioned the value of pity. He found it to be a symp- 
tom of modern civilisation — a quality held in contempt 
by the older philosophers, even by such widely dissimilar 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 207 

minds as Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant 
— but a quality given high place by the more modern 
thinkers. Despite the seemingly apparent isolation of the 
problem of pity-morality, Nietzsche saw that in truth it 
was a question which underlay all other moral proposi- 
tions; and, using it as a ground- work for his research, he 
began to question the utility of all those values held as 
"good," to apply the qualities of the "good man" to the 
needs of civilisation, and to inquire into the results left 
upon the race by the "bad man." 

So great was the misunderstanding which attached to 
his phrase, "beyond good and evil," and so persistently 
was this phrase interpreted in its narrow sense of "be- 
yond good and bad," that he felt the necessity of draw- 
ing the line of distinction between these two diametrically 
opposed conceptions and of explaining the origin of each. 
His first essay in "The Genealogy of Morals" is devoted 
to this task. At the outset he devotes considerable space 
criticising the methods and conclusions of former gene- 
alogists of morals, especially of the English psychologists 
who attribute an intrinsic merit to altruism because at 
one time altruism possessed a utilitarian value. Herbert 
Spencer's theory that "good" is the same as "purposive" 
brings from Nietzsche a protest founded on the conten- 
tion that because a thing was at one time useful, and 
therefore "good," it does not follow that the thing is 
good in itself. By the etymology of the descriptive 
words of morality, Nietzsche traces the history of modern 
moral attributes through class distinctions to their origin 
in the instincts of the "nobles" and the "vulgarians." 
He shows the relationship between the Latin bonus and 
the "warrior," by deriving bonus from duonus. Bellum, 
he shows, equals duellum which equals duen-lum, in 



208 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

which word duonus is contained. Likewise, he points 
out the aristocratic origin of "happiness" — a quality aris- 
ing from an abundance of energy and the consciousness 
of power. 

"Good and evil," according to Nietzsche, is a sign of 
slave-morality; while "good and bad" represents the 
qualities in the master-morality. The one stands for the 
adopted qualities of the subservient races; the other em- 
bodies the natural functioning of dominating races. The 
origin of the "good" in these two instances is by no 
means the same. In the strong man "good" represented 
an entirely different condition than the "good" in the re- 
sentful and weak man; and these two "goods" arose out 
of different causes. The one was spontaneous and nat- 
ural — inherent in the individual of strength: the other 
was a manufactured condition, an optional selection of 
qualities to soften and ameliorate the conditions of ex- 
istence. "Evil" and "bad," by the same token, became 
attributes originating in widely separated sources. The 
"evil" of the weak man was any condition which worked 
against the manufactured ideals of goodness, which 
brought about unhappiness — it was the beginning of the 
conception of a slave-morality, a term applied to all ene- 
mies. The "bad" of the strong man was the concept 
which grew directly out of his feeling for "good," and 
which had no application to another individual. Thus 
the ideas of "good" and "bad" are directly inherited 
from the nobles of the race, and these ideas included 
within themselves the tendency toward establishing so- 
cial distinctions. 

The second section of "The Genealogy of Morals," 
called " 'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscience/ and the Like," is an- 
other important document, the reading of which is almost 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 209 

imperative for the student who would understand the 
processes of thought which led to Nietzsche's philosophic 
conclusions. In this essay Nietzsche traces the origin of 
sin to debt, thereby disagreeing with all the genealogists 
of morals who preceded him. He starts with the birth 
of memory in man and with the corresponding will to 
forgetfulness, showing that out of these two mental 
qualities was born responsibility. Out of responsibility 
in turn grew the function of promising and the accepting 
of promises, which at once made possible between indi- 
viduals the relationship of "debtor" and "creditor." As 
soon as this relationship was established, one man had 
rights over another. The creditor could exact payment 
from the debtor, either in the form of material equivalent 
or by inflicting an injury in which was contained the 
sensation of satisfaction. Thus the creditor had the right 
to punish in cases where actual repayment was impos- 
sible. And in this idea of punishment began not only 
class distinction but primitive law. Later, when the 
power to punish was transferred into the hands of the 
community, the law of contract came into existence. 
Here, says Nietzsche, we find the cradle of the whole 
moral world of the ideas of "guilt," "conscience," and 
"duty"; and adds, "Their commencement, like the com- 
mencement of all great things in the world, is thoroughly 
and continuously saturated in blood." 

Carrying out the principle underlying the relationship 
of debtor and creditor we arrive at the formation of the 
community. In return for protection and for communal 
advantages the individual pledged his good behaviour. 
When he violated this contract with the community, the 
community, in the guise of the defrauded creditor, took 
its revenge, or exacted its payment, from the debtor, the 



210 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

criminal. And, as was the case in early history, the com- 
munity deprived the violator of future advantages and 
protection. The debtor was divested of all rights, even 
of mercy, for then there were no degrees in law-breaking. 
Primitive law was martial law. Says Nietzsche, "This 
shows why war itself (counting the sacrificial cult of 
war) has produced all the forms under which punish- 
ment has manifested itself in history." Later, as the 
community gathered strength, the offences of the indi- 
vidual debtors were looked upon as less serious. Out of 
its security grew leniency toward the offender: the penal 
code became mitigated, and, as in all powerful nations 
to-day, the criminal was protected. Only when there 
was a consciousness of weakness in a community did the 
acts of individual offenders take on an exaggerated seri- 
ousness, and under such conditions the law was conse- 
quently harshest. Thus, justice and the infliction of 
legal penalties are direct outgrowths of the primitive re- 
lation of debt between individuals. Herein we have the 
origin of guilt. 

Nietzsche attempts an elaborate analysis of the his- 
tory of punishment, in an effort to ascertain its true mean- 
ing, its relation to guilt and to the community, and its 
final effects on both the individual and society. It has 
been impossible to present the sequence of this analysis 
by direct excerpts from his own words, due to the close, 
synthetic manner in which he has made his research. 
Therefore I offer the following brief exposition of pages 
88 to 99 inclusive, in which he examines the causes and 
effects of punishment. To begin with, Nietzsche dis- 
associates the "origin" and the "end" of punishment, and 
regards them as two separate and distinct problems. He 
argues that the final utility of a thing, in the sense that 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 211 

revenge and deterrence are the final utilities of punish- 
ment, is in all cases opposed to the origin of that thing; 
that every force or principle is constantly being put to 
new purposes by forces greater than itself, thus making 
it impossible to determine its inception by the end for 
which it is used. Therefore the "function" of punishing 
was not conceived with a view to punishing, but may 
have been employed for any number of ends, according 
as a will to power has overcome that function and made 
use of it for its own purpose: in short; punishment, like 
any organ or custom or "thing," has passed through a 
series of new interpretations and adjustments and mean- 
ings — and is not a direct and logical progresses to an end. 
Having established this point, Nietzsche endeavours 
to determine the utilisation to which the custom of pun- 
ishment has been put — to ascertain the meaning which 
has been interpreted into it. He finds that even in mod- 
ern times not one but many uses have been made of pun- 
ishment, and that in ancient times so diverse have been 
the utilisations of punishment that it is impossible to 
define them all. In fact, one cannot determine the pre- 
cise reason for punishment. To emphasise this point, 
Nietzsche gives a long list of possible meanings. Taking 
up the more popular supposed utilities of punishment at 
the present time — such as creating in the wrong-doer the 
consciousness of guilt, which is supposed to evolve into 
conscience and remorse — he shows wherein punishment 
fails in its object. Against this theory of the creation 
of remorse, he advances psychology and shows that, to 
the contrary, punishment numbs and hardens. He ar- 
gues also that punishment for the purpose of making the 
wrong-doer conscious of the intrinsic reprehensibility of 
his crime, fails because the very act for which he is chas- 



212 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tened is practised in the service of justice and is called 
"good." Eliminating thus the supposed effects of pun- 
ishment, Nietzsche arrives at the conclusion (included 
in the excerpts at the end of this chapter) that punish- 
ment makes only for caution and secrecy, and is there- 
fore detrimental. 

In his analysis of the origin of the "bad conscience," 
Nietzsche lends himself to quotation. Therefore I have 
been able to present in his own words a fair resume of 
the course pursued by him in his examination of the his- 
tory of conscience. This particular branch of his re- 
search is carried into the formation of the "State" which, 
according to him, grew out of "a herd of blonde beasts." 
The older theory of the state, namely: that it originated 
in the adoption of a contract, is set aside as untenable 
when dealing with a peoples who possessed conquerors 
or masters. These masters, argues Nietzsche, had no 
need of contracts. By using the "bad conscience" as a 
ground for inquiry, the causes for the existence of altru- 
ism are shown to be included in the self -cruelty which 
followed in the wake of the instinct for freedom. (This 
last point is developed fully in the discussion of ascetic 
ideals which is found at the end of the book now under 
consideration.) Nietzsche traces the birth of deities 
back along the lines of credit and debt. First came the 
fear of ancestors. Then followed the obligation to an- 
cestors. At length the sacrifice to ancestors marked the 
beginning of a conception of duty (debt) to the super- 
natural. The ancestors of powerful nations in time be- 
came heroes, and finally evolved into gods. Later mono- 
theism came as a natural consequence, and God became 
the creditor. In the expiation of sin, as symbolised in 
the crucifixion of Christianity, we have this same rela- 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 213 

tionship of debtor and creditor carried out into a more 
complex form through the avenues of self-torture. 

The most important essay in "The Genealogy of 
Morals" is the last, called "What is the Meaning of 
Ascetic Ideals'?" Nietzsche examines this question in re- 
lation to the artist, to the philosopher, to the priest, and 
to the race generally. In his examination of the problem 
in regard to artists he uses Wagner as a basis of inquiry, 
comparing the two phases of Wagner's art — the Parsi- 
falian and the ante-Parsifalian. Artists, asserts Nie- 
tzsche, need a support of constituted authority; they are 
unable to stand alone — "standing alone is opposed to 
their deepest instincts" — and so they make use of asceti- 
cism as a rampart, as building material, to give their 
work authority. In his application of the ascetic ideal 
to philosophers, Nietzsche presents the cases of Schopen- 
hauer and Kant, and concludes that asceticism in such 
instances is used as an escape from torture — a means to 
recreation and happiness. With the philosopher the 
ideal of asceticism is not a denial of existence. Rather 
is it an affirmation of existence. It permits him freedom 
of the intellect. It relieves him of the numerous obliga- 
tions of life. Furthermore, the philosophic spirit, in 
order to establish itself, found it necessary to disguise 
itself as "one of the previously fixed types of the con- 
templative man," as a priest or soothsayer. Only in such 
a religious masquerade was philosophy taken with any 
seriousness or reverence. 

The history of asceticism in the priest I have been able 
to set forth with a certain degree of completeness in Nie- 
tzsche's own words. The priest was the sick physician 
who administered to the needs of a sick populace. His 
was the mission of mitigating suffering and of perform- 



214 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ing every kind of consolation. Wherein he failed, says 
Nietzsche, was in not going to the source, the cause, of 
suffering, but in dealing merely with its manifestations. 
These manifestations were the result of physiological de- 
pressions which prevailed at intervals among portions of 
the population. These depressions were the outgrowth 
of diverse causes, such as long wars, emigration to un- 
suitable climates, wrong diet, miscegenation on a large 
scale, disease, etc. According to Nietzsche the cure for 
such physiological phenomena can be found only in the 
realm of moral psychology, for here the origin is con- 
sidered and administered to by disciplinary systems 
grounded in true knowledge. But the method employed 
by the priest was far from scientific. He combated 
these depressions by reducing the consciousness of life 
itself to the lowest possible degree — that is, by a doctrine 
of asceticism, of self-abnegation, equanimity, self-hypno- 
tism. By thus minimising the consciousness of life, these 
depressions took on more and more the aspect of normal- 
ity. The effects of this treatment, however, were tran- 
sient, for the starving of the physical desires and the ab- 
stinence from exercising the physical impulses paved the 
way for all manner of mental disorders, excesses and in- 
sanity. Herein lies Nietzsche's explanation for religious 
ecstasies, hallucinations, and sensual outbursts. 

Another form of treatment devised by the ascetic 
priests for a depressed people gave birth to the "blessed- 
ness" which, under the Christian code, attaches to work. 
These priests attempted to turn the attention of the peo- 
ple from their suffering by the establishment of mechani- 
cal activity, namely: work, routine and obedience. The 
sick man forgot himself in the labour which had received 
sanctification. The priests also combated depression by 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 215 

permitting pleasure through the creation and production 
of joy. That is, they set men to helping and comforting 
each other, by instilling in them the notion of brotherly 
love. Thereby the community mutually strengthened it- 
self, and at the same time it reaped the joy of service 
which had been sanctioned by the priests. Out of this 
last method sprang many of the Christian virtues, espe- 
cially those which benefit others rather than oneself. 

Such methods as these — devitalisation, labour, broth- 
erly love — are called by Nietzsche the "innocent" pre- 
scriptions in the fight against depression. The "guilty" 
ones are far different, and are embodied in the one 
method: the production of emotional excess. This, the 
priests understood, was the most efficacious manner in 
overcoming protracted depression and pain. Confronted 
by the query : By what means can this emotional excess 
be produced*? they made use of "the whole pack of hounds 
that rage in the human kennel" — -rage, fear, lust, revenge, 
hope, despair, cruelty and the like. And once these emo- 
tional excesses became established, the priests, when 
asked by the "patients" for a "cause" of their suffering, 
declared it to be within the man himself, in his own 
guiltiness. Thus was the sick man turned into a sinner. 
Here originated also the conception of suffering as a state 
of punishment^ the fear of retribution, the iniquitous con- 
science, and the hope of redemption. Nietzsche goes fur- 
ther, and shows the racial and individual decadence which 
has followed in the train of this system of treatment. 
Dr. Oscar Levy says with justice that this last essay, con- 
sidered in the light which it throws upon the attitude of 
the ecclesiast to the man of resentment and misfortune, 
"is one of the most valuable contributions to sacerdotal 
psychology." 



216 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 

The pathos of nobility and distance, . . . the chronic 
and despotic esprit de corps and fundamental instinct of 
a higher dominant race coming into association with a 
meaner race, an "under race," this is the origin of the 
antitheses of good and bad. 20 

The knightly-aristocratic "values" are based on a care- 
ful cult of the physical, on a flowering, rich, and even 
effervescing healthiness, that goes considerably beyond 
what is necessary for maintaining life, on war, adventure, 
the chase, the dance, the tourney — on everything, in fact, 
which is contained in strong, free, and joyous action. 
The priestly aristocratic mode of valuation is — we have 
seen — based on other hypotheses: it is bad enough for 
this class when it is a question of war! Yet the priests 
are, as is notorious, the worst enemies — why*? Because 
they are the weakest. 29 

The slave-morality requires as the condition of its 
existence an external and objective world, to employ 
physiological terminology, it requires objective stimuli to 
be of action at all — its action is fundamentally a reac- 
tion. The contrary is the case when we come to the 
aristocrat's system of values: it acts and grows spon- 
taneously, it merely seeks its antithesis in order to pro- 
nounce a more grateful and exultant "yes" to its own 
self. ... 35 

The aristocratic man conceives the root idea "good" 
spontaneously and straight away, that is to say, out of 
himself, and from that material then creates for himself 
a concept of "bad" ! This "bad" of aristocratic origin 
and that "evil" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred 
— the former an imitation, an "extra," an additional 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 217 

nuance; the latter, on the other hand, the original, the 
beginning, the essential act in the conception of a slave- 
morality — these two words "bad" and "evil," how great 
a difference do they mark in spite of the fact that they 
have an identical contrary in the idea "good." 39 

It is impossible not to recognise at the core of all these 
aristocratic races the beast of prey; the magnificent blonde 
brute^ avidly rampant for spoil and victory; this hidden 
core needed an outlet from time to time, the beast must 
get loose again, must return into the wilderness — the 
Roman, Arabic, German, and Japanese nobility, the 
Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings, are all alike 
in this need. It is the aristocratic races who have left 
the idea "Barbarian" on all the tracks in which they have 
marched; nay, a consciousness of this very barbarianism, 
and even a pride in it, manifests itself even in their high- 
est civilisation. 4 o 

What produces to-day our repulsion towards "man" 1 ? 
— for we suffer from "man," there is no doubt about it. 
It is not fear; it is rather that we have nothing more to 
fear from men; it is that the worm "man" is in the fore- 
ground and pullulates; it is that the "tame man," the 
wretched mediocre and unedifying creature, has learnt to 
consider himself a goal and a pinnacle, an inner meaning, 
an historic principle, a "higher man." . . . 42-43 

In the dwarfing and levelling of the European man 
lurks our greatest peril, for it is this outlook which 
fatigues — we see to-day nothing which wishes to be 
greater, we surmise that the process is always still back- 
wards, still backwards towards something more attenu- 
ated, more inoffensive, more cunning, more comfortable, 
more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more 
Christian. 44 



218 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

To require of strength that it should not express itself 
as strength, that it should not be a wish to overpower, a 
wish to overthrow, a wish to become master, a thirst for 
enemies and antagonisms and triumphs, is just as absurd 
as to require of weakness that it should express itself as 
strength. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of 
movement, will, action. 45 

The impotence which requites not, is turned to "good- 
ness," craven baseness to meekness, submission to those 
whom one hates, to obedience (namely, obedience to one 
of whom they say that he ordered this submission — they 
call him God). The inoffensive character of the weak, 
the very cowardice in which he is rich, his standing at the 
door, his forced necessity of waiting, gain here fine names, 
such as "patience," which is also called "virtue"; not 
being able to avenge one's self, is called not wishing to 
avenge one's self, perhaps even forgiveness. 48 

They are miserable, there is no doubt about it, all these 
whisperers and counterfeiters in the corners, although 
they try to get warm by crouching close to each other, but 
they tell me that their misery is a favour and distinction 
given to them by God, just as one beats the dogs one likes 
best; that perhaps this misery is also a preparation, a 
probation, a training; that perhaps it is still more some- 
thing which will one day be compensated and paid back 
with a tremendous interest in gold, nay in happiness. 
This they call "Blessedness." 4 s-49 

The two opposing values "good and bad," "good and 
evil," have fought a dreadful, thousand-year fight in the 
world, and though indubitably the second value has been 
for a long time in the preponderance, there are not want- 
ing places where the fortune of the fight is still unde- 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 219 

cisive. It can almost be said that in the meanwhile the 
fight reaches a higher and higher level, and that in the 
meanwhile it has become more and more intense, and al- 
ways more and more psychological; so that nowadays 
there is perhaps no more decisive mark of the higher na- 
ture, of the more psychological nature, than to be in that 
sense self-contradictory, and to be actually still a battle- 
ground for those two opposites. The symbol of this 
fight, written in a writing which has remained worthy of 
perusal throughout the course of history up to the present 
time, is called "Rome against Judaea, Judsea against 
Rome." Hitherto there has been no greater event than 
that fight, the putting of that question, that deadly antag- 
onism. Rome found in the Jew the incarnation of the 
unnatural, as though it were its diametrically opposed 
monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held to be con- 
victed of hatred of the whole human race: and rightly 
so, in so far as it is right to link the well-being and the 
future of the human race to the unconditional mastery of 
the aristocratic values, of the Roman values. What, 
conversely, did the Jews feel against Rome 1 ? One can 
surmise it from a thousand symptoms, but it is sufficient 
to carry one's mind back to the Johannian Apocalypse, 
that most obscene of all the written outbursts, which has 
revenge on its conscience. 53-54 

Beyond Good and Evil — at any rate that is not the 
same as "Beyond Good and Bad." 57 

The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of 
responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of 
this power over himself and over fate, has sunk right down 
to his innermost depths, and has become an instinct, a 
dominating instinct — what name will he give to it, to 



220 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

this dominating instinct if he needs to have a word for it? 
But there is no doubt about it — the sovereign man calls 
it his conscience, es 

Have these current genealogists of morals ever allowed 
themselves to have even the vaguest notion, for instance, 
that the cardinal moral idea of "ought" originates from 
the very material idea of "owe"? Or that punishment 
developed as a retaliation absolutely independently of 
any preliminary hypothesis of the freedom or determina- 
tion of the will ? — And this to such an extent, that a high 
degree of civilisation was always first necessary for the 
animal man to begin to make those much more primitive 
distinctions of "intentional," "negligent," "accidental," 
"responsible," and their contraries, and apply them in the 
assessing of punishment. That idea — "the wrong-doer 
deserves punishment because he might have acted other- 
wise," in spite of the fact that it is nowadays so cheap, 
obvious, natural, and inevitable, and that it has had to 
serve as an illustration of the way in which the sentiment 
of justice appeared on earth is in point of fact an exceed- 
ingly late, and even refined form of human judgment and 
inference; the placing of this idea back at the beginning 
of the world is simply a clumsy violation of the prin- 
ciples of primitive psychology. 6 q 

The sight of suffering does one good, the infliction of 
suffering does one more good — this is a hard maxim, but 
none the less a fundamental maxim, old, powerful, and 
"human, all-too-human"; one, moreover, to which per- 
haps even the apes as well would subscribe : for it is said 
that in inventing bizarre cruelties they are giving abund- 
ant proof of their future humanity, to which, as it were, 
they are playing the prelude. Without cruelty, no feast : 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 221 

so tea' hes the oldest and longest history of man — and in 
unishment too is there so much of the festive. 75 

The darkening of the heavens over man has always in 1 
in proportion to the growth of man's shame be- 
in. The tired pessimistic outlook, the mistrust of 
I the -~_i:lle of life, the icy negation of disgusted ennui, all 
those are not the signs of the most evil age of the human 
race : much rather do they come first to the light of day, 
as the swamp-flowers, which they are, when the swamp to 
which they belong comes into existence — I mean the dis- 
eased refinement and moralisation, thanks to which the 
"animal man" has at last learnt to be ashamed of all his 
instincts. 75 

The curve of human sensibilities to pain seems indeed 
to sink in an extraordinary and almost sudden fashion, as 
soon as one has passed the upper ten thousand or ten mil- 
lions of over-civilised humanity, and I personally have 
no doubt that, by comparison with one painful night 
passed by one single hysterical chit of a cultured woman, 
the suffering of all the animals taken together who have 
been put to the question of the knife, so as to give scien- 
tific answers, are simply negligible. 76-77 

Man . . . arrived at the great generalisation "every- 
thing has its price, all can be paid for," the oldest and 
most naive moral canon of justice the beginning of all 
"kindness," of all "equity," of all "goodwill," of all 
"objectivity" in the world, so 

The self-destruction of Justice! we know the pretty 
name it calls itself — Grace! it remains, as is obvious, the 
privilege of the strongest, better still, their super-law. ss-s* 

The aggressive man has at all times enjoyed the 
stronger, bolder, more aristocratic, and also freer outlook, 



222 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the better conscience. On the other hand, we already 
surmise who it really is that has on his conscience tfaf 
vention of the "bad conscience," — the resentful man ! 8 e 

To talk of intrinsic right and intrinsic wrong is abso- 
lutely nonsensical; intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, 
an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, 
inasmuch as life is essentially (that is, in its cardinal func- 
tions) something which functions by injuring, oppressing, 
exploiting, and annihilating, and is absolutely inconceiv- 
able without such a character. 8 s 

Evildoers have throughout thousands of years felt 
when overtaken by punishment exactly like Spinoza, on 
the subject of their "offence" : "here is something which 
went wrong contrary to my anticipation, not I ought not 
to have done this." — They submitted themselves to pun- 
ishment, just as one submits one's self to a disease, to a 
misfortune, or to death, with that stubborn and resigned 
fatalism which gives the Russians, for instance, even now- 
adays, the advantage over us Westerners, in the handling 
of life. If at that period there was a critique of action, 
the criterion was prudence : the real effect of punishment 
is unquestionably chiefly to be found in a sharpening of 
the sense of prudence, in a lengthening of the memory, 
in a will to adopt more of a policy of caution, suspicion, 
and secrecy ; in the recognition that there are many things 
which are unquestionably beyond one's capacity; in a 
kind of improvement in self-criticism. The broad effects 
which can be obtained by punishment in man and beast, 
are the increase of fear, the sharpening of the sense of 
cunning, the mastery of the desires : so it is that punish- 
ment tames man, but does not make him "better" — it 
would be more correct even to go so far as to assert the 
contrary. 99 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 223 

instincts which do not find a vent without, turn 
ds — this is what I mean by the growing "internali- 
on" of man: consequently we have the first growth 
in man, of what subsequently was called his soul. The 
1 inner world, originally as thin as if it had been 
stretched between two layers of skin, burst apart and 
expanded proportionately, and obtained depth, breadth, 
and height, when man's external outlet became obstructed. 
These terrible bulwarks, with which the social organisa- 
tion protected itself against the old instincts of freedom 
(punishments belong pre-eminently to these bulwarks), 
brought it about that all those instincts of wild, free, 
prowling man became turned backwards against man 
himself. Enmity, cruelty, the delight in persecution, in 
surprises, change, destruction — the turning all these in- 
stincts against their own possessors: this is the origin of 
the "bad conscience." It was man, who, lacking external 
enemies and obstacles, and imprisoned as he was in the 
oppressive narrowness and monotony of custom, in his 
own impatience lacerated, persecuted, gnawed, frightened, 
and ill-treated himself; it was this animal in the hands 
of the tamer, which beat itself against the bars of its 
cage ; it was this being who, pining and yearning for that 
desert home of which it had been deprived, was compelled 
to create out of its own self, an adventure, a torture- 
chamber, a hazardous and perilous desert — it was this 
fool, this homesick and desperate prisoner — who invented 
the "bad conscience." 100-101 

A herd of blonde beasts of prey, a race of conquerors 
and masters, which with all its warlike organisation and 
all its organising power pounces with its terrible claws on 
a population, in numbers possibly tremendously superior, 
but as yet formless, as yet nomad. Such is the origin of 



224 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

the "State." That fantastic theory that makes it beg 
with a contract is, I think, disposed of. He who C 
command, he who is a master by "nature," he who c( 
on the scene forceful in deed and gesture — what ha 
to do with contracts'? Such beings defy calculation, 
they come like fate, without cause, reason, notice, excuse, 
they are there like the lightning is there, too terrible, too 
sudden, too convincing, too "different," to be personally 
even hated. Their work is an instinctive creating and 
impressing of forms, they are the most involuntary, un- 
conscious artists that there are. ... 103 

It is only the bad conscience, only the will for self- 
abuse, that provides the necessary conditions for the exist- 
ence of altruism as a value. 105 

The feeling of owing a debt to the deity has grown 
continuously for several centuries, always in the same pro- 
portion in which the idea of God and the consciousness 
of God have grown and become exalted among mankind. 
(The whole history of ethnic fights, victories, reconcilia- 
tions, amalgamations, everything, in fact, which precedes 
the eventual classing of all the social elements in each 
great race synthesis, are mirrored in the hotch-potch 
genealogy of their gods, in the legends of their fights, 
victories, and reconciliations, Progress towards uni- 
versal empires invariably means progress towards uni- 
versal deities; despotism, with its subjugation of the 
independent nobility, always paves the way for some sys- 
tem or other of monotheism.) The appearance of the 
Christian god, as the record god up to this time, has for 
that very reason brought equally into the world the record 
amount of guilt consciousness. 109 

This is a kind of madness of the will in the sphere of 
psychological cruelty which is absolutely unparalleled : — 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 225 

man's will to find himself guilty and blameworthy to the 
point of inexpiability, his will to think of himself as 
punished, without the punishment ever being able to bal- 
ance the guilt, his will to infect and to poison the funda- 
mental basis of the universe with the problem of punish- 
ment and guilt, in order to cut off once and for all any 
escape out of this labyrinth of "fixed ideas," his will for 
rearing an ideal — that of the "holy God" — face to face 
with which he can have tangible proof of his own un- 
worthiness. Alas for this mad melancholy beast man! 

112-113 

What is the meaning of ascetic ideals'? In artists, 
nothing, or too much; in philosophers and scholars, a 
kind of "flair" and instinct for the conditions most fav- 
ourable to advanced intellectualism ; in women, at best 
an additional seductive fascination, a little morbidezza 
on a fine piece of flesh, the angelhood of a fat, pretty 
animal; in physiological failures and whiners (in the 
majority of mortals), an attempt to pose as "too good" 
for this world, a holy form of debauchery, their chief 
weapon, in the battle with lingering pain and ennui; in 
priests, the actual priestly faith, their best engine of 
power, and also the supreme authority for power; in 
saints, finally a pretext for hibernation, their novissima 
gloria cupido, their peace in nothingness ("God"), their 
form of madness. 121 

All good things were once bad things ; from every orig- 
inal sin has grown an original virtue. Marriage, for 
example, seemed for a long time a sin against the rights 
of the community ; a man formerly paid a fine for the in- 
solence of claiming one woman to himself. 144-145 

The soft, benevolent yielding, sympathetic feelings — 
eventually valued so highly that they almost become "in- 



226 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

trinsic values," were for a very long time actually de- 
spised by their possessors; gentleness was then a subject 
for shame, just as hardness is now. 145 

The ascetic ideal springs from the prophylactic and 
self-preservative instincts which mark a decadent life, 
which seeks by every means in its power to maintain its 
position and fight for its existence ; it points to a partial 
physiological depression and exhaustion, against which 
the most profound and intact life-instincts light cease- 
lessly with new weapons and discoveries. The ascetic 
ideal is such a weapon: its position is consequently ex- 
actly the reverse of that which the worshippers of the 
ideal imagine — life struggles in it and through it with 
death and against death; the ascetic ideal is a dodge for 
the preservation of life. 154 

The ascetic priest is the incarnate wish for an exist- 
ence of another kind, an existence on another plane, — 
he is, in fact, the highest point of this wish, its official 
ecstasy and passion: but it is the very power of this 
wish which is the fetter that binds him here; it is just 
that which makes him into a tool that must labour to 
create more favourable conditions for earthly existence, 
for existence on the human plane — it is with this very 
power that he keeps the whole herd of failures, distor- 
tions, abortions, unfortunates, sufferers from themselves 
of every kind, fast to existence, while he as the herdsman 
goes instinctively on in front. 154-155 

The sick are the great danger of man, not the evil, not 
the "beasts of prey." They who are from the outset 
botched, oppressed, broken, those are they, the weakest 
are they, who most undermine the life beneath the feet 
of man, who instil the most dangerous venom and scep- 
ticism into our trust in life, in man, in ourselves. 157 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 227 

Preventing the sick making the healthy sick . . . this 
ought to be our supreme object in the world — but for this 
it is above all essential that the healthy should remain 
separated from the sick, that they should even guard 
themselves from the look of the sick, that they should not 
even associate with the sick. Or may it, perchance, be 
their mission to be nurses or doctors? But they could 
not mistake or disown their mission more grossly — the 
higher must not degrade itself to be the tool of the lower, 
the pathos of distance must to all eternity keep their mis- 
sions also separate. The right of the happy to existence, 
the right of bells with a full tone over the discordant 
cracked bells, is verily a thousand times greater: they 
alone are the sureties of the future, they alone are bound 
to man's future, wo-iei 

The ascetic priest must be accepted by us as the pre- 
destined saviour, herdsman, and champion of the sick 
herd: thereby do we first understand his awful historic 
mission. i 6 2 

"I suffer: it must be somebody's fault" — so thinks 
every sick sheep. But his herdsman, the ascetic priest, 
says to him, "Quite so, my sheep, it must be the fault of 
some one ; but thou thyself art that some one, it is all the 
fault of thyself alone — it is the fault of thyself alone 
against thyself": that is bold enough, false enough, 
but one thing is at least attained ; thereby, as I have said, 
the course of resentment is — diverted, igs 

All sick and diseased people strive instinctively after 
a herd-organisation, out of a desire to shake off their sense 
of oppressive discomfort and weakness ; the ascetic priest 
divines this instinct and promotes it; wherever a herd 
exists it is the instinct of weakness which has wished for 
the herd, and the cleverness of the priests which has or- 



228 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ganised it, for, mark this: by an equally natural neces- 
sity the strong strive as much for isolation as the weak 
for union: when the former bind themselves it is only 
with a view to an aggressive joint action and joint satis- 
faction of their Will for Power, much against the wishes 
of their individual consciences; the latter, on the con- 
trary, range themselves together with positive delight in 
such a muster — their instincts are as much gratified 
thereby as the instincts of the "born master" (that is the 
solitary beast-of-prey species of man) are disturbed and 
wounded to the quick by organisation. 176-177 

The keynote by which the ascetic priest was enabled to 
get every kind of agonising and ecstatic music to play 
on the fibres of the human soul — was, as every one knows, 
the exploitation of the feeling of "guilt." 1S2 

The ascetic ideal and its sublime moral cult, this most 
ingenious, reckless, and perilous systematisation of all 
methods of emotional excess, is writ large in a dreadful 
and unforgettable fashion on the whole history of man, 
and unfortunately not only on history. I was scarcely 
able to put forward any other element which attacked the 
health and race efficiency of Europeans with more de- 
structive power than did this ideal; it can be dubbed, 
without exaggeration, the real fatality in the history of 
the health of the European man. lse-m 

The ascetic ideal has corrupted not only health and 
taste, there are also third, fourth, fifth, and sixth things 
which it has corrupted — I shall take care not to go through 
the catalogue (when should I get to the end 4 ?). i 90 

The periods in a nation in which the learned man 
comes into prominence; they are the periods of exhaus- 
tion, often of sunset, of decay — the effervescing strength, 
the confidence of life, the confidence in the future are no 



"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS" 229 

more. The preponderance of the mandarins never sig- 
nifies any good, any more than does the advent of de- 
mocracy, or arbitration instead of war, equal rights for 
women, the religion of pity, and all the other symptoms 
of declining life. 200 

The ascetic ideal simply means this: that something 
was lacking, that a tremendous void encircled man — he 
did not know how to justify himself, to explain himself, 
to affirm himself, he suffered from the problem of his own 
meaning. He suffered also in other ways, he was in the 
main a diseased animal; but his problem was not suffer- 
ing itself, but the lack of an answer to that crying ques- 
tion, "To what purpose do we suffer 1 ?" Man, the brav- 
est animal and the one most inured to suffering, does not 
repudiate suffering in itself: he wills it, he even seeks it 
out, provided that he is shown a meaning for it, a pur- 
pose of suffering was the curse which till then lay spread 
over humanity — and the ascetic ideal gave it a meaning I 
It was up till then the only meaning; but any meaning 
is better than no meaning; the ascetic ideal was in that 
connection the "faute de mieux" par excellence that ex- 
isted at that time. In that ideal suffering found an 
explanation; the tremendous gap seemed filled; the door 
to all suicidal Nihilism was closed. The explanation — 
there is no doubt about it — brought in its train new suf- 
fering, deeper, more penetrating, more venomous, gnaw- 
ing more brutally into life : it brought all suffering under 
the perspective of guilt; but in spite of all that — man 
was saved thereby, he had a meaning, and from hence- 
forth was no more like a leaf in the wind, a shuttlecock, 
of chance, of nonsense, he could now "will" something 
— absolutely immaterial to what end, to what purpose, 
with that means he wished: the will itself was saved. 



230 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

It is absolute^ impossible to disguise what in point of 
fact is made clear by every complete will that has taken 
its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hate of the 
human, and even more of the animal, and more still of 
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, 
this fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to get right 
away from all illusion, change, growth, death, wishing 
and even desiring — all this means — let us have the cour- 
age to grasp it — a will for Nothingness, a will opposed 
to life, a repudiation of the most fundamental conditions 
of life, but it is and remains a will! — and to say at the 
end that which I said at the beginning — man will wish 
Nothingness rather than not wish at all. 210-211 



IX 

"The Twilight of the Idols" 

NIETZSCHE followed "The Genealogy of Morals" 
with "The Case of Wagner," that famous pam- 
phlet in which he excoriated the creator of Parsifal. Im- 
mediately after the publication of this attack, he began 
work on what was to be still another preparatory book 
for "The Will to Power." For its title he first chose 
"Idle Hours of a Psychologist." The book, a brief one, 
was already on the presses when he changed the caption 
to "Gotzendammerung" — "The Twilight of the Idols" 
— a titular parody on Wagner's "Gotterdammerung." 
For a subtitle he appended a characteristically Nie- 
tzschean phrase — "How to Philosophise with the Ham- 
mer." The writing of this work was done with great 
rapidity: it was accomplished in but a few days during 
August, 1888. In September it was sent to the pub- 
lisher, but during its printing Nietzsche added a chapter 
headed "What the Germans Lack," and several aphor- 
isms to the section called "Skirmishes in a War with the 
Age." In January, 1889, the book appeared. 

Nietzsche was then stricken with his fatal illness, 
and this was the last book of his to appear during his 
lifetime. "The Antichrist" was already finished, hav- 
ing been written in the fall of 1888 immediately after 
the completion of "The Twilight of the Idols." "Ecce 
Homo" his autobiography, was written in October, 

1888; and during December Nietzsche again gave his 

231 



232 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

attention to Wagner, drafting "Nietzsche contra Wag- 
ner," a pamphlet made up entirely of excerpts from his 
earlier writings. This work, intended to supplement 
"The Case of Wagner," was not published until 1895, 
although it had been printed and corrected before the 
author's final breakdown. "The Antichrist" appeared 
at the same time as this second Wagner document, while 
"Ecce Homo" was withheld from publication until 1908. 
"The Twilight of the Idols" sold 9,000 copies, but Nie- 
tzsche's mind was too clouded to know or care that at 
last he was coming into his own, that the public which 
had denied him so long had finally begun to open its 
eyes to his greatness. 

In many ways "The Twilight of the Idols" is one of 
Nietzsche's most brilliant books. Being more compact, 
it consequently possesses a greater degree of precision and 
clarity than is found in his more analytical writings. It 
is not, however, a treatise to which one may go without 
considerable preparation. With the exception of "Thus 
Spake Zarathustra," it demands more on the part of the 
reader than any of Nietzsche's other books. It is, for 
the most part, composed of conclusions and comments 
which grow directly out of the laborious ethical research 
of his preceding volumes, and presupposes in the stu- 
dent an enormous amount of reading, not only of Nie- 
tzsche's own writings but of philosophical works in gen- 
eral. But once equipped with this preparation, one will 
find more of contemporary interest in it than in the 
closely organised books such as "Beyond Good and 
Evil" and "The Genealogy of Morals." There are few 
points in Nietzsche's philosophy not found here. For a 
compact expression of his entire teaching I know of no 
better book to which one might turn. Nietzsche him- 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 233 

self, to judge from a passage in his "Ecce Homo" in- 
tended this book as a statement of his whole ethical sys- 
tem. He probably meant that it should present in toto 
the principal data of his foregoing studies, in order that 
the reader might be familiar with all the steps in his 
philosophy before setting forth upon the formidable doc- 
trines of "The Will to Power." Obviously, therefore, it 
is not a book for beginners. Being expositional rather 
than argumentative, it is open to misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. It contains apparent contradictions 
which might confuse the student who has not followed 
Nietzsche in the successive points which led to his con- 
clusions, and who is unfamiliar with the exact definitions 
attached to certain words relating to human conduct. 

Other qualities of a misleading nature are to be en- 
countered in this book. Many of the paragraphs have 
about them an air of mere cleverness, although in reality 
they embody profound concepts. The reader ignorant 
of the inner seriousness of Nietzsche will accept these 
passages only at their surface value. Of the forty-four 
short epigrams which comprise the opening chapter, I 
have appended but three, for fear they would be judged 
solely by their superficial characteristics. Many of the 
other aphorisms throughout the book lend themselves all 
too easily to the same narrow judgment. 

Again, "The Problem of Socrates," the second division 
of the book, because of its profundity, presents many 
difficulties to the unprepared student. Here is a criti- 
cism of the Socratic ideals which requires, in order that 
it be intelligently grasped, not only a wide general knowl- 
edge, but also a specific training in the uprooting of 
prejudices and of traditional ethical conceptions — such a 
training as can be acquired only by a close study of Nie- 



234 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tzsche's own destructive works. The explanation of Soc- 
rates's power, the condemnation of that ancient philoso- 
pher's subtle glorification of the canaille, the reasons for 
his secret fascination, and the interpretation of his whole 
mental progress culminating in his death — all this is pro- 
found and categorical criticism which has its roots in the 
very fundamentals of Nietzsche's philosophy. But be- 
cause it is so deep-rooted, it therefore presents a wide 
and all-inclusive vista of that philosophy from which 
it stems. Furthermore, this criticism of Socrates poses 
a specific problem which can be answered only by resort- 
ing to the doctrines which underlie Nietzsche's entire 
thought. In like manner the chapter, "Reason in Phi- 
losophy," is understandable only in the light of those in- 
vestigations set forth in "Beyond Good and Evil." 

Under the caption, "The Four Great Errors," Nie- 
tzsche uproots a series of correlated beliefs which have 
the accumulated impetus of centuries of acceptance be- 
hind them. These "errors," as stated, are (l) the error 
of the confusion of cause and effect, (2) the error of 
false causality, (3) the error of imaginary causes, and 
(4) the error of free will. The eradication of these er- 
rors is necessary for a complete acceptance of Nie- 
tzsche's philosophy. But unless one is familiar with the 
vast amount of criticism which has led up to the present 
discussion of them, one will experience difficulty in fol- 
lowing the subtly drawn arguments and analogies pre- 
sented against them. To demonstrate briefly the spe- 
cific application of the first error, namely: the confusion 
of cause and effect, I offer an analogy stated in the pas- 
sage. We know that Christian morality teaches us that 
a people perish through vice and luxury — that is to say, 
that these two conditions are causes of racial degenera- 






"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 235 

tion. Nietzsche's contention to the contrary is that when 
a nation is approaching physiological degeneration, vice 
and luxury result in the guise of stimuli adopted by ex- 
hausted natures. By this it can be seen how the Chris- 
tian conscience is developed by a misunderstanding of 
causes ; and it can also be seen how this error may affect 
the very foundation on which morality is built. I am 
here stating merely the conclusion : for the reasons lead- 
ing up to this conclusion one must go to the book direct. 
Nietzsche denies the embodiment of the motive of an 
action in the "inner facts of consciousness" where, so we 
have been taught by psychologists and physicists, the re- 
sponsibilities of conduct are contained. The will itself, 
he argues, is not a motivating force ; rather is it an effect 
of other deeper causes. This is what he discusses in his 
paragraphs dealing with the second error of false causal- 
ity. In his criticism of the third error relating to imag- 
inary causes, he points to the comfort we obtain by at- 
tributing a certain unexplained fact to a familiar cause 
— by tracing it to a commonplace source — thereby doing 
away with its seeming mystery. Thus ordinary maladies 
or afflictions, or, to carry the case into moral regions, mis- 
fortunes and unaccountable strokes of fate, are explained 
by finding trite and plausible reasons for their existence. 
As a consequence the habit of postulating causes becomes 
a fixed mental habit. In the great majority of cases, 
and especially in the domain of morality and religion, 
the causes are false, inasmuch as the operation of finding 
them depends on the mental characteristics of the 
.searcher. The error of free will Nietzsche attributes to 
the theologians' attempt to make mankind responsible 
for its acts and therefore amenable to punishment. I 
have been able to present his own words in explanation 



236 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of this error, and they will be found at the end of this 
chapter — 41-42 and 43. 

In "Skirmishes in a War with the Age," the longest 
section in the book, Nietzsche gives us much brilliant 
and incisive criticism of men, art and human attributes. 
He is here at his best, both in clarity of mind and in his 
manner of expression. This passage, one of the last 
things to come from his pen, contains the full ripeness 
of his nature, and is a portion of his work which no stu- 
dent can afford to overlook. It contains the whole of 
the Nietzschean philosophy applied to the conditions of 
his age. Because it is not a direct voicing of his doc- 
trines it does not lend itself to mutilation except where 
it touches on principles of conduct and abstract aspects 
of morality. Many of the most widely read passages 
of all of Nietzsche's work are contained in it. But here 
again, as in the case of "Thus Spake Zarathustra," one 
regrets that the surface brilliance of its style attracted 
readers in England and America before these nations 
were acquainted with the books which came before. The 
casual reader, unfamiliar with the principles underlying 
Nietzsche's ethic, will see only a bold and satanic flip- 
pancy in his definition of Zola — "the love of stinking," 
or in his characterisation of George Sand as "the cow 
with plenty of beautiful milk," or in his bracketing of 
"tea-grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and 
other democrats." Yet it is significant that Nietzsche 
did not venture upon these remarks until he had the 
great bulk of his life's work behind him. 

In this chapter are discussions of Renan, Sainte- 
Beuve, George Eliot, George Sand, Emerson, Carlyle, 
Darwin, Schopenhauer, Goethe and other famous men 
and women. In the short essays devoted to these writers 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 237 

we have, however, more than mere detached valuations. 
Beneath all the criticisms is a rationale of judgment 
based on definite philosophical doctrines. This same 
basis of appreciation is present in the discussion of art 
and artists, to which subjects many pages are devoted. 
In fact, "The Twilight of the Idols" contains most of 
the art theories and esthetic doctrines which Nietzsche 
advanced. He defines the psychology of the artist, and 
draws the line between the two concepts, Apollonian and 
Dionysian, as applied to art. He analyses the meaning 
of beauty and ugliness, and endeavours to show in what 
manner the conceptions of these qualities are related to 
the racial instincts. He also inquires into the doctrine 
of "Tart pour fart" and points out wherein it fails in 
its purpose. A valuable explanation of "genius" is put 
forth in the theory that the accumulative power of gen- 
erations breaks forth in the great men of a nation, and 
that these great men mark the end of an age, as in the 
case of the Renaissance. 

The most significant brief essay in this section is an 
answer made to certain critics who, in reviewing "Be- 
yond Good and Evil," claimed a superiority for the pres- 
ent age over the older civilisations. Nietzsche calls this 
essay "Have We Become Moral?" and proceeds to make 
comparisons of contemporaneous virtues with those of 
the ancients. He denies that to-day, without our de- 
crepit humanitarianism and our doctrines of weakness, 
we would be able to withstand, either nervously or mus- 
cularly, the conditions that prevailed during the Renais- 
sance. He points out that our morals are those of senil- 
ity, and that we have deteriorated, physically as well as 
mentally, as a result of an adherence to a code of moral- 
ity invented to meet the needs of a weak and impover- 



238 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ished people. Our virtues, he says, are determined and 
stimulated by our weakness, so that we have come to 
admire the moralities of the slave, the most prominent 
among which is the doctrine of equality. In the decline 
of all the positive forces of life Nietzsche sees only racial 
decadence. In this regard it is important to take note 
of one of the passages relative to the discussion of this 
decadence, namely: the one wherein he characterises the 
anarchist as "the mouthpiece of the decaying strata of 
society." The appellation of "anarchist" has not infre- 
quently been applied to Nietzsche himself by those who 
have read him superficially or whose acquaintance with 
him has been the result of distorted hearsay. I know 
of no better analysis of anarchistic motives or of no 
keener dissection of anarchistic weakness than is set forth 
here. Nor do I know of any better answer to those 
critics who have accused Nietzsche of anarchy, than the 
criticism contained in this passage. 

In a final chapter, under the caption of "Things I 
Owe to the Ancients," Nietzsche outlines the inspirational 
source of many of his doctrines and literary habits. This 
chapter is important only to the student who wishes to 
go to the remoter influences in Nietzsche's writings, and 
for that reason I have omitted from the following ex- 
cerpts any quotation from it. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 

Man thinks woman profound — why*? Because he can 
never fathom her depths. Woman is not even shallow. 5 

The trodden worm curls up. This testifies to its cau- 
tion. It thus reduces its chances of being trodden upon 
again. In the language of morality: Humility. 5 -s 

The Church combats passion by means of excision of 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 239 

all kinds: its practise, its "remedy," is castration. It 
never inquires "how can a desire be spiritualised, beauti- 
fied, deified'?" — In all ages it has laid the weight of dis- 
cipline in the process of extirpation (the extirpation of 
sensuality, pride, lust of dominion, lust of property, and 
revenge). — But to attack the passions at their roots, 
means attacking life itself at its source: the method of 
the Church is hostile to life. 27 

Only degenerates find radical methods indispensable: 
weakness of will, or more strictly speaking, the inability 
not to react to a stimulus, is in itself simply another form 
of degeneracy. Radical and mortal hostility to sensu- 
ality, remains a suspicious symptom: it justifies one in 
being suspicious of the general state of one who goes to 
such extremes. 27 

A man is productive only in so far as he is rich in con- 
trasted instincts; he can remain young only on condition 
that his soul does not begin to take things easy and to 
yearn for peace. 28-29 

All naturalism is morality — that is to say, every sound 
morality is ruled by a life instinct — any one of the laws 
of life is fulfilled by the definite canon "thou shalt," 
"thou shalt not," and any sort of obstacle or hostile ele- 
ment in the road of life is thus cleared away. Conversely, 
the morality which is antagonistic to nature — that is to 
say, almost every morality that has been taught, hon- 
oured and preached hitherto, is directed precisely against 
the life-instincts. ... 30 

Morality, as it has been understood hitherto, is the 
instinct of degeneration itself, which converts itself into 
an imperative: it says: "Perish!" It is the death sen- 
tence of men who are already doomed. 31 

Morality, in so far it condemns per se, and not out of 



240 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

arty aim, consideration or motive of life, is a specific 
error, for which no one should feel any mercy, a degen- 
erate idiosyncrasy, that has done an unutterable amount 
of harm. 32 

Every mistake is in every sense the sequel to degenera- 
tion of the instincts to disintegration of the will. This 
is almost the definition of evil. 35 

Morality and religion are completely and utterly parts 
of the psychology of error : in every particular case cause 
and effect are confounded. 41 

At present we no longer have any mercy upon the con- 
cept "free-will" : we know only too well what it is — the 
most egregious theological trick that has ever existed for 
the purpose of making mankind "responsible" in a theo- 
logical manner — that is to say, to make mankind depend- 
ent upon theologians. 41 

The doctrine of the will was invented principally for 
the purpose of punishment, — that is to say, with the in- 
tention of tracing guilt. The whole of ancient psychol- 
ogy, or the psychology of the will, is the outcome of the 
fact that its originators, who were the priests at the head 
of ancient communities, wanted to create for themselves 
a right to administer punishments — or the right for God 
to do so. Men were thought of as "free" in order that 
they might be held guilty. ... 42 

The fact that no one shall any longer be made re 
sponsible, that the nature of existence may not be traced 
to a causa prima^ that the world is an entity neither as 
sensorium nor as a spirit — this alone is the great deliver- 
ance^ — thus alone is the innocence of Becoming restored. 
. . . The concept "God" has been the greatest objection 
to existence hitherto. . . . We deny God, we deny re- 
sponsibility in God: thus alone do we save the world. 43 



i 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 241 

Moral judgment has this in common with the religious 
one, that it believes in realities which are not real. Mo- 
rality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena: or 
more strictly speaking, a misinterpretation of them. 
Moral judgment, like the religious one, belongs to a stage 
of ignorance in which even the concept of reality, the 
distinction between real and imagined things, is still 
lacking. ... 44 

In the early years of the Middle Ages, during which 
the Church was most distinctly and above all a menagerie, 
the most beautiful examples of the "blond beast" were 
hunted down in all directions, — the noble Germans, for 
instance, were "improved." But what did this "im- 
proved" German, who had been lured to the monastery 
look like after the process 1 ? He looked like a caricature 
of man, like an abortion: he had become a "sinner," he 
was caged up, he had been imprisoned behind a host of 
appalling notions. He now lay there, sick, wretched, 
malevolent even toward himself: full of hate for the in- 
stincts of life, full of suspicion in regard to all that is 
still strong and happy. In short a "Christian." In 
physiological terms: in a fight with an animal, the only 
way of making it weak may be to make it sick. The 
Church understood this: it ruined man, it made him 
weak, — but it laid claim to having "improved" him. 45 -46 

All means which have been used heretofore with the 
object of making man moral, were through and through 
immoral. 49 

My impossible people — Seneca, or the toreador of vir- 
tue. — Rousseau, or the return to nature, in impuris natir- 
alibus. — Schiller, or the Moral Trumpeter of Sackingen. 
— Dante, or the hysena that writes poetry in tombs. — 
Kant, or cant as an intelligible character. — Victor Hugo, 



242 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

or the lighthouse on the sea of nonsense. — Liszt, or the 
school of racing — after women. — George Sand, or lactea 
ubertaS) in plain English: the cow with plenty beauti- 
ful milk. — Michelet, or enthusiasm in its shirt sleeves. — 
Carlyle, or Pessimism after undigested meals. — John 
Stuart Mill, or offensive lucidity. — The brothers Gon- 
court, or the two Ajaxes fighting with Homer. Music 
by Offenbach. — Zola, or the love of stinking. 6 o 

For art to be possible at all — that is to say, in order 
that an aesthetic mode of action and of observation may 
exist, a certain preliminary physiological state is indis- 
pensable : ecstasy. This state of ecstasy must first have 
intensified the susceptibility of the whole machine : other- 
wise, no art is possible. All kinds of ecstasy, however 

. differently produced, have this power to create art, and 
above all the state dependent upon sexual excitement — 
this most venerable and primitive form of ecstasy. The 
same applies to that ecstasy which is the outcome of all 

» great desires, all strong passions ; the ecstasy of the feast, 
of the arena, of the act of bravery, of victory, of all ex- 
treme action; the ecstasy of cruelty; the ecstasy of de- 
struction; the ecstasy following upon certain meteoro- 
logical influences, as for instance that of springtime, or 
upon the use of narcotics ; and finally the ecstasy of will, 
that ecstasy which results from accumulated and surging 

will-power, es-ee 

What is the meaning of the antithetical concepts Apol- 
lonian and Dionysian which I have introduced into the 
vocabulary of Esthetic, as representing two distinct modes 
of ecstasy? — Apollonian ecstasy acts above all as a force 
stimulating the eye, so that it acquires the power of vis- 
ion. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are essen- 
tially visionaries. In the Dionysian state, on the other 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 243 

hand, the whole system of passions is stimulated and in- 
tensified, so that it discharges itself by all the means of 
expression at once, and vents all its power of representa- 
tion, of imitation, of transfiguration, of transformation, 
together with every kind of mimicry and histrionic dis- 
play at the same time. 67-es 

As to the famous "struggle for existence," it seems to 
me, for the present, to be more of an assumption than a 
fact. It does occur, but as an exception. The general 
condition of life is not one of want or famine, but rather 
of riches, of lavish luxuriance, and even of absurd prodi- 
gality, — where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for 
power. 71 

The most intellectual men, provided they are also the 
most courageous, experience the most excruciating trage- 
dies: but on that very account they honour life, because 
it confronts them with its more formidable antagon- 
ism. 73 

When the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the decaying 
strata of society, raises his voice in splendid indignation 
for "right," "justice," "equal rights," he is only groan- 
ing under the burden of his ignorance, which cannot un- 
derstand why he actually suffers, — what his poverty con- 
sists of — the poverty of life. 8 s 

To bewail one's lot is always despicable: it is always 
the outcome of weakness. Whether one ascribes one's 
afflictions to others or to one's self, it is all the same. 
The socialist does the former, the Christian, for instance, 
does the latter. That which is common to both attitudes, 
or rather that which is equally ignoble in them both, is 
the fact that somebody must be to blame if one suffers — 
in short that the sufferer drugs himself with the honey of 
revenge to allay his anguish. 8 & 



244 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Why a Beyond, if it be not a means of splashing mud 
over a "Here," over this world? 8 7 

' An "altruistic" morality, a morality under which self- 
ishness withers, is in all circumstances a bad sign. This 
is true of individuals and above all of nations. The 
best are lacking when selfishness begins to be lacking. 
Instinctively to select that which is harmful to one, to be 
lured by "disinterested" motives, — these things almost 
provide the formula for decadence. "Not to have one's 
own interests at heart" — this is simply a moral fig-leaf 
concealing a very different fact, a physiological one, to 
wit: — "I no longer know how to find what is to my in- 
terest." . . . Disintegration of the instincts! — All is up 
with man when he becomes altruistic. 87 

One should die proudly when it is no longer possible 
to live proudly. Death should be chosen freely, — death 
at the right time, faced clearly and joyfully and embraced 
while one is surrounded by one's children and other wit- 
nesses. It should be affected in such a way that a proper 
farewell is still possible, that he who is about to take leave 
of us is still himself, and really capable not only of valu- 
ing what he has achieved and willed in life, but also of 
summing-up the value of life itself. Everything pre- 
cisely the opposite of the ghastly comedy which Christian- 
ity has made of the hour of death. We should never 
forgive Christianity for having so abused the weakness 
of the dying man as to do violence to his conscience, or 
for having used his manner of dying as a means of valu- 
ing both man and his past! — In spite of all cowardly 
prejudices, it is our duty, in this respect, above all to re- 
instate the proper — that is to say, the physiological, as- 
pect of so-called natural death, which after all is perfectb 
"unnatural" and nothing else than suicide. One never 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 245 

perishes through anybody's fault but one's own. The 
only thing is that the death which takes place in the most 
contemptible circumstances, the death that is not free, 
the death which occurs at the wrong time, is the death 
of a coward. Out of the very love one bears to life, one 
should wish death to be different from this — that is to 
say, free, deliberate, and neither a matter of chance nor 
of surprise. Finally let me whisper a word of advice to 
our friends the pessimists and all other decadents. We 
have not the power to prevent ourselves from being born : 
but this error — for sometimes it is an error — can be recti- 
fied if we choose. The man who does away with him- 
self performs the most estimable of deeds: he almost 
deserves to live for having done so. ss-89 

The decline of the instincts of hostility and of those 
instincts that arouse suspicion, — for this if anything is 
what constitutes our progress — is only one of the results 
manifested by the general decline in vitality: it requires 
a hundred times more trouble and caution to live such a 
dependent and senile existence. In such circumstances 
everybody gives everybody else a helping hand, and, to a 
certain extent, everybody is either an invalid or an in- 
valid's attendant. This is then called "virtue" : among 
those men who knew a different life — that is to say, a 
fuller, more prodigal, more superabundant sort of life, it 
might have been called by another name, — possibly 
"cowardice," or "vileness," or "old woman's morality." 

91-92 

Ages should be measured according to their positive 
forces; — valued by this standard that prodigal and fate- 
ful age of the Renaissance, appears as the last great age, 
while we moderns with our anxious care of ourselves and 
love of our neighbours, with all our unassuming virtues 



246 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of industry, equity, and scientific method — with our lust 
of collection, of economy and of mechanism — represent 
a weak age. 93 

Liberalism, or, in plain English, the transformation of 
mankind into cattle. 94 

Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves. 
It is to preserve the distance which separates us from 
other men. To grow more indifferent to hardship, to 
severity, to privation, and even to life itself. To be 
ready to sacrifice men for one's cause, one's self included. 
Freedom denotes that the virile instincts which rejoice 
in war and in victory, prevail over other instincts; for 
instance, over the instincts of "happiness." The man 
who has won his freedom, and how much more so, there- 
fore, the spirit that has won his freedom, tramples ruth- 
lessly upon that contemptible kind of comfort which tea- 
grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other 
democrats worship in their dreams. The free man is a 
warrior. 94-95 

By showing ever more and more favour to love-mai- 
riages, the very foundation of matrimony, that which 
alone makes it an institution, has been undermined. No 
institution ever has been nor ever will be built upon an 
idiosyncrasy; as I say, marriage cannot be based upon 

"lOVe." 97-98 

The mere fact that there is such a thing as the question 
of the workingman is due to stupidity, or at bottom to 
degenerate instincts which are the cause of all the stupid- 
ity of modern times. Concerning certain things no ques- 
tions ought to be put: the first imperative principle of 
instinct. For the life of me I cannot see what people 
want to do with the working-man of Europe; now that 
they have made a question of him. He is far too com- 



"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 247 

fortable to cease from questioning, ever more and more, 
and with ever less modesty. After all, he has the ma- 
jority on his side. There is now not the slightest hope 
that an unassuming and contented sort of man, after the 
style of the Chinaman, will come into being in this quar- 
ter: and this would have been the reasonable course, it 
was even a dire necessity. What has been done? 
Everything has been done with the view of nipping the 
very pre-requisite of this accomplishment in the bud, — 
with the most frivolous thoughtlessness those self-same 
instincts by means of which a working-class becomes pos- 
sible, and tolerable even to its members themselves, have 
been destroyed root and branch. The working-man has 
been declared fit for military service; he has been granted 
the right of combination, and of franchise: can it be 
wondered at that he already regards his condition as one 
of distress (expressed morally, as an injustice) 1 ? But, 
again I ask, what do people want? If they desire a cer- 
tain end, then they should desire the means thereto. If 
they will have slaves, then it is madness to educate them 
to be masters. 93-99 

Great men, like great ages, are explosive material, in 
which a stupendous amount of power is accumulated; the 
first conditions of their existence are always historical 
and physiological; they are the outcome of the fact that 
for long ages energy has been collected, hoarded up, 
saved up and preserved for their use, and that no ex- 
plosion has taken place. When the tension in the bulk 
has become sufficiently excessive, the most fortuitous 
stimulus suffices in order to call "genius," "great deeds," 
and momentous fate into the world. 101-102 

The criminal type is the type of the strong man and 
unfavourable conditions, a strong man made sick. He 



248 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

lacks the wild and savage state, a form of nature and 
existence which is freer and more dangerous, in which 
everything that constitutes the shield and the sword in 
the instinct of the strong man, takes a place by right. 
Society puts a ban upon his virtues; the most spirited 
instincts inherent in him immediately become involved 
with the depressing passions, with suspicion, fear and 
dishonour. But this is almost the recipe for physiologi- 
cal degeneration. When a man has to do that which he 
is best suited to do, which he is most fond of doing, not 
only clandestinely, but also with long suspense, caution 
and ruse, he becomes ansemic; and inasmuch as he is al- 
ways having to pay for his instincts in the form of danger, 
persecution and fatalities, even his feelings begin to turn 
against these instincts — he begins to regard them as fatal. 
It is society, our tame, mediocre, castrated society, in 
which an untutored son of nature who comes to us from 
his mountains or from his adventures at sea, must neces- 
sarily degenerate into a criminal. Or almost necessarily : 
for there are cases in which such a man shows himself to 
be stronger than society: the Corsican Napoleon is the 
most celebrated case of this. 103-104 

As long as the priest represented the highest type of 
man, every valuable kind of man was depreciated. . . . 
The time is coming — this I guarantee — when he will pass 
as the lowest type, as our Chandala, as the falsest and 
most disreputable kind of man. 105 

Everything good is an inheritance: that which is not 
inherited is imperfect, it is simply a beginning. 107 

Christianity with its contempt of the body is the great- 
est mishap that has ever befallen mankind. ios 

I also speak of a "return to nature," although it is not a 
process of going back but of going up — up into lofty, free 






"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS" 249 

and even terrible nature and naturalness; such a nature 
as can play with great tasks and may play with them. ios 
The doctrine of equality! . . . But there is no more 
deadly poison than this for it seems to proceed from the 
very lips of justice, whereas in reality it draws the cur- 
tain down on all justice. . . . "To equals equality, to 
unequals inequality" — that would be the real speech of 
justice and that which follows from it. "Never make 
unequal things equal." The fact that so much horror 
and blood are associated with this doctrine of equality, 
has lent this "modern idea" par excellence such a halo of 
fire and glory, that the Revolution as a drama has misled 
even the most noble minds. 108-109 



X 

"The Antichrist" 

"fTT^HE Antichrist" ("Der Antichrist") was written 
JL in September, 1888, work evidently having 
been begun on it as soon as "The Twilight of the 
Idols" had been sent to the publisher. Its composition 
could not have occupied more than a few weeks at most, 
for the former book was not despatched until September 
7, and the present work was completed before October. 
At this time Nietzsche was working at high pressure. 
He must have had some presentiment of his impending 
breakdown for he filled in every available minute with 
ardent and rapid writing. The fall of 1888 was the 
most prolific period of his life. No less than four books 
—'The Twilight of the Idols," "The Antichrist," "Nie- 
tzsche contra Wagner" and "Ecce Homo" — were com- 
pleted by him between the late summer and the first of 
the year; and in addition to this he made many notes 
for his future volumes and read and corrected a consid- 
erable amount of proofs. "The Antichrist," however, 
though completed in 1888, was not published until the 
end of 1894, six years after he had laid aside his work 
forever, and at a time when his mind was too darkened 
to know or care about the circumstances of its issuance. 
It appeared in Vol. XIII of Nietzsches Werke which, 
although published at the close of 1894, bore the date 
of the following year. 

"The Antichrist" which, like "Beyond Good and 

250 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 251 

Evil," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "The Twilight 
of the Idols," forms a part of Nietzsche's final philo- 
sophic scheme, was intended — to judge from the evidence 
contained in his notebooks — as the first division of a 
work to be entitled "The Trans valuation of All Values" 
("Die Umwertung Alter Werte"). In fact this title 
and also "The Will to Power" were considered alter- 
nately for his magnum opus which he intended writing 
after the completion of "The Transvaluation of All 
Values." He finally decided on the latter title for his 
great work, although he used the former caption as a 
subtitle. The complete outline for the volumes which 
were to be called "The Transvaluation of All Values" 
and which were to be incorporated in his final general 
plan, is as follows: 

1. "The Antichrist. An Attempted Criticism of 
Christianity." ("Der Antichrist: Versuch einer 
Kritik des Christentliums") 

2. "The Free Spirit. A Criticism of Philosophy as a 
Nihilistic Movement." ("Der freie Geist: Kritik 
der Pkilosopkie als einer nihilistichen Bewegung.") 

3. "The Immoralist. A Criticism of the Most Fatal 
Species of Ignorance, Morality." ("Der Immor- 
alist: Kritik der verh'dngnissvollsten Art von Un- 
wissenheit, der Moral.") 

4. "Dionysus, the Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence." 
("Dionysus, Philosophie der ewigen Wieder- 
kunft.") 

But Nietzsche did not finish this task, although "The 
Antichrist" is in the form in which he intended it to be 
published. Nevertheless, it must be considered merely 
as a fragment of a much more extensive plan. 



252 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Though Nietzsche was far from being the first, he 
yet was the most effective critic who ever waged war 
against Christianity. This was due to the fact that he 
went about his destructive work from an entirely new 
angle. Before him there had been many competent anti- 
Christian writers and scientists. Even during his own 
time there was a large and loud school of atheists at 
work undermining the foundations of Nazarene moral- 
ity. With the methods of his predecessors and contem- 
poraries, however, he had nothing in common. He saw 
that, despite the scientific denial of the miracles of 
Christianity and the biological opposition to the origin 
of Christian history, the theologian was always able to 
reply to the denial of Christian truth with the counter- 
argument of Christian practicability. Thus, while the 
reasoning of such men as Darwin, Huxley and Spencer 
held good so far as the scientific aspects of Christianity 
went, the results of Christianity were not involved. The 
church, meeting the onslaughts of the "higher criticism," 
denied the necessity of a literal belief in the Gospels, and 
asserted that, while all the anti-Christian critics might 
be accurate in their purely scientific and logical conclu- 
sions, Christianity itself as a workable code was still 
efficient and deserving of consideration as the most per- 
fect system of conduct the world had ever known. 
- Nietzsche therefore did not go into the field already 
ploughed by Voltaire, Hume, Huxley, Spencer, Paine 
and a host of lesser "free thinkers." The preliminary- 
battles in the great warfare against Christianity had al- 
ready been won, and he saw the futility of proceeding 
along historical and scientific lines. Consequently he 
turned his attention to a consideration of the effects of 
Christian morality upon the race, to an inquiry into the 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 253 

causes of pity-morality, and to a comparison of moral 
codes in their relation to the needs of humanity. 
Whether or not the origins of Christianity conformed to 
biological laws did not concern him, although he as- 
sumed as his hypothesis the conclusions of the scientific 
investigators. The only way of determining the merits 
and demerits of the Christian code, he argued, was to 
ascertain the actual results of its application, and to com- 
pare these with the results which had accrued from the 
application of hardier and healthier codes. To this in- 
vestigation Nietzsche devotes practically the whole of 
"The Antichrist," although there are a few analytical 
passages relating to the early dissemination of Jewish 
ethics. But with these passages the student need not 
seriously concern himself. They are speculative and 
non-essential. 

Nietzsche's criticism of the effects of Christian vir- 
tues, however, did not begin in "The Antichrist," al- 
though this book is the final flowering of those anti- 
Christian ideas which cropped up continually through- 
out his entire work. This religious antipathy was pres- 
ent even in his early academic essays, and in "Human, 
All-Too-Human" we find him well launched upon his 
campaign. No book of his, with the exception of his 
unfinished pamphlet, "The Eternal Recurrence," is free 
from this criticism. But one will find all his earlier 
conclusions and arguments drawn together in a compact 
and complete whole in the present volume. 

Nietzsche's accusation against Christianity, reduced to 
a few words, is that it works against the higher devel- 
opment of the individual ; that, being a religion of weak- 
ness, it fails to meet the requirements of the modern 
man; in short, that it is dangerous. This conclusion is 



254 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

founded on the principle of biological monism. Nie- 
tzsche assumes Darwin's law of the struggle for exist- 
ence, and argues that the Christian virtues oppose not 
only this law but the law of natural selection as well. 
By this opposition the race has been weakened, for self- 
sacrifice, the basis of Christian morality, detracts from 
the power of the individual and consequently lessens his 
chances for existence. Furthermore, the Christian ideal 
in itself is opposed to progress and all that progress en- 
tails, such as science and research. Knowledge of any 
kind tends to make man more independent, and thereby 
reduces his need for theological supervision. As a re- 
sult of the passing over of power from the strong to the 
weak, in accordance with the morality of Christianity, 
the strength of the race as a whole is depleted. Further- 
more, such a procedure is in direct opposition to the laws 
of nature, and so long as man lives in a natural environ- 
ment the only way to insure progress is to conform to the 
conditions of that environment. Nietzsche therefore 
makes a plea for the adoption of other than Christian 
standards — standards compatible with the laws of exist- 
ence. He points out that already the race has been al- 
most irremediably weakened by its adherence to anti- 
natural doctrines, that each day of Christian activity is 
another step in the complete degeneration of man. And 
he asserts that the only reason the race has maintained 
its power as long as it has is because the stronger mem- 
bers of society, despite their voiced belief, do not live up 
to the Christian code, but are continually compromising 
with it. 

The problem of the origin of Christianity interests 
Nietzsche, because he sees in it an explanation of the 
results which it wished to accomplish. Christianity, 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 255 

says he, can be understood only in relation to the soil 
out of which it grew. When the Jewish people, subju- 
gated and in a position of slavery, were confronted with 
the danger of extermination at the hands of a stronger 
people, they invented a system of conduct which would 
insure their continued existence. They realised that the 
adherence to such virtues as retaliation, aggressiveness, 
initiative, cruelty, arrogance and the like would mean 
death ; the stronger nations would not have countenanced 
such qualities in a weak and depleted nation. As a re- 
sult the Jews replaced retaliation with "long suffering," 
aggressiveness with peacefulness, cruelty with kindness, 
and arrogance with humility. These negative virtues 
took the place of positive virtues, and were turned into 
"beatitudes." By thus "turning the other cheek" and 
"forgiving one's enemies," instead of resenting persecu- 
tion and attempting to avenge the wrongs perpetrated 
against them, they were able to prolong life. This sys- 
tem of conduct, says Nietzsche, was a direct falsification 
of all natural conditions and a perversion of all healthy 
instincts. It was the morality of an impoverished and 
subservient people, and was adopted by the Jews only 
when they had been stripped of their power. 

Nietzsche presents a psychological history of Israel as 
an example of the process by which natural values were 
denaturalised. The God of Israel was Jehovah. He 
was the expression of the nation's consciousness of 
power, of joy and of hope. Victory and salvation were 
expected from him: he was the God of justice. The 
Assyrians and internal anarchy changed the conditions 
of Israel. Jehovah was no longer able to bring victory 
to his people, and consequently the nature of this God 
was changed. In the hands of the priest he became a 



256 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

weapon, and unhappiness was interpreted as punishment 
for "sins." Jehovah became a moral dictator, and con- 
sequently morality among the Israelites ceased to be an 
expression of the conditions of life and became an ab- 
stract theory opposed to life. Nor did the Jewish priest- 
hood stop at this. It interpreted the whole of history 
with a view to showing that all sin against Jehovah led 
to punishment and that all pious worship of Jehovah re- 
sulted in reward. A moral order of the universe was 
thus substituted for a natural one. To bolster up this 
theory a "revelation" became necessary. Accordingly a 
"stupendous literary fraud" was perpetrated, and the 
"holy scriptures" were "discovered" and foisted upon the 
people. The priests, avid for power, made themselves 
indispensable by attributing to the will of God all those 
acts they desired of the people. Repentance, namely: 
submission to the priests, was inaugurated. Thus 
Christianity, hostile to all reality and power, gained its 
footing. 

The psychology of Christ, as set forth in "The Anti- 
christ," and the use made of his doctrines by those who 
directly followed him, form an important part of Nie- 
tzsche's argument against Christian morality. Christ's 
doctrine, according to Nietzsche, was one of immediacy. 
It was a mode of conduct and not, according to the pres- 
ent Christian conception, a preparation for a future 
world. Christ was a simple heretic in his rebellion 
against the existing political order. He represented a 
reactionary mode of existence- — a system of conduct 
which said Nay to life, a code of inaction and non-inter- 
ference. His death on the cross was meant as a supreme 
example and proof of this doctrine. It remained for his 
disciples to attach other meanings to it. Loving Christ 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 257 

as they did, and consequently blinded by that love, they 
were unable to forgive his execution at the hands of the 
State. At the same time they were unprepared to follow 
his example and to give their own lives to the cause of 
his teachings. A feeling of revenge sprang up in them, 
and they endeavoured to find an excuse for his death. 
To what was it attributable? And the answer they 
found, says Nietzsche, was "dominant Judaism, its rul- 
ing class." For the moment they failed to realise that 
the "Kingdom of God," as preached by Christ, was an 
earthly thing, something contained within the individ- 
ual; and after the crucifixion it was necessary for them 
either to follow Christ's example or to interpret his death, 
a voluntary one, as a promise of future happiness, that 
is, to translate his practical doctrine into symbolic terms. 
They unhesitatingly chose the latter. 

In their search for an explanation as to how God could 
have allowed his "son" to be executed, they fell upon 
the theory that Christ's death was a sacrifice for their 
sins, an expiation for their guilt. From that time on, 
says Nietzsche, "there was gradually imported into the 
type of the Saviour the doctrine of the Last Judgment, 
and of the 'second coming,' the doctrine of sacrificial 
death, and the doctrine of Resurrection, by means of 
which the whole concept 'blessedness,' the entire and only 
reality of the gospel, is conjured away — in favour of a 
state after death." St. Paul then rationalised the con- 
ception by introducing into it the doctrine of personal 
immortality by means of having Christ rise from the 
dead; and he preached this immortality as a reward for 
virtue. Thus, asserts Nietzsche, Christ's effort toward 
a Buddhistic movement of peace, "toward real and not 
merely promised happiness on earth" was controverted 



258 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

by his posterity. Nothing of Christ's original doctrine 
remained, once Paul, the forger, set to work to twist it 
to his own ends. Paul went further and by changing 
and falsifying it turned all Jewish history into a 
prophecy for his own teachings. Thus the whole doc- 
trine of Christ, the true meaning of his death and the 
realities which he taught, were altered and distorted. In 
short, Christ's life was used as a means for furthering 
the religion of Paul, who gave to it the name of Chris- 
tianity. 

A most important part of "The Antichrist" is that 
passage wherein Nietzsche defines his order of castes. 
Every healthy society, says he, falls naturally into three 
separate and distinct types. These classes condition one 
another and "gravitate differently in the psychological 
sense." Each type has its own work, its own duties, its 
own emotions, its own compensations and mastership. 
The first class, comprising the rulers, is distinguished by 
its intellectual superiority. It devolves upon this class 
"to represent happiness, beauty and goodness on earth." 
The members of this superior class are in the minority, 
but they are nevertheless the creators of values. "Their 
delight is self-mastery: with them asceticism becomes a 
second nature, a need, an instinct. They regard a diffi- 
cult task as their privilege; to play with burdens which 
crush their fellows is to them a recreation." They are 
at once the most honourable, cheerful and gracious of all 
men. The second class is composed of those who re- 
lieve the first class of their duties and execute the will 
of the rulers. They are the guardians of the law, the 
merchants and professional men, the warriors and the 
judges. In brief, they are the executors of the race. 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 259 

The third class is made up of the workers, the lowest 
order of man — those destined for menial and disagree- 
able tasks. "The fact," says Nietzsche, "that one is 
publicly useful, a wheel, a function, presupposes a cer- 
tain natural destiny: it is not society, but the only kind 
of happiness of which the great majority are capable, 
that makes them intelligent machines. For the medi- 
ocre it is a joy to be mediocre; in them mastery in one 
thing, a specialty, is a natural instinct." The concep- 
tion of these classes contains the nucleus of Nietzsche's 
doctrine. It embodies his whole idea of a natural aris- 
tocracy as opposed to the spurious European aristocracy 
of the present day, wherein the rulers are in reality 
merely members of the second class. 

The charge is constantly brought against Nietzsche 
by the ecclesiastic dialecticians that his criticism of 
Christianity is fraught with the very nihilism against 
which he so eloquently argues. There is perhaps a slight 
basis for such a contention if we confine ourselves strictly 
to those of his utterances against the Jewish morality 
which appear in his previous books. But in "The Anti- 
christ" this does not hold true even in the slightest man- 
ner. Nietzsche is constantly supplanting modes of ac- 
tion for every Christian virtue he denies. He is as con- 
structive as he is destructive. "The Antichrist" con- 
tains, not only a complete denial of all Christian moral- 
ity, but a statement of a new and consistent system of 
ethics based on the research of all his works. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE ANTICHRIST" 

What is good? All that enhances the feeling of 
power, the Will to Power, and power itself in man. 



260 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

What is bad*? — All that proceeds from weakness. What 
is happiness*? — The feeling that power is increasing \ — 
that resistance has been overcome. 

Not contentment, but more power; not peace at any 
price, but war; not virtue, but efficiency (virtue in the 
Renaissance sense, virtu, free from all moralic acid). 
The weak and botched shall perish : first principle of our 
humanity. And they ought even to be helped to per- 
ish. 

' What is more harmful than any vice*? — Practical 
sympathy with all the botched and the weak— Chris- 
tianity. 128 

We must not deck out and adorn Christianity: it has 
waged a deadly war upon this higher type of man, it has 
set a ban upon all the fundamental instincts of this type, 
and has distilled evil and the devil himself out of these 
instincts : — the strong man as the typical pariah, the vil- 
lain. Christianity has sided with everything weak, low, 
and botched; it has made an ideal out of antagonism 
against all the self-preservative instincts of strong life: 
it has corrupted even the reason of the strongest intel- 
lects, by teaching that the highest values of intellectuality 
are sinful, misleading and full of temptations, iso 

I call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt, when 
it loses its instincts, when it selects and prefers that which 
is detrimental to it. 131 

Life itself, to my mind, is nothing more nor less than 
the instinct of growth, of permanence, of accumulating 
forces, of power : where the will to power is lacking, de- 
generation sets in. i3 i 

Pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the 
energy of the feeling of life : its action is depressing. A 
man loses power when he pities. By means of pity the 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 261 

drain on strength which suffering itself already intro- 
duces into the world is multiplied a thousandfold. i3 i 

On the whole, pity thwarts the law of development 
which is the law of selection. It preserves that which 
is ripe for death, it fights in favour of the disinherited 
and the condemned of life. 131-132 

This depressing and infectious instinct thwarts those 
instincts which aim at the preservation and enhancement 
of the value of life : by multiplying misery quite as much 
as by preserving all that is miserable, it is the principal 
agent in promoting decadence. 132 

That which a theologian considers true, must of neces- 
sity be false : this furnishes almost the criterion of truth. 
It is his most profound self-preservative instinct which 
forbids reality ever to attain to honour in any way, or 
even to raise its voice. Whithersoever the influence of 
the theologian extends, valuations are topsy-turvy, and 
the concepts "true" and "false" have necessarily changed 
places: that which is most deleterious to life, is here 
called "true," that which enhances it, elevates it, says 
Yea to it, justifies it and renders it triumphant, is called 
"false." 135 

What is there that destroys a man more speedily than 
to work, think, feel, as an automaton of "duty," without 
internal promptings, without a profound personal pre- 
dilection, without joy? This is the recipe par excellence 
of decadence and even of idiocy. 137 

In Christianity, neither morality nor religion comes in 
touch at all with reality. Nothing but imaginary causes 
(God, the soul, the ego, spirit, free will — or even non- 
free will) ; nothing but imaginary effects (sin, salvation, 
grace, punishment, forgiveness of sins). Imaginary 
beings are supposed to have intercourse (God, spirits, 



262 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

souls); imaginary Natural History (anthropocentric: 
total lack of the notion, "natural causes") ; an imaginary 
psychology (nothing but misunderstandings of self, in- 
terpretations of pleasant or unpleasant general feelings; 
for instance of the states of the nervus sympathicus, with 
the help of the sign language of a religio-moral idiosyn- 
crasy, — repentance, pangs of conscience, the temptation 
of the devil, the presence of God) ; an imaginary teleology 
(the Kingdom of God, the Last Judgment, Everlasting 

Lilte). 141-142 

A proud people requires a God, unto whom it can sac- 
rifice things. . . . Religion, when restricted to these 
principles, is a form of gratitude. A man is grateful for 
his own existence; for this he must have a God. — Such 
a God must be able to profit and to injure him, he must 
be able to act the friend and the foe. He must be es- 
teemed for his good as well as for his evil qualities. 143 

When a people is on the road to ruin ; when it feels its 
belief in a future, its hope of freedom vanishing for ever; 
when it becomes conscious of submission as the most use- 
ful quality, and of the virtues of the submissive as self- 
preservative measures, then its God must also modify 
himself. He then becomes a tremulous and unassuming 
sneak; he counsels "peace of the soul," the cessation of all 
hatred, leniency and "love" even towards friend and foe. 
He is for ever moralising, he crawls into the heart of 
every private virtue, becomes a God for everybody. 143 

The Christian concept of God — God as the deity of 
the sick, God as a spider, God as a spirit — is one of the 
most corrupt concepts of God that has ever been attained 
on earth. Maybe it represents the low-water mark in 
the evolutionary ebb of the godlike type. God degen- 
erated into the contradiction of life, instead of being its 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 263 

transfiguration and eternal Yea! With God war is de- 
clared on life, nature, and the will to life! God is the 
formula for every calumny of this world and for every lie 
concerning a beyond ! i4 8 

Christianity aims at mastering beasts of prey; its ex- 
pedient is to make them ill, — to render feeble is the Chris- 
tion recipe for taming, for "civilisation." 151 

If faith is above all necessary, then reason, knowledge, 
and scientific research must be brought into evil repute: 
the road to truth becomes the forbidden road. — Strong 
hope is a much greater stimulant of life than any single 
realised joy could be. Sufferers must be sustained by a 
hope which no actuality can contradict, — and which can- 
not ever be realised: the hope of another world. (Pre- 
cisely on account of this power that hope has of making 
the unhappy linger on, the Greeks regarded it as the evil 
of evils, as the most mischievous evil : it remained behind 
in Pandora's box.) In order that love may be possible, 
God must be a person. In order that the lowest instincts 
may also make their voices heard God must be young. 
For the ardour of the women a beautiful saint, and for 
the ardour of the men a Virgin Mary has to be pressed 
into the foreground. All this on condition that Christi- 
anity wishes to rule over a certain soil, on which Aphro- 
disiac or Adonis cults had already determined the notion 
of a cult. To insist upon chastity only intensifies the 
vehemence and profundity of the religious instinct — it 
makes the cult warmer, more enthusiastic, more soulful. 
— Love is the state in which man sees things most widely 
different from what they are. The force of illusion 
reaches its zenith here, as likewise the sweetening 
and transfiguring power. When a man is in love he en- 
dures more than at other times ; he submits to everything. 



264 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The thing was to discover a religion in which it was pos- 
sible to love : by this means the worst in life is overcome 
— it is no longer even seen. — So much for three Christian 
virtues Faith, Hope, and Charity: I call them the three 
Christian precautionary measures. 152-153 

What is Jewish morality, what is Christian morality? 
Chance robbed of its innocence; unhappiness polluted 
with the idea of "sin"; well being interpreted as a dan- 
ger, as a "temptation"; physiological indisposition poi- 
soned by means of the cankerworm of conscience. 157-153 

What does a "moral order of the universe" mean*? 
That once and for all there is such a thing as will of God 
which determines what man has to do and what he has to 
leave undone; that the value of a people or of an indi- 
vidual is measured according to how much or how little 
the one or the other obeys the will of God; that in the 
destinies of a people or of an individual, the will of God 
shows itself dominant, that is to say it punishes or rewards 
according to the degree of obedience. In the place of this 
miserable falsehood reality says: a parasitical type of 
man, who can flourish only at the cost of all the healthy 
elements of life, the priest abuses the name of God: he 
calls that state of affairs in which the priest determines the 
value of things "the Kingdom of God" ; he calls the means 
whereby such a state of affairs is attained or maintained, 
"the Will of God" ; with cold-blooded cynicism he meas- 
ures peoples, ages and individuals according to whether 
they favour or oppose the ascendency of the priest- 
hood. 158-159 

I fail to see against whom was directed the insurrection 
of which rightly or wrongly Jesus is understood to have 
been the promoter, if it were not directed against the 
Jewish church. i 6 2 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 265 

This saintly anarchist who called the lowest of the low, 
the outcasts and "sinners," the Chandala of Judaism, to 
revolt against the established order of things (and in lan- 
guage which, if the gospels are to be trusted, would get 
one sent to Siberia even to-day) — this man was a po- 
litical criminal in so far as political criminals were pos- 
sible in a community so absurdly non-political. This 
brought him to the cross : the proof of this is the inscrip- 
tion found thereon. He died for his sins — and no mat- 
ter how often the contrary has been asserted there is ab- 
solutely nothing to show that he died for the sins of 
others. 162-163 

The instinctive hatred of reality is the outcome of an 
extreme susceptibility to pain and to irritation, which can 
no longer endure to be "touched" at all, because every 
sensation strikes too deep. 

' The instinctive exclusion of all aversion, of all hostil- 
ity, of all boundaries and distances in feeling, is the out- 
come of an extreme susceptibility to pain and to irrita- 
tion, which regards all resistance, all compulsory resist- 
ance as insufferable anguish ( — that is to say, as harmful, 
as deprecated by the self-preservative instinct), and which 
knows blessedness (happiness) only when it is no longer 
obliged to offer resistance to anybody, either evil or detri- 
mental, — love as the only ultimate possibility of 
life. ... 

These are the two -physiological realities upon which 
and out of which the doctrine of salvation has grown. i 6 e 

With a little terminological laxity Jesus might be 
called a "free spirit" — he cares not a jot for anything that 
is established: the word killeth, everything fixed killeth. 
The idea, experience, "life" as he alone knows it, is, ac- 
cording to him, opposed to every kind of word, formula, 



266 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

law, faith and dogma. He speaks only of the innermost 
things: "life" or "truth" or "light," is his expression for 
the innermost things, — everything else the whole of real- 
ity, the whole of nature, language even, has only the 
value of a sign, of a simile for him. 109-170 

The whole psychology of the "gospels" lacks the con- 
cept of guilt and punishment, as also that of reward. 
"Sin," any sort of aloofness between God and man, is 
done away with, — this is precisely what constitutes the 
"glad tidings." Eternal bliss is not promised, it is not 
bound up with certain conditions; it is the only reality — 
the rest consists only of signs wherewith to speak about 
it. . . . 

The results of such a state project themselves into a 
new practice of life, the actual evangelical practice. It 
is not a "faith" which distinguishes himself by means of 
a different mode of action. ... 171 

The life of the Saviour was naught else than this prac- 
tice, — neither was his death. He no longer required any 
formulae, any rites for his relations with God — not even 
prayer. He has done with all the Jewish teaching of re- 
pentance and of atonement; he alone knows the mode of 
life which makes one feel "divine," "saved," "evangel- 
ical," and at all times a "child of God." Not "repent- 
ance," not "prayer and forgiveness" are the roads to God: 
the evangelical mode of life alone leads to God, it is 
"God." — That which the gospels abolished was the Juda- 
ism of the concepts "sin," "forgiveness of sin," "faith," 
"salvation through faith," — the whole doctrine of the 
Jewish church was denied by the "glad tidings." 

The profound instinct of how one must live in order 
to feel "in Heaven," in order to feel "eternal," while in 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 267 

every other respect one feels by no means "in Heaven" : 
this alone is the psychological reality of "Salvation." — 
A new life and not a new faith. . . . 171-172 

This "messenger of glad tidings" died as he lived and 
as he taught — not in order "to save mankind," but in or- 
der to show how one ought to live. It was a mode of life 
that he bequeathed to mankind : his behaviour before his 
judges, his attitude towards his executioners, his accusers, 
and all kinds of calumny and scorn, — his demeanour on 
the cross, m 

The history of Christianity — from the death on the 
cross onwards — is the history of a gradual and ever coarser 
misunderstanding of an original symbolism. 175 

"The world" to Christianity means that a man is a sol- 
dier, a judge, a patriot, that he defends himself, that he 
values his honour, that he desires his own advantage, that 
he is proud. . . . The conduct of every moment, every 
instinct, every valuation that leads to a deed, is at pres- 
ent anti-Christian : what an abortion of falsehood modern 
man must be, in order to be able without a blush still to 
call himself a Christian ! n S 

The very word "Christianity" is a misunderstanding, 
— truth to tell, there never was more than one Christian, 
and he died on the Cross. The "gospel" died on the 
cross. That which thenceforward was called "gospel" 
was the reverse of that "gospel" that Christ had lived : it 
was "evil tidings," a dysangel. It is false to the point of 
nonsense to see in "faith," in the faith in salvation 
through Christy the distinguishing trait of the Christian; 
the only thing that is Christian is the Christian mode of 
existence, a life such as he led who died on the Cross. . . . 
To this day a life of this kind is still possible ; for certain 



268 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

men, it is even necessary : genuine, primitive Christianity 
will be possible in all ages. . . . Not a faith, but a course 
of action. 173-179 

To regard a man like St.-Paul as honest (a man whose 
home was the very headquarters of Stoical enlightenment) 
when he devises a proof of the continued existence of the 
Saviour out of a hallucination; or even to believe him 
when he declares that he had this hallucination, would 
amount to foolishness on the part of a psychologist: St.- 
Paul desired the end, consequently he also desired the 
means. . . . Even what he himself did not believe, was 
believed in by the idiots among whom he spread his doc- 
trine. — What he wanted was power; with St.-Paul the 
priest again aspired to power. i 8s 

When the centre of gravity of life is laid, not in life, 
but in a beyond — in nonentity, life is utterly robbed of 
its balance. The great lie of personal immortality de- 
stroys all reason, all nature in the instincts, — everything 
in the instincts that is beneficent, that promotes life and 
that is a guarantee of the future, henceforward aroused 
suspicion. The very meaning of life is now construed as 
the effort to live in such a way that life no longer has any 
point. . . . Why show any public spirit? Why be 
grateful for one's origin and one's forebears'? Why col- 
laborate with one's fellows, and be confident"? Why be 
concerned about the general weal or strive after it*? . . . 
All these things are merely so many "temptations," so 
many deviations from the "straight path." "One thing 
only is necessary "... that everybody, as an "immortal 
soul," should have equal rank, that in the totality of be- 
ings, the "salvation" of each individual may lay claim 
to eternal importance, that insignificant bigots and three- 
quarter-lunatics may have the right to suppose that the 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 269 

laws of nature may be persistently broken on their ac- 
count, — any such magnification of every kind of selfish- 
ness to infinity, to insolence, cannot be branded with suf- 
ficient contempt. And yet it is to this miserable flattery 
of personal vanity that Christianity owed its triumph, — 
by this means it lured all the bungled and the botched, all 
revolting and revolted people, all abortions, the whole of 
the refuse and offal of humanity, over to its side, iss-ise 

With Christianity, the art of feeling holy lies, which 
constitutes the whole of Judaism, reaches its final master- 
ship, thanks to many centuries of Jewish and most thor- 
oughly serious training and practice, iss 

Only read the gospels as books calculated to seduce by 
means of morality — morality is appropriated by these 
petty people, — they know what morality can do! The 
best way of leading mankind by the nose is with moral- 
ity ! The fact is that the most conscious conceit of peo- 
ple who believe themselves to be chosen, here simulates 
modesty: in this way they, the Christian community, the 
"good and the just" place themselves once and for all on 
a certain side, the side "of Truth" — and the rest of man- 
kind, "the world" on the other. . . . This was the most 
fatal kind of megalomania that had ever yet existed on 
earth; insignificant little abortions of bigots and liars be- 
gan to lay sole claim to the concepts "God," "Truth," 
"Light," '"Spirit," "Love," "Wisdom," "Life," as if 
these things were, so to speak, synonyms of themselves, 
in order to fence themselves off from "the world" ; little 
ultra-Jews, ripe for every kind of madhouse, twisted val- 
ues round in order to suit themselves, just as if the Chris- 
tian, alone, were the meaning, the salt, the standard and 
even the "ultimate tribunal" of all the rest of man- 
kind. 189-190 



270 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

One does well to put on one's gloves when reading the 
New Testament. The proximity of so much pitch al- 
most defiles one. We should feel just as little inclined 
to hobnob with "the first Christians" as with Polish Jews : 
not that we need explain our objections. . . . They sim- 
ply smell bad. — In vain have I sought for a single sympa- 
thetic feature in the New Testament; there is not a trace 
of freedom, kindliness, openheartedness and honesty to be 
found in it. Humaneness has not even made a start in 
this book, while cleanly instincts are entirely absent from 
it. . . . Only evil instincts are to be found in the New 
Testament, it shows no sign of courage, these people lack 
even the courage of these evil instincts. All is coward- 
ice, all is a closing of one's eyes and self-deception. 
Every book becomes clean, after one has just read the 
New Testament. 193-194 

In the whole of the New Testament only one figure 
appears which we cannot help respecting. Pilate, the 
Roman Governor. To take a Jewish quarrel seriously 
was a thing he could not get himself to do. One Jew 
more or less- — what did it matter? . . . The noble scorn 
of a Roman, in whose presence the word "truth" had 
been shamelessly abused, has enriched the New Testa- 
ment with the only saying which is of value, — and this 
saying is not only the criticism, but actually the shatter- 
ing of that Testament: "What is truth!" 195-196 

No one is either a philologist or a doctor, who is not 
also an Antichrist. As a philologist, for instance, a man 
sees behind the "holy books" as a doctor he sees behind 
the physiological rottenness of the typical Christian, 
The Doctor says "incurable," the philologist says 
"forgery." 197 

The priest knows only one great danger, and that is 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 271 

science, — the healthy concept of cause and effect. But, 
on the whole, science flourishes only in happy conditions, 
— a man must have time, he must also have superfluous 
mental energy in order to "pursue knowledge." . . . 
11 Consequently man must be made unhappy," — this has 
been the argument of the priest of all ages. — You have 
already divined what, in accordance with such a manner 
of arguing, must first have come into the world : — "sin." 
. . . The notion of guilt and punishment, the whole 
"moral order of the universe," was invented against sci- 
ence. 199 

The notion of guilt and punishment, including the 
doctrine of "grace," of "salvation" and of "forgiveness" 
— all lies through and through without a shred of psy- 
chological reality — were invented in order to destroy 
man's sense of causality: they are an attack with the fist, 
with the knife, with honesty in hate and love ! But one 
actuated by the most cowardly, most crafty, and most ig- 
noble instincts ! A priest's attack ! A parasite's attack ! 
A vampyrism of pale subterranean leeches ! 200 

"Faith saveth; therefore it is true." — It might be ob- 
jected here that it is precisely salvation which is not 
probed but only promised; salvation is bound up with 
the condition "faith," — one shall be saved, because one 
has faith. . . . But how prove that that which the priest 
promises to the faithful really will take place, to wit: 
the "Beyond" which defies all demonstration'? — The as- 
sumed "proof of power" is at bottom once again only 
a belief in the fact that the effect which faith promises 
will not fail to take place. In a formula: "I believe 
that faith saveth; — consequently it is true." — But with 
this we are at the end of our tether. 201 

Holiness ■ in itself is simply a symptom of an 



272 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

impoverished, enervated and incurably deteriorated 

body! 203-204 

Christianity is built upon the rancour of the sick; its 
instinct is directed against the sound, against health. 
Everything well-constituted, proud, high-spirited, and 
beautiful is offensive to its ears and eyes. 204 

"Faith" simply means the refusal to know what is 
true. 205 

The conclusion which all idiots, women and common 
people come to, that there must be something in a cause 
for which some one lays down his life (or which, as in 
the case of primitive Christianity, provokes an epidemic 
of sacrifices), — this conclusion put a tremendous check 
upon all investigation, upon the spirit of investigation 
and of caution. Martyrs have harmed the cause of 
truth. 208 

Convictions are prisons. They never see far enough, 
they do not look down from a sufficient height: but in 
order to have any say in questions of value and non-value, 
a man must see five hundred convictions beneath him — 
behind him. ... A spirit who desires great things, and 
who also desires the means thereto, is necessarily a scep- 
tic. Freedom from every kind of conviction belongs to 
strength, to the ability to open one's eyes freely. 209-210 

Whom do I hate most among the rabble, the Chandala 
apostles, who undermine the working man's instinct, his 
happiness and his feeling of contentedness with his in- 
significant existence, — who make him envious, and who 
teach him revenge. . . . The wrong never lies in un- 
equal rights ; it lies in the claim to equal rights. 220 

The Christian and the anarchist are both decadents; 
they are both incapable of acting in any other way than 
disintegratingly, poisonously and witheringly, like blood- 



"THE ANTICHRIST" 273 

suckers; they are both actuated by an instinct of mortal 
hatred of everything that stands erect, that is great, that 
is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. 221-222 

Christianity destroyed the harvest we might have 
reaped from the culture of antiquity, later it also de- 
stroyed our harvest of the culture of Islam. The won- 
derful Moorish world of Spanish culture, which in its 
essence is more closely related to us, and which appeals 
more to our sense and taste than Rome and Greece, was 
trampled to death ( — I do not say by what kind of feet), 
why*? — because it owed its origin to noble, to manly in- 
stincts, because it said yea to life, even that life so full 
of the race, and refined luxuries of the Moors ! 226 

I condemn Christianity and confront it with the most 
terrible accusation that an accuser has ever had in his 
mouth. To my mind it is the greatest of all conceivable 
corruptions, it has had the will to the last imaginable cor- 
ruption. The Christian Church allowed nothing to escape 
from its corruption; it converted every value into its op- 
posite, every truth into a lie, and every honest impulse 
into an ignominy of the soul. Let any one dare to speak 
to me of its humanitarian blessings! To abolish any 
sort of distress was opposed to its profoundest interests; 
its very existence depended on states of distress ; it created 
states of distress in order to make itself immortal. . . . 
The cancer germ of sin, for instance : the Church was the 
first to enrich mankind with this misery ! — The "equality 
of souls before God," this falsehood, this pretext for the 
rancunes of all the base-minded, this anarchist bomb of 
a concept, which has ultimately become the revolution, 
the modern idea, the principle of decay of the whole of 
social order, — this is Christian dynamite. . . . The "hu- 
manitarian" blessings of Christianity! To breed a self- 



274 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

contradiction, an art of self -profanation, a will to lie at 
any price, an aversion, a contempt of all good and honest 
instincts out of humanitas! Is this what you call the 
blessings of Christianity 1 ? — Parasitism as the only 
method of the Church; sucking all the blood, all the 
love, all the hope of life out of mankind with anaemic and 
sacred ideals. A "Beyond" as the will to deny all real- 
ity; the cross as the trade-mark of the most subterranean 
form of conspiracy that has ever existed, — against health, 
beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, kindliness 
of soul, against Life itself. . . . 

This eternal accusation against Christianity I would 
fain write on all walls, wherever there are walls, — I have 
letters with which I can make even the blind see. ... I 
call Christianity the one great curse, the one enormous and 
innermost perversion, the one great instinct of revenge, 
for which no means are too venomous, too underhand, 
too underground and too petty, — I call it the one im- 
mortal blemish of mankind. . . . 230-231 



XI 
"The Will to Power" 

Volume I 

ALL the evidences of what was to be Nietzsche's 
final and complete philosophical work in four vol- 
umes, are contained in two volumes of desultory and 
often highly condensed notes which were recently issued 
under the single caption of "The Will to Power" ("Die 
Wille zur Macht"). On this culminating work Nie- 
tzsche had laboured from 1883 until his final breakdown. 
He made two plans for "The Will to Power" — one in 
1886 and the other in 1887. As the 1887 plan was the 
one ultimately adhered to, there seems no reason to hesi- 
tate about accepting it as the right one. The titles of 
the four books which comprised this final work as it 
stands to-day are "European Nihilism," "A Criticism of 
the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto," 
"The Principles of a New Valuation" and "Discipline 
and Breeding." These headings are according to the 
last plan made at Nice in 1887, and although, as I stated 
in the preceding chapter, there was some hesitation be- 
tween the general title of "The Will to Power" and 
"The Transvaluation of All Values," "The Antichrist," 
which fell under the latter heading, must not be con- 
sidered as forming a part of "The Will to Power." 
However, "The Antichrist" and also "Beyond Good and 
Evil," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "The Twilight 

275 



276 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

of the Idols," are closely related in thought to "The Will 
to Power." This fact is borne out not only by inter- 
nal evidence, by the manner in which the books overlap, 
and by the constant redistribution of titles which some- 
times prove the unity of the last phase of his thought, 
but also by the testimony of those who had Nietzsche's 
confidence and could watch him at close quarters. 

Nietzsche intended to embody in the four books of 
"The Will to Power" the entire sweep of his philosoph- 
ical teachings. This work was to be a summary, not 
only in statement but also in analysis, of his ethical sys- 
tem. His preceding books had been replete in repeti- 
tions, and lacked both organisation and sequence. His 
health was such that he could work only sporadically 
and in short shifts, with the result that he was constantly 
trying to crowd an enormous amount of material into 
a short space. He was able to deal with but one point 
at a time, and, as his working period was frequently too 
short to develop that point as fully as he desired, we 
find him constantly going back over old ground, alter- 
ing his syllogisms, making addenda, interpolating analo- 
gies, and in numerous other ways changing and clarify- 
ing what he had previously written. "The Will to 
Power" was to be, then, a colossal organisation of all 
his writings, with every step intact, and every conclusion 
in its place. And throughout the four volumes em- 
phasis was to be put on his motivating doctrine, the will 
to power, an oppositional theory to Darwin's theory of 
struggle for mere existence. But although we have two 
large volumes of notes, these jottings lack in a large de- 
gree the co-ordination which would have characterised 
them had Nietzsche been able to carry out his plan. 

The notes of these two books are the work of many 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 277 

years, and the putting together of them for publication 
has been done without any attempt to alter their orig- 
inal text. They are just as Nietzsche left them — in 
some cases completed and closely argued paragraphs, in 
others mere notations and memoranda, elliptic and un- 
elaborated. It is possible, however, to gain a very ade- 
quate idea of what was to be the contents of this final 
work, due to the copiousness of the material at hand. 
From the time of finishing "Thus Spake Zarathustra" to 
1889, Nietzsche was constantly making notes for his 
great work, and there is no phase of his thought which 
is not touched upon in these two remaining volumes. 
By following their pages closely, in the light of his fore- 
going works, one gets a very definite impression of the 
synthesis of his thoughts. Especially true is this of the 
second volume of "The Will to Power," for it is here 
that his cardinal doctrine is most strongly and consist- 
ently emphasised and its relationship to all human rela- 
tionships most concisely drawn. Because of this fact I 
have chosen to consider the two volumes separately. The 
first volume is full of material more or less familiar to 
those who have followed Nietzsche in his earlier works. 
The notes are, in the majority of cases, elaborations and 
explanations of doctrines contained in those books which 
followed "Thus Spake Zarathustra." As such they are 
important. 

The first volume is divided into two sections — "Euro- 
pean Nihilism" and "A Criticism of the Highest Values 
that Have Prevailed Hitherto." Two subdivisions are 
found under section one — "Nihilism" and "Concerning 
the History of European Nihilism." In this first sub- 
division Nietzsche defines Nihilism and attempts to trace 
its origin. He states that it is an outcome of the valua- 



278 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

tions and interpretations of existence which have for- 
merly prevailed, namely: the result of the doctrines of 
Christianity. For our adherence to Christian morality, 
Nietzsche says, we must pay dearly: by this adherence 
we are losing our equilibrium and are on the verge of 
adopting opposite valuations — those consisting of Nihil- 
istic elements. He defines the Nihilistic movement as 
an expression of decadence, and declares that this de- 
cadence is spreading throughout all our modern institu- 
tions. Under his second subdivision, he explains that 
modern gloominess is a result of the "slow advance and 
rise of the middle and lower classes," and asserts that 
this gloominess is accompanied by moral hypocrisy and 
the decadent virtues of sympathy and pity. In this con- 
nection he denies that the nineteenth century shows an 
improvement over the sixteenth. No better analysis of 
the effects of Christian morality on modern man is to be 
found in any of Nietzsche's writings than in this treatise 
of Nihilism; and a close study of this analysis will 
greatly help one in grasping the full significance of the 
doctrine of the will to power. Although the notes in 
this book are the least satisfactory of all the portions 
of "The Will to Power," being both tentative and in- 
complete, I have been able to select enough definite state- 
ments from them to give an adequate idea of both Nie- 
tzsche's theories and conclusions in regard to Nihilism. 
In the second section of Volume I, "A Criticism of the 
Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto," the 
notes are fuller and more closely organised. This is 
due to the fact that the ground covered by them is in the 
main the same ground covered by "The Antichrist," 
"The Genealogy of Morals" and "Beyond Good and 
Evil." In fact, there is in these notes much repetition 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 279 

of passages to be found in the three previous volumes. 
The first subdivision of this second section is called 
"Criticism of Religion," and there is little material in it 
which does not appear in "The Antichrist." Even in 
the manner of expression there exists so strong a similar- 
ity that I am inclined to think Nietzsche used these notes 
in composing his famous philippic against Christianity. 
Consequently I have made but few quotations from this 
division, choosing in each instance only such passages as 
do not possess a direct parallel in his earlier work. We 
find here the same inquiry into the origin of religions, 
the same analysis of Christian ideals, the same history 
of Christian doctrines, and the same argument against 
the dissemination of Christian faiths as are contained in 
"The Antichrist." However, these present notes are 
sufficiently different from this previous book to interest 
the thorough student, and there are occasional specula- 
tions advanced which are not to be encountered else- 
where in Nietzsche's writings. For the casual reader, 
however, there is little of new interest in this subdi- 
vision. 

The same criticism holds true to a large extent when 
we come to the second subdivision of the second section 
— "A Criticism of Morality." In "The Genealogy of 
Morals" we have a discussion of practically all the sub- 
jects considered in the present notes, such as the origin 
of moral valuations, the basis of conscience, the influ- 
ence of the herd, the dominance of virtue, the slander 
of the so-called evil man, and the significance of such 
words as "improving" and "elevating." However, there 
is sufficient new material in these notes to warrant a 
reading, for although, despite a few exceptions, there are 
no new issues posed, certain points which were put forth 



280 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

only in a speculative and abridged manner in earlier 
books, are here enlarged upon. This is especially true 
in regard to the doctrine of rank. Nietzsche has been 
accused of advocating only an individualistic morality. 
But the truth is that he advanced two codes. He 
preached a morality for the herd, a definite system which 
suited the needs of the serving classes. For the superior 
individuals, on the other hand, he taught another code, 
one which fitted and met the needs of the rulers. The 
herd morality has always sought to create and maintain 
a single type of mediocre man. Nietzsche preached the 
necessity of the superior, as well as the inferior, type of 
man; and in his present notes he goes into this doctrine 
more fully than heretofore. Furthermore, he makes 
clear his stand in regard to the weak. On page 291 he 
states, "I have declared war against the anaemic Chris- 
tian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), 
not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an 
end to its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals^ for 
more robust ideals." It has been stated, even in quar- 
ters where we have a right to look for more intelligent 
criticism, that Nietzsche favoured the complete elimina- 
tion of the weak and incompetent. No such advocacy 
is to be found in his teachings. To the contrary, as will 
be seen from the above quotation, he preached only 
against the dominance of the weak. He resented their 
supremacy over the intelligent man. Their existence, 
he maintained, was a most necessary thing. This belief 
is insisted upon in many places, and one should bear the 
point in mind when reading the criticisms of socialism 
to be found throughout the present volume. 

Another new point to be found in these notes relates 
to the immoral methods used by the disseminators of 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 281 

morals. From the passages in which these new points 
are raised I have taken the quotations which follow at 
the end of this chapter. 

In the third and last subdivision of this second sec- 
tion, "Criticism of Philosophy," we have an extension 
of Chapter I in "Beyond Good and Evil," "Prejudices 
of Philosophers," and of the two chapters in "The Twi- 
light of the Idols" — "The Problem of Socrates" and 
" 'Reason' in Philosophy." The notes (excepting a few 
pages of general remarks) occupy themselves with a 
criticism of Greek philosophy and with an analysis of 
philosophical truths and errors. These notes touch only 
indirectly on Nietzsche's doctrines, and may be looked 
upon as explanations of his intellectual methods. 

Despite their fragmentariness, the notes in this vol- 
ume, as I have said, permit one to gain an adequate idea 
of Nietzsche's purpose. In making my excerpts from 
this book, I have chosen those passages which will throw 
new light upon his philosophy rather than those state- 
ments of conclusions which have been previously en- 
countered. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" VOLUME I 

What does Nihilism mean? — That the highest values 
are losing their value, s 

Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is ab- 
surd, in the light of the highest values already discov- 
ered; it also includes the view that we have not the 
smallest right to assume the existence of transcendental 
objects or things in themselves, which would be either 
divine or morality incarnate. 

This view is the result of fully developed "truthful- 
ness" : therefore a consequence of the belief in morality, s 



282 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Moral valuations are condemnations, negations; mor- 
ality is the abdication of the will to live. i2 

All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend 
the world some worth, from our point of view, and with 
which we have therefore deprived it of all zvorth (once 
these values have been shown to be inapplicable) — all 
these values, are, psychologically, the results of certain 
views of utility, established for the purpose of maintain- 
ing and increasing the dominion of certain communities: 
but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is al- 
ways man's exaggerated ingenuousness to regard himself 
as the sense and measure of all things. i5 

Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance, 
the Buddhistic) terminates in Nihilism: Europe must 
expect the same thing! It is supposed that one can 
get along with a morality bereft of a religious back- 
ground; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is 
opened. 19 

Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain" — 
not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; 
but one actually puts one's shoulder to the plough; one 
destroys. 22 

The time is coming when we shall have to pay for 
having been Christians for two thousand years: we are 
losing the equilibrium which enables us to live — for a 
long while we shall not know in what direction we are 
travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the 
opposite valuations, with that degree of energy which 
could only have been engendered in man by an overvalua- 
tion of himself. 

Now, everything is false from the root, words and 
nothing but words, confused, feeble, or overstrained. 25 

Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 283 

only of the modern world, not of the world and existence 
as such. 29 

The "preponderance of pain over pleasure" or the re- 
verse (Hedonism) ; both of these doctrines are al ready- 
signposts to Nihilism. . . . 

For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought 
than the phenomenon pleasure or pain. 29 

"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is 
the good of tears'?" — this is a feeble and sentimental at- 
titude of mind. 29-30 

People have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious 
— namely, that Pessimism is not a problem but a symp- 
tom, — that the term ought to be replaced by "Nihilism," 
— that the question, "to be or not to be," is itself an ill- 
ness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy. 

The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of 
physiological decadence. 32 

Decay, decline, and waste, are, per se, in no way open 
to objection; they are the natural consequences of life 
and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just 
as necessary to life as advance or progress is : we are not 
in a position which enables us to suppress it. On the con- 
trary, reason would have it retain its rights. 

It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to 
argue that circumstances and social combinations could 
be devised which would put an end to all vice, illness, 
crime, prostitution, and poverty. . . . But that is tanta- 
mount to condemning Life. 33 

Decadence itself is not a thing that can be withstood: 
it is absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and 
all peoples. That which must be withstood, and by all 
means in our power, is the spreading of the contagion 
among the sound parts of the organism. 33-34 



284 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

All those things which heretofore have been regarded 
as the causes of degeneration, are really its effects. 34 

If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not 
therefore immoral: the growth of physiological and 
moral evils in the human race, is rather the result of mor- 
bid and unnatural morality. •** 

The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct 
than that of the herd, i.e., of a multitude of mere ciphers 
— of which every cipher has "equal rights," and where 
it is a virtue to be — naught. 45 

Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled have 
no longer any consolation, that they destroy in order to 
be destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, 
they no longer have any reason to "resign themselves," 
that they take up their stand on the territory of the op- 
posite principle, and will also exercise power themselves, 
by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. 52 

Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to miti- 
gate distress, to honour it, and to wage war in advance 
with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of the poor. 57 

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy — our modern 
vices. 64 

Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal 
rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all 
these big words are only valuable in a struggle, as ban- 
ners: not as realities, but as skowwords, for something 
quite different (yea, even quite opposed to what they 
mean!). 6 s 

The nineteenth century shows no advance whatever 
on the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an 
example of a backward movement when compared with 
that of 1788. . . . Mankind does not advance, it does 
not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 285 

like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some 
things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number 
of things fail; where all order, logic, co-ordination, and 
responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the fact 
that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement*? — 
that the German Reformation was a recrudescence of 
Christian barbarism 1 ? — that the Revolution destroyed 
the instinct for an organisation of society on a large 
scale? . . . Man is not an example of progress as com- 
pared with animals : the tender son of culture is an abor- 
tion compared with the Arab or the Corsican ; the China- 
man is a more successful type — that is to say, richer in 
sustaining power than the European. 72-73 

I know best why man is the only animal that laughs : 
he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was compelled 
to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melan- 
choly animal is, as might have been expected, the most 
cheerful. 7* 

Socialism — or the tyranny of the meanest and the most 
brainless, — that is to say, the superficial, the envious, 
and the mummers, brought to its zenith, — is, as a mat- 
ter of fact, the logical conclusion of "modern ideas" and 
their latent anarchy: but in the genial atmosphere of 
democratic well-being the capacity for forming resolu- 
tions or even for coming to an end at all, is paralysed. 
Men will follow — but no longer their reason. That is 
why socialism is on the whole a hopelessly bitter affair: 
and there is nothing more amusing than to observe the 
discord between the poisonous and desperate faces of 
present-day socialists — and what wretched and nonsensi- 
cal feelings does not their style reveal to us! — and the 
childish lamblike happiness of their hopes and desires. 102 

This is the teaching which life itself preaches to all 



286 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

living things: the morality of Development. To have 
and to wish to have more, in a word, Growth — that is 
life itself. In the teaching of socialism "a will to the 
denial of life" is but poorly concealed: botched men and 
races they must be who have devised a teaching of this 
sort. 103 

Spiritual enlightenment is an unfailing means of mak- 
ing men uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour 
and support; in short, of developing the herding instincts 
in them. 105 

When the feeling of power suddenly seizes and over- 
whelms a man, — and this takes place in the case of all 
the great passions, — a doubt arises in him concerning his 
own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this 
astonishing sensation — and thus he posits a stronger per- 
son, a Godhead as its cause. 114-115 

Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ulti- 
mate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness, and truth 
are superhuman, and are only obtainable by the grace 
of God. lie 

In short: what is the price paid for the improvement 
supposed to be due to morality 4 ? — The unhinging oi rea- 
son, the reduction of all motives to fear and hope (pun- 
ishment and reward) ; dependence upon the tutelage of 
priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is sup- 
posed to express a divine will; the implantation of a N 
"conscience" which establishes a false science in the place 
of experience and experiment: as though all one had to 
do or had not to do were predetermined — a kind of con- 
traction of the seeking and striving spirit; — in short: the 
worst mutilation of man that can be imagined, and it is 
pretended that "the good man" is the result. 122-123 

Paganism is that which says yea to all that is natural, 



'THE WILL TO POWER" 287 

it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness." Chris- 
tianity is that which says no to all that is natural, it is 
a certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to 
Nature. 32 7 

Christianity is a degenerative movement, consisting of 
all kinds of decaying and excremental elements : it is not 
the expression of the downfall of a race, it is, from the 
root, an agglomeration of all the morbid elements which 
are mutually attractive and which gravitate to one an- 
other. 

It is therefore not a national religion, not determined 
by race : it appeals to the disinherited everywhere ; it con- 
sists of a foundation of resentment against all that is 
successful and dominant : it is in need of a symbol which 
represents the damnation of everything successful and 
dominant. It is opposed to every form of intellectual 
movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for 
idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment 
against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually in- 
dependent: in all these it suspects the element of success 
and domination. 130 

All Christian "truth," is idle falsehood and deception, 
and is precisely the reverse of that which was at the bot- 
tom of the first Christian movement. 133 

To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely in- 
different to dogmas, cults, priests, church, and the- 
ology. 133 

A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, 
resurrection after death — all these things are the counter- 
feit coins of real-Christianity, for which that pernicious 
blockhead Paul must be held responsible, iss 

Christianity has, from the first, always transformed 
the symbolical into crude realities : 



288 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were 
misunderstood and changed into "life here" and "life be- 
yond." 

(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the per- 
sonal life which is ephemeral, is translated into "personal 
immortality"; 

(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing 
the same food and drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian man- 
ner, is interpreted as the "miracle of transubstantiation." 

(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the 
entrance to the "true life," in the sense of being intellec- 
tually "born again," becomes an historical contingency, 
supposed to take place at some moment after death; 

(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of 
God," — that is to say, the life-relationship between man 
and God, — becomes the "second person of the Trinity," 
and thus the filial relationship of every man — even the 
lowest — to God, is done away with; 

(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there 
is no other way to this filial relationship to God save 
through the practice of life taught by Christ) becomes 
transformed into the belief that there is a miraculous 
way of atoning for all sin; though not through our own 
endeavours, but by means of Christ : 

For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to 
be interpreted afresh. The death itself would certainly 
not be the principal feature of the event ... it was 
only another sign pointing to the way in which one should 
behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world 
— that one was not to defend oneself — this was the ex- 
emplary life. 139-140 

The Gospel is the announcement that the road to hap- 
piness lies open for the lowly and the poor — that all one 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 289 

has to do is to emancipate one's self from all institutions, 
traditions, and the tutelage of the higher classes. Thus 
Christianity is no more than the typical teaching of So- 
cialists. 

Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and 
rank, tribunals, the police, the State, the Church, Edu- 
cation, Art, militarism: all these are so many obstacles 
in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, snares, and 
devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence — 
all this is typical of socialistic doctrines. 

Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of 
a concentrated loathing of the "masters" — the instinct 
which discerns the happiness of freedom after such long 
oppression. 173-174 

Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious moral- 
ity: under the power of the most complete misapprehen- 
sions and self-deceptions. Democracy is a more natural 
form of it, and less sown with falsehood. It is a fact 
that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and 
half-castes, will prevail. 

First step: they make themselves free — they detach 
themselves, at first in fancy only; they recognise each 
other; they make themselves paramount. 

Second step: they enter the lists, they demand ac- 
knowledgment, equal rights, "Justice." 

Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the 
representatives of power over to their side). 

Fourth step : they alone want all power, and they have 

it. 177 

When and where has any man, of any note at all^ re- 
sembled the Christian ideal? — at least in the eyes of 
those who are psychologists and triers of the heart and 
reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes ! i 80 



2Q0 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

The higher man distinguishes himself from the lower 
by his fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfor- 
tune: it is a sign of degeneration when eudemonistic 
values begin to prevail (physiological fatigue and en- 
feeblement of will-power). Christianity, with its pros- 
pect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of 
a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abun- 
dant strength will be active, will suffer, and will go 
under. is2 

All ideals are dangerous ; because they lower and brand 
realities; they are all poisons. i 83 

These "conditions of salvation" of which the Chris- 
tian is conscious are merely variations of the same dis- 
eased state — the interpretation of an attack of epilepsy 
by means of a particular formula which is provided, not 
by science, but by religious m'ania. i 90 

A -pang of conscience in a man is a sign that his char- 
acter is not yet equal to his deed. There is such a thing 
as a pang of conscience after good deeds: in this case it 
is their unfamiliarity, their incompatibility with an old 
environment. 192 

We immoralists prefer to disbelieve in "faults." We 
believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are identically 
the same at root; just as deeds which turn against us may 
be useful from an economical point of view, and even 
generally desirable. In certain individual cases, we 
admit that we might well have been spared a given ac- 
tion ; the circumstances alone predisposed us in its favour. 
Which of us, if favoured by circumstances, would not 
already have committed every possible crime 1 ? . . . 
That is why, one should never say: "Thou shouldst 
never have done such and such a thing," but only: 
"How strange it is that I have not done such and such 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 291 

a thing hundreds of times already!" — As a matter of 
fact, only a very small number of acts are typical acts 
and real epitomes of a personality, and seeing what a 
small number of people really are personalities, a single 
act very rarely characterises a man. Acts are mostly 
dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely 
reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, 
long before the depths of our beings are affected or con- 
sulted in the matter. 192-193. 

Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a 
man has elevated himself to any great extent above the 
average of his fellows, every high degree of -power al- 
ways involves a corresponding degree of freedom from 
Good and Evil as also from "true" and "false," and can- 
not take into account what goodness dictates. 200 

What is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not 
precisely this mutual assistance with a view to survival, 
this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of selection? 
What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism 
of the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after 
everybody else, every individual will be preserved for a 
longer period of time*? . . . He who does not consider 
this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against life, 
himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares their 
instincts. . . . Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice 
for the good of the species — it is hard, full of self-con- 
trol, because it needs human sacrifices. 203 

What deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the 
ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a reli- 
gion like Christianity, — or rather like the Church, — 
which, instead of recommending death and self-destruc- 
tion, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and 
encourages them to propagate their kind. 204 



292 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all 
the things which his instincts forbid him to do: — he 
covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, 
knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud — in short, 
all culture: his object is to deprive the latter of its clean 
conscience. 20s 

What is it we combat in Christianity*? That it aims 
at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at ex- 
ploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at con- 
verting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience- 
trouble ; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts 
and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their 
will to power, turns inwards, against themselves — until 
the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt 
and self-immolation. 209 

All virtues should be looked upon as physiological 
conditions. 213 

Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye 
shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form 
of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn the Soil 
out of which it grew." 214 

My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral 'phe- 
nomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. 
The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the 
pale of morality. 214 

The whole of morality of Europe is based upon the 
values which are useful to the herd. 22s 

The herd regards the exception, whether it be above or 
beneath its general level, as something which is antagonis- 
tic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with 
the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the 
wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become 
guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen — in fact, to become 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 293 

their head-servants: thus they convert a danger into a 
thing which is useful. 231 

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain 
and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself 
on two sides — that is to say, against those which are de- 
cadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against 
those who rise superior to its dead level. 236 

My philosophy aims at a new order of rank: not at an 
individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should 
rule within the herd — but not beyond it: the leaders of 
the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for 
their actions. 237 

Conscience condemns an action because that action has 
been condemned for a long period of time : all conscience 
does is to imitate : it does not create values. That which 
first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was not 
conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice 
against) its consequences. . . . The approbation of con- 
science, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is 
of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his 
work — it proves nothing. 2*2 

By what means does a virtue attain to power? — With 
precisely the same means as a political party: slander, 
suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that hap- 
pen to be already in power, the changing of their names, 
systematic persecution and scorn; in short, by means of 
acts of general "immorality " 252 

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into 
tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. 
The same has happened to the love of the sexes which 
has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind 
appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes 
humility; the disease of the nervus sympathicus, for in- 



294 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

stance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Car- 
lylism, etc. 253 

The qualities which constitute the strength of an op- 
posing race or class are declared to be the most evil and 
pernicious things it has : for by means of them it may be 
harmful to us. 255 

I recognise virtue in that : ( 1 ) it does not insist upon 
being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence 
of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) 
it does not suffer from the absence of virtue, but regards 
it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue 
into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no 
propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge be- 
cause it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does pre- 
cisely what is generally forbidden: virtue as I understand 
it is the actual vetitum within all gregarious legislation; 
(7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renais- 
sance style — virtu — free from all moralic acid. 25s 

Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, 
fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why 
it stands so securely. 2 ei 

Vice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome of certain effects 
resulting from physiological degeneracy. A general 
proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, 
namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one 
were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate 
man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of 
course, wherever Christianity prospers and prevails, the 
proposition holds good: for then the existence of an un- 
healthy soil — of a degenerate territory — is demon- 
strated. 269 

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when 
one sees how he understands the art of fighting his way, 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 295 

of enduring, of turning circumstances to his own advan- 
tage, and of overthrowing opponents; but when he is 
seen in the light of his desires, he is the most absurd of 
all animals. 269 

As to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a 
blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral 
ideal. 275 

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself 
endeavours to further its purpose (a) by laying claim to 
a spurious origin; (b) by assuming a relationship be- 
tween itself and the powerful ideals already existing; 

(c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as 
though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; 

(d) by the slander of its opponents' ideals; (e) by a 
lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its 
wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general 
peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God. 27s 

My view: all the forces and instincts which are the 
source of life are lying beneath the ban of morality: mor- 
ality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be an- 
nihilated if life is to be emancipated. 27s 

Every one's desire is that there should be no other 
teaching and valuation of things than those by means 
of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental 
tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been 
to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of 
the weak: their chief weapon in this process was the moral 
principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak 
is branded as evil ; the highest states of the strong become 
bad bywords. 279 

Every small community (or individual), finding it- 
self involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of 
this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are 



296 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

ours." War urges people to this exaggerated self-es- 
teem. 281 

Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have 
(whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoral- 
ist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid 
insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is 
deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have 
an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, 
and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. 2 si 

Real heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner 
of self-sacrifice, submission and disinterestedness, but in 
not fighting at all. ... "I am thus: I will be thus — 
and you can go to the devil !" 282 

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus 
you would that men were*? — that good men were? But 
such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the 
future, ssa 

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just 
so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of 
great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence 
for one's self. 29 o 

I have declared war against the ansemic Christian 
ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not 
because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end 
to its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for 
more robust ideals. 291 

If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and 
not one's neighbour that one is succouring. 29 4 

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's 
'ego 1 at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in 
living at the cost of others" — he who has not grasped 
this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to 
himself. 294 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 297 

A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing of 
the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging pa- 
tience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in 
word and deed may be of the highest value within the 
confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: 
for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and 
of envy, — feelings which are only too natural in the 
bungled and the botched, — and it even deifies them under 
the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being- 
ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This ex- 
plains why the ruling classes (or races) and individ- 
uals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unsel- 
fishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the 
Cross." 296 

The hatred of egoism, whether it be one's own (as in 
the case of the Socialists) appears as a valuation reached 
under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act 
of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the 
suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of 
co-operation and unity. ... At bottom, the discharge 
of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, 
rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of 
others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of 
the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altru- 
ism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regu- 
larly appears under certain definite physiological cir- 
cumstances. 

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries 
for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that 
he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable 
to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in 
crying; — if he were more at ease he would take jolly 
good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would 



298 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of 
the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the 
"world" — and does not even except himself. But that 
is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we 
are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, 
and who find relief in slander. 29s 

I value a man according to the quantum of power and 
fulness of his will; not according to the enfeeblement 
and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philoso- 
phy which teaches the denial of will is both defamatory 
and slanderous. ... I test the power of a will accord- 
ing to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount 
of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn 
to its own advantage ; I do not point to the evil and pain 
of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather en- 
tertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and 
more full of suffering than it has ever been. 304 

My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man repre- 
sents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of 
any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "de- 
siderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and 
dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular 
kind of man has sought to establish his measures of 
preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every 
"desideratum" of this kind which has been made to 
dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength, and his 
trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre in- 
tellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, 
when he reveals a desire; that man's ability to fix values 
has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do jus- 
tice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," worth 
of man; that, up to the present, ideals have really been 
the power which has most slandered man and power, the 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 299 

poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which 
have seduced men to yearn for nonentity. ... 311 

One must be very immoral in order to make people 
moral by deeds. The moralist's means are the most ter- 
rible that have ever been used; he who has not the cour- 
age to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything 
else, but not for the duties of a moralist. 3 is 

The priests of all ages have always pretended that 
they wished to "improve." . . . But we, of another per- 
suasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak 
to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming 
of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the 
moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker 
member of his species. 319 

Up to the present, morality has developed at the cost 
of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well- 
constituted and beautiful natures, the independent and 
privileged classes in all respects. 

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement oppos- 
ing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a higher type. Its 
effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its 
tendencies are felt to be immoral), — hostility towards 
the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to 
be opposed to the higher instincts). — Degeneration and 
self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is pre- 
cisely in them that the conflict becomes conscious. 321 

Suppose the strong were masters in all respects, even 
in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would 
be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice. Self -con- 
tempt on the part of the weak would be the result : they 
would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their 
kind. And would this be desirable? — should we really 
like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the 



3oo WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

intellectuality, the plasticity — in fact, the whole influence 
of the weak — was lacking? ... 323 

Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something 
very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred 
times superior to philosophers and other disciples of 
"truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in one's up- 
rightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to 
say nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard 
the philosophers that have appeared heretofore as con- 
temptible libertines hiding behind the petticoats of the 
female "Truth." 334 



XII 
"The Will to Power" 

Volume II 

THE second volume of "The Will to Power," even 
in its present fragmentary form, is the most im- 
portant of Nietzsche's works. It draws together under 
one cover many of the leading doctrines voiced in his 
principal constructive books, and in addition states them 
in terms of his fundamental postulate — the will to 
power. In Volume I of this work we had the applica- 
tion of this doctrine to morality, religion and philosophy. 
In the present book it is applied to science, nature, soci- 
ety, breeding and art. The notes are more analytical 
than in the former volume; and the subject-matter is in 
itself of greater importance, being more directly con- 
cerned with the exposition of Nietzsche's main theory. 
Volume II is also fuller and more homogeneous, and con- 
tains much new material. So compact is its organisa- 
tion that one is able to gain a very adequate idea of the 
purpose which animated Nietzsche at the time of making 
these notes. 

The will to power, the principle which Nietzsche held 
to be the elementary expression of life, must be under- 
stood in order for one to comprehend the Nietzschean 
system of ethics. Throughout all the books which fol- 
lowed "The Joyful Wisdom" we have indirect refer- 
ences to it and conclusions based on its assumption as a 

301 



302 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

hypothesis. And, although it was never definitely and 
finally defined until the publication of the notes com- 
prising "The Will to Power," it nevertheless was the 
actuating motive in all Nietzsche's constructive writings. 
Simply stated, the will to power is the biological instinct 
to maintenance, persistence and development. Nietzsche 
holds that Darwin's universal law of the instinct to mere 
survival is a misinterpretation of the forces at work in 
life. He points out that existence is a condition — a 
medium of action — and by no means an end. It is true 
that only the fittest survive in nature as a result of the 
tendency to exist; but this theory does not account for 
the activities which take place after existence has been 
assured. In order to explain these activities Nietzsche 
advances the theory of the will to power and tests all 
actions by it. It will be seen that by this theory the 
universal law of Darwin is by no means abrogated, but 
rather is it explained and developed. 

In the operation of Darwin's biological law there are 
many forces at work. That is to say, once the fact of 
existence is established, numerous forces can be found at 
work within the limits of existence. We know that the 
forces of nature — acting within the medium of existence 
which is an a priori condition — are rarely unified and di- 
rected toward the same result. In short, they are not 
reciprocal. To the contrary, they work more often 
against each other — they are antagonistic. Immediately 
a war of forces takes place; and it is this war that con- 
stitutes all action in nature. A force in nature directed 
at another force calls forth a resistance and counter- 
force; and this instinct to act and to resist is in itself a 
will to act. Otherwise, inertia would be the condition 
of life, once mere existence was assured by the fittest. 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 303 

But life is not inert. Even when certain organisms have 
accomplished the victory for existence, and are no longer 
moved by a necessity to struggle for mere being, the will 
to action persists; and this will to action, according to 
Nietzsche, is the will for power, for in every clash of 
forces, there is an attempt on the part of each force to 
overcome and resist the antagonistic one. The greater 
the action, the greater the antagonism. Hence, this 
tendency in all forces to -persist is at bottom a tendency 
of self-assertion, of overcoming counter-forces, of aug- 
menting individual power. Wherever this will to per- 
sist is found, Nietzsche argues that the will to act is 
present; and there can be no will to act without a will to 
power, because the very desire for existence and develop- 
ment is a desire for power. 

This, in brief, is Nietzsche's doctrine applied to the 
organic and inorganic world. In its application to the 
ideological world, the reasoning is not changed. In 
ideas Nietzsche finds this same will to power. But in 
them it is the reflection of the principle inherent in the 
material world. There is no will inherent in ideas. 
This assumption of a reflected will to power in the ideo- 
logical world is one of Nietzsche's most important con- 
cepts, for it makes all ideas the outgrowth of ourselves, 
and therefore dependent on natural laws. It does away 
with the conception of supernatural power and with the 
old philosophical belief that ideas are superior forces to 
those of the organic and inorganic world. Nietzsche 
once and for all disposes of the theory that there is any- 
thing more powerful than force, and by thus doing away 
with this belief, he rationalises all ideas and puts thought 
on a tangible and stable basis. In the opening section 
of the present book where he applies the will to power to 



304 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

scientific research, the whole of this new theory is made 
clear, and I advise the student to read well this section, 
for I have been unable to present as clear and complete 
an expositional statement of it in Nietzsche's own words 
as I would have liked to do, owing to the close and in- 
terrelated manner in which these notes were written. 

Volume II of "The Will to Power" is in two books. 
The first is called "The Principles of a New Valuation" ; 
the second, "Discipline and Breeding." The first book 
is divided into four sections — "The Will to Power in 
Science," "The Will to Power in Nature," "The W T ill 
to Power as Exemplified in Society and in the Individ- 
ual" and "The Will to Power in Art." The second book 
has three divisions — "The Order of Rank," "Dionysus" 
and "Eternal Recurrence." Of the first section of Book 
One, "The Will to Power in Science," I have already 
spoken. In this section Nietzsche shows how arbitrary 
a thing science is, and how closely related are its conclu- 
sions to the instinct of the scientists, namely : the instinct 
of the will to power. Scientists, he holds, are confronted 
by the necessity of translating all phenomena into terms 
compatible with the struggle for persistence and main- 
tenance. A fact in nature unaccounted for is a danger, 
an obstacle to the complete mastery of natural conditions. 
Consequently the scientist, directed and influenced by his 
will to power, invents explanations which will bring all 
facts under his jurisdiction and control, and will thereby 
increase his feeling of power. As a result, the great facts 
of life are looked upon as of secondary importance to 
their explanations, and science becomes, not an intelligent 
search for knowledge, but a system of interpretations 
tending to increase the feeling of mastery in the men 
directly connected with it. Thus the law of the will to 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 305 

power, as manifest in the organic and inorganic world, 
becomes the dominating instinct in the ideological world 
as well. 

It is well to speak here of truth as Nietzsche conceived 
it. We have seen how he denied its absolutism and de- 
clared it to be relative. But in his present work he goes 
further and contends that the feeling of the increase of 
power is the determining factor in truth. If, as we have 
seen, the "truths" of science are merely those interpreta- 
tions which grow out of the scientists' will to power, then 
truth itself must be the outgrowth of this instinct. That 
which makes for the growth and development of the in- 
dividual — or in other words, that which increases the 
feeling of strength — is necessarily the truth. From this 
it is easy to deduce the conclusion that in many instances 
truth is a reversal of facts, for preservation very often 
consists in an adherence to actual falsity. Thus, the 
false causality of certain phenomena — the outcome of 
logic engendered by a will to power — has not infre- 
quently masqueraded as truth. Nietzsche holds that 
this doctrine contains the only possible definition of 
truth; and in this doctrine we find an explanation for 
many of the apparent paradoxes in his teachings when 
the matter of truth and falsity are under discussion. 

The second part of the first book relates to the will to 
power in nature, and contains the most complete and 
lucid explanation of Nietzsche's basic theory to be found 
anywhere in his writings. This section opens with an 
argument against a purely mechanical interpretation of 
the world, and a refutation of the physicists' concept of 
"energy." The chemical and physical laws, the atomic 
theory and the mechanical concept of movement, he char- 
acterises as "inventions" on the part of scientists and re- 



306 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

searchers for the purpose of understanding natural phe- 
nomena and therefore of increasing their feeling of 
power. The apparent sequence of phenomena which 
constitutes "law" is, according to Nietzsche, only a "rela- 
tion of power between two or more forces" — a matter of 
interdependence, a process wherein the "procession of mo- 
ments do not determine each other after the manner of 
cause and effect." In these observations we see the proc- 
ess of reasoning with which Nietzsche refutes the current 
methods of ascertaining facts and the manner in which 
he introduces the principle of will to power into the phe- 
nomena of nature. 

It is in this section that Nietzsche discusses at length 
the points of divergence between his life principle and 
that of Darwin. And it is here also that he treats of 
the psychology of pleasure and pain in their relation to 
the will to power. This latter statement is of great im- 
portance in an understanding of the instincts of life as 
he taught them, for it denies both pleasure and pain a 
place in the determining of acts. They are both, accord- 
ing to him, but accompanying factors, never causes, and 
are but second-rate valuations derived from a dominat- 
ing value. He denies that man struggles for happiness. 
To the contrary, he holds that all expansion and growth 
and resistance — in short, all movement — is related to 
states of pain, and that, although the modern man is 
master of the forces of nature and of himself, he is no 
happier than the primeval man. Why, then, does man 
struggle for knowledge and growth, knowing that it does 
not bring happiness 1 ? Not for existence, because exist- 
ence is already assured him. But for power, for the feel- 
ing of increased mastery. Thus Nietzsche answers the 
two common explanations of man's will to action — the 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 307 

need for being and the desire for happiness — by his doc- 
trine of the will to power. 

The entire teaching of Nietzsche in regard to classes 
and to the necessity of divergent moral codes to meet 
the needs of higher and lower castes, is contained in the 
third part of the first book. Here again he emphasises 
the need of two codes and makes clear his stand in rela- 
tion to the superior individual. As I have pointed out 
in preceding chapters, Nietzsche did not attempt to do 
away with the morality of the inferior classes. He saw 
that some such religious belief as Christianity was im- 
perative for them. His fight was against its application 
to all classes, against its dominance. I mention this 
point again because it is the basis of the greatest misun- 
derstanding of Nietzsche's philosophy. Part III is 
written for the higher man, and if this viewpoint is as- 
sumed on the part of the reader, there will be no con- 
fusion as to doctrines encountered. The statements in 
this section are in effect similar to those to be found in 
Nietzsche's previous works, but in every instance in the 
present case they are directly related to the will to power. 
Because of this they possess a significance which does not 
attach to them in antecedent volumes. 

The whole of Nietzsche's art theories are to be found 
in Part IV, "The Will to Power in Art." It is not 
merely a system of esthetics that occupies the pages under 
this section, for Nietzsche never divorces art from life 
itself; and the artist, according to him, is the superior 
type, the creator of values. The concepts of beauty and 
ugliness are the outgrowths of an overflow of Dionysian 
power; and it is to the great artists of the past, the in- 
stinctive higher men, that we owe our current concepts. 
The principle here is the dominant one in Nietzsche's 



3 o8 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

philosophy in relation to valuing: — to the few individ- 
uals of the race are we indebted for the world of values. 
To the student who wishes to go deeply into Nietzsche's 
ideas of art and his conception of the artist, and to know 
in just what manner the Dionysian and Apollonian figure 
in his theories, I unhesitatingly recommend Anthony M. 
Ludovici's book, "Nietzsche and Art." 

The first section of the second book in this volume 
contains some of Nietzsche's finest writing. Its title, 
"The Order of Rank," explains in a large measure what 
material comprises it. It is a description of the various 
degrees of man, and a statement of the attributes which 
belong to each. No better definition of the different 
classes of men is to be found anywhere in this philoso- 
pher's writings. One part is devoted to a consideration 
of the strong and the weak, and the way in which they 
react on one another; another part deals with "the noble 
man" and contains (in Aphorism 943) a list of the char- 
acteristics of the noble man, unfortunately too long a list 
to be quoted in the present chapter; another part defines 
"the lords of the earth"; another part delineates "the 
great man," and enumerates his specific qualities; and 
still another part treats of "the highest man as law-giver 
of the future." This section, however, is not a mere 
series of detached and isolated definitions, but an impor- 
tant summary of the ethical code which Nietzsche ad- 
vanced as a result of his application of the doctrine of 
the will to power to the order of individual rank. 

The two remaining sections — "Dionysus" and "Eter- 
nal Recurrence" — are short, and fail to touch on new 
ground. There are a few robust and heroic passages in 
the former section which summarise Nietzsche's defini- 
tions of Apollonian and Dionysian ; but in the latter sec- 



'THE WILL TO POWER" 309 

tion there is nothing not found in the pamphlet called 
"The Eternal Recurrence" and in "Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra." I do not doubt that Nietzsche had every in- 
tention of elaborating this last section, for he consid- 
ered the principle of recurrence a most important one in 
his philosophy. But, as it stands, it is but a few pages 
in length and in no way touches upon his other philo- 
sophical doctrines. If importance it had in the philoso- 
phy of the superman, that importance was never shown 
either by Nietzsche or by his critics. 

However, let us not overlook the importance of the 
doctrine of the will to power either in its relation to Nie- 
tzsche's writings or in its application to ourselves. By 
this doctrine the philosopher wished to make mankind 
realise its great dormant power. The insistence on the 
human basis of all things was no more than a call to 
arms — an attempt to instil courage in men who had 
attributed all great phenomena to supernatural forces and 
had therefore acquiesced before them instead of having 
endeavoured to conquer them. Nietzsche's object was 
to make man surer of himself, to infuse him with pride, 
to imbue him with more daring, to awaken him to a full 
realisation of his possibilities. This, in brief, is the 
teaching of the will to power reduced to its immediate 
influences. In this doctrine is preached a new virility. 
Not the sedentary virility of compromise, but the virility 
which is born of struggle and suffering, which is a sign 
of one's great love of living. Nietzsche offered a new 
set of vital ideals to supplant the decadent ones which 
now govern us. Resolute faith, the power of affirma- 
tion, initiative, pride, courage and fearlessness — these 
are the rewards in the exercise of the will to power. The 
strength of great love and the vitality of great deeds, as 



310 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

well as the possibility of rare and vigorous growth, lie 
within this doctrine of will. Its object is to give back 
to us the life we have lost — the life of beauty and pleni- 
tude, of strength and exuberance. 

EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" VOLUME II 

For hundreds of years, pleasure and pain have been 
represented as the motives for every action. Upon re- 
flection, however, we are bound to concede that every- 
thing would have proceeded in exactly the same way, ac- 
cording to precisely the same sequence of cause and ef- 
fect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had been en- 
tirely absent. 8 -9 

The measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon 
the extent to which the Will to Power grows in a cer- 
tain species : a species gets a grasp of a given amount of 
reality, in order to master it, in order to enlist that 
amount in its service. 12 

It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts 
and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a 
sort of thirst for power. ... 13 

That a belief, however useful it may be for the preser- 
vation of a species, has nothing to do with the truth, may 
be seen from the fact that we must believe in time, space, 
and motion, without feeling ourselves compelled to re- 
gard them as absolute realities. ie 

Truth is that kind of error without which a certain 
species of living being cannot exist. 20 

In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, 
it was a need in us that was the determining power : not 
the need "to know," but to classify, to schematise, for 
the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. 29 

Logic is the attempt on our part to understand the 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 311 

actual world according to a scheme of Being devised by 
ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making 
the actual world more calculable and more susceptible 
to formulation, for our own purposes. ... 33 

"Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold 
sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to clas- 
sify phenomena according to definite categories. In this 
way we start out with a belief in the "true nature" of 
things (we regard phenomena as real). 

The character of the world in the process of Becoming 
is not susceptible of formulation; it is "false" and "con- 
tradicts itself." Knowledge and the process of evolution 
exclude each other. Consequently, knowledge must be 
something else; it must be preceded by a will to make 
things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must cre- 
ate the impression of Being. 33-34. 

The chief error of psychologists: they regard the in- 
distinct idea as of a lower kind than the distinct; but that 
which keeps at a distance from our consciousness and 
which is therefore obscure, may on that very account be 
quite clear in itself. The fact that a thing becomes ob- 
scure is a question of the perspective of consciousness. 42 

The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the 
feeling of power. 49 

Logic was intended to be a method of facilitating 
thought: a means of expression, — not truth. . . . Later 
on it got to act like truth. ... 50 

In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness 
would be an anti-natural tendency: its only purpose 
would be to provide a means of attaining to a higher de- 
gree of falsity. 51 

We have absolutely no experience concerning cause; 
viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept 



312 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

from the subjective conviction, that we ourselves are 
causes. 55 

"Truth" is not something which is present and which 
has to be found and discovered ; it is something which has 
to be created and which gives its name to a process, or, 
better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself has 
no purpose. . . . eo 

The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute 
mode of existence" is nonsense, the concept "being," 
"thing," is always relative to us. 

The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "ap- 
parent" and "real," the correlative valuations "little 
value" and "absolute value" have been spread abroad. 83 

Man seeks "the truth" : a world that does not contra- 
dict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, 
a real world — a world in which there is no suffering: 
contradiction, deception, variability — the causes of suf- 
fering. He does not doubt that there is such a thing as 
a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to 
it. . . . Obviously, the will to truth is merely the long- 
ing for a stable world. 

The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: there- 
fore, it was concluded, reason is the road to a static state ; 
the most spiritual ideas must be nearest to the "real 
world." ss 

The degree of a man's will-power may be measured 
from the extent to which he can dispense with the mean- 
ing in things, from the extent to which he is able to en- 
dure a world without meaning: because he himself ar- 
ranges a small portion of it. 90 

There is no such thing as an established fact, every- 
thing fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after 
all, the most lasting of all things are our opinions. 103 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 313 

That the worth of the world lies in our interpretations 
(that perhaps yet other interpretations are possible some- 
where, besides mankind's) ; that the interpretations made 
hitherto were perspective valuations, by means of which 
we were able to survive in life, i. e. in the Will to Power 
and in the growth of power; that every elevation of man 
involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations ; that 
every higher degree of strength or power attained, brings 
new views in its train, and teaches a belief in new hori- 
zons — these doctrines lie scattered through all my 
works. 107 

The triumphant concept "energy" with which our 
physicists created God and the world, needs yet to be 
completer: it must be given an inner will which I char- 
acterise as the "Will to Power" — that is to say, as an 
insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application 
and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. ... no 

The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does 
not prove any "law," but a relation of power between 
two or more forces. n 5 

A quantum of power is characterised by the effect it 
produces and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric 
state which would be thinkable in itself, is entirely lack- 
ing. It is essentially a will to violence and a will to 
defend one's self against violence. It is not self-preser- 
vation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole 
of existence — it is thought out of existence if one thinks 
this radiation of will-power away. That is why I call 
it a quantum of "Will to Power." . . . ut-us 

My idea is that every specific body strives to become 
master of all space, and to extend its power (its will to 
power), and to thrust back everything that resists it. 
But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same en- 



314 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

deavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by 
coming to terms with those (by "combining" with those) 
which are sufficiently related to it — and thus they con- 
spire together for power. And the process contin- 
ues. 121 

The influence of "environment" is nonsensically over- 
rated in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of 
life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and 
to create forms, which merely uses, exploits "environ- 
ment." 127 

The feeling of being surcharged, the feeling accom- 
panying an increase in strength, quite apart from the 
utility of the struggle, is the actual progress: from these 
feelings the will to war is first derived. i 2 s 

A living thing seeks above all to discharge its 
strength: (i self -preservation" is only one of the results 
thereof. . . . 12s 

The most fundamental and most primeval activity of 
a protoplasm cannot be ascribed to a will to self-preser- 
vation, for it absorbs an amount of material which is 
absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its preser- 
vation: and what is more, it does not "preserve itself" 
in the process, but actually falls to pieces. . . . The in- 
stinct which rules here, must account for this total ab- 
sence in the organism of a desire to preserve it- 
self. ... 128 

The will to power can manifest itself only against 
obstacles: it therefore goes in search of what resists it — 
this is the primitive tendency of the protoplasm when it 
extends its pseudopodia and feels about it. The act of 
appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the result of 
an additional building and rebuilding, until at last the 
subjected creature has become completely a part of the 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 315 

superior creature's sphere of power, and has increased 
the latter. . . . 130 

Why is all activity, even that of a sense, associated 
with pleasure? Because, before the activity was possi- 
ble, an obstacle or a burden was done away with. Or, 
rather, because all action is a process of overcoming, of 
becoming master of, and of increasing the feeling of 
-power? 135 

* Man is not only an individual, but the continuation of 
collective organic life in one definite line. The fact 
that man survives, proves that a certain species of inter- 
pretations (even though it still be added to) has also 
survived; that, as a system, this method of interpreting 
has not changed. 152 

The fundamental phenomena: innumerable individ- 
uals are sacrificed for the sake of a few, in order to make 
the few possible. — One must not allow one's self to be 
deceived; the case is the same with "peoples and races: 
they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated 
and valuable individuals, who continue the great proc- 
ess. 153 

Life is not the continuous adjustment of internal rela- 
tions to external relations, but will to power, which, pro- 
ceeding from inside, subjugates and incorporates an ever- 
increasing quantity of "external" phenomena. 153-154 

Man as a species is not progressing. Higher speci- 
mens are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The 
general level of the species is not raised. . . . Man as 
a species does not represent any sort of progress compared 
with any other animal. 157 

The domestication (culture) of man does not sink very 
deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immedi- 
ately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The 



316 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

"wild" man (or, in moral terminology, the evil man) is 
a reversion to Nature — and, in a certain sense, he repre- 
sents a recovery, a cure from the effects of "cul- 
ture." ... 158 

The strong always have to be upheld against the weak; 
and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the 
healthy against the sick and physiologically botched. If 
we drew our morals from reality, they would read thus : 
the mediocre are more valuable than the exceptional crea- 
tures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the will to 
nonentity prevails over the will to life. ... 159 

That species show an ascending tendency, is the most 
nonsensical assertion that has ever been made : until now 
they have only manifested a dead level. There is noth- 
ing whatever to prove that the higher organisms have de- 
veloped from the lower. i 6 o 

Man as he has appeared up to the present is the em- 
bryo of the man of the future; all the formative powers 
which are to produce the latter, already lie in the former: 
and owing to the fact that they are enormous, the more 
promising for the future the modern individual happens 
to be, the more suffering falls to his lot. iei 

The will to power is the primitive motive force out of 
which all other motives have been derived. 162 

From a psychological point of view the idea of 
"cause" is our feeling of power in the act which is called 
willing — our concept "effect" is the superstition that this 
feeling of power is itself the force which moves 
things. ... 163 

Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be 
applied to existence in general) strives after the maxi- 
mum feeling of power; life is essentially a striving after 
more power; striving itself is only a straining after more 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 317 

power; the most fundamental and innermost thing of all 
is this will. 165 

Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid un- 
happiness. Everybody knows the famous prejudices I 
here contradict. Pleasure and pain are mere results, 
mere accompanying phenomena — that which every man, 
which every tiny particle of a living organism will have, 
is an increase of power. In striving after this, pleasure 
and pain are encountered; it is owing to that will that 
the organism seeks opposition and requires that which 
stands in its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will 
to power is therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredi- 
ent of every organic phenomenon; man does not avoid 
it; on the contrary, he is constantly in need of it; every 
triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event presup- 
poses an obstacle overcome. 172 

Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master 
too of his own wild and unbridled feelings (the passions 
have followed suit, and have learned to become useful) 
— in comparison with primeval man, the man of to-day 
represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an 
increase in happiness. How can one maintain, then, 
that he has striven after happiness? 174 

"God" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal 
process of deifying and undeifying. But withal there 
is no zenith of values, but only a zenith of power, m 

Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he de- 
sires power, and this impulse, which is called freedom, 
must be the longest restrained. Hence ethics has in- 
stinctively aimed at such an education as shall restrain 
the desire for power; thus our morality slanders the 
would-be tyrant, and glorifies charity, patriotism, and 
the ambition of the herd. i 8 e 



318 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

When the instincts of a society ultimately make it give 
up war and renounce conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe 
for democracy and the rule of shopkeepers. i8 9 

The maintenance of the military State is the last means 
of adhering to the great tradition of the past; or, where 
it has been lost, to revive it. By means of it the supe- 
rior or strong type of man is preserved, and all institu- 
tions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of 
rank in States such as national feeling, protective tariffs, 
etc., may on that account seem justified. 190 

Concerning the future of marriage. — A supertax on 
inherited property, a longer term of military service for 
bachelors of a certain minimum age within the com- 
munity. 

Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon 
the world, and perhaps plural votes as well. 

A medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, 
endorsed by the parochial authorities, in which a series 
of questions addressed to the parties and the medical of- 
ficers must be answered ("family histories"). 

As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoble- 
ment, I would recommend leasehold marriages (to last 
for a term of years or months), with adequate provision 
for the children. 

Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a 
certain number of good men and true, of the parish, as 
a parochial obligation. i 9S 

Society . . . should in many cases actually prevent 
the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for 
rank, descent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rig- 
orous forms of compulsion and restriction, and, under 
certain circumstances, have recourse to castration. 194 

The idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the con- 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 319 

cept of the suppression of revolt, a weapon against the 
vanquished (by means of long or short terms of imprison- 
ment) . But punishment should not be associated in any 
way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man 
who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; 
he is therefore a man of courage. Neither should pun- 
ishment be regarded as penance or retribution, as though 
there were some recognised rate of exchange between 
crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, 
simply because crime does not sully. 19s 

Should not the punishment fit the crime'? 200 

"The will to power" is so loathed in democratic ages 
that the whole of the psychology of these ages seems di- 
rected towards its belittlement and slander. 205 

I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenu- 
ously of "goodness, truth, beauty, and equal rights" (an- 
archy pursues the same ideal, but in a more brutal 
fashion). 

I am opposed to parliamentary government and the 
power of the press, because they are the means whereby 
cattle become masters. 206 

The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more 
profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aris- 
tocracy always uses hatred of monarchy as a mask. 207 

Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life. "The 
blessing of work" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. In- 
capacity for leisure. 208 

There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to 
work, or a right to be happy: in this respect man is no 
different from the meanest worm. 208 

Fundamental errors: to regard the herd as an aim in- 
stead of the individual ! The herd is only a means and 
nothing more! But nowadays people are trying to un- 



320 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

derstand the herd as they would an individual, and to 
confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated personali- 
ties. ... In addition to this, all that makes for gre- 
gariousness, e.g., sympathy, is regarded as the more valu- 
able side of our natures. 214-215 
The will to power appears: — 

(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in 
the form of will to "freedom" ': the mere fact of break- 
ing loose from something seems to be an end in itself (in 
a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable to 
one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc., 
etc.). 

(b) In the case of a stronger species, ascending to 
power, in the form of the will to overpower. If this 
fails, then it shrinks to the "will to justice" — that is to 
say, to the will to the same measure of rights as the 
ruling caste possesses. 

(c) In the case of the strongest, richest, most inde- 
pendent, and most courageous, in the form of "love of 
humanity," of "love of the people," of the "gospel," of 
"truth," of "God," of "pity," of "self-sacrifice," etc., 
etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of capture, 
of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reck- 
oning of one's self as part of a great mass of power to 
which one attempts to give a direction: the hero, the 
prophet, the Caesar, the Saviour, the bell-wether. 220-221 

Individualism is a modest and still unconscious form 
of will to power; with it a single human unit seems to 
think it sufficient to free himself from the preponderat- 
ing power of society (or of the State or Church). He 
does not set himself up in opposition as a personality, 
but merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other 
individuals as against the whole. That is to say, he in- 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 321 

stinctively places himself on a level with every other 
unit: what he combats he does not combat as a person, 
but as a representative of units against a mass. 227 

There are no such things as moral actions: they are 
purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demon- 
strate their existence (a fact which Kant and Christian- 
ity, for instance, both acknowledge) — but they are not 
even possible. Owing to psychological misunderstand- 
ing, man invented an opposite to the instinctive impulses 
of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was 
thereby discovered: a primum mobile was postulated 
which does not exist at all. According to the valuation 
which gave rise to the antithesis "moral" and "immoral," 
one should say: There is nothing else on earth but im- 
moral intentions and actions. 

The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral," 
arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral 
actions are the result of a spontaneous will — in short, 
that such a will exists; or in other words, that moral 
judgments can only hold good with regard to intuitions 
and actions that are free. But this whole order of ac- 
tions and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world 
to which the moral standard could be applied does not 
exist at all: there is no such thing as a moral or an im- 
moral action. 230-231 

There are two conditions in which art manifests itself 
in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of him 
whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint to 
visionary states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. 240 

Sexuality, intoxication, cruelty; all these belong to the 
oldest festal joys of mankind, they also preponderate in 
budding artists. 243 

The desire for art and beauty is an indirect longing 



322 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

for the ecstasy of sexual desire, which gets communicated 
to the brain. 24s 

All art works as a tonic; it increases strength, it kin- 
dles desire (i.e., the feeling of strength), it excites all the 
more subtle recollections of intoxication. ... 252 

The inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection, suspen- 
sion of the will. . . . The inartistic states are: those 
which impoverish, which subtract, which bleach, under 
which life suffers — the Christian. 257 

Would any link be missing in the whole chain of sci- 
ence and art, if woman, if woman's work, were excluded 
from it"? Let us acknowledge the exception — it proves 
the rule — that woman is capable of perfection in every- 
thing which does not constitute a work: in letters, in 
memoirs, in the most intricate handiwork — in short, in 
everything which is not a craft. . . . 260-261 

A man is an artist to the extent to which he regards 
everything that inartistic people call "form" as the actual 
substance, as the "principal" thing. 261 

The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting 
existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art 
is essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deifica- 
tion of existence. ... 263 

The greatness of an artist is not to be measured by 
the beautiful feelings which he evokes: let this belief be 
left to the girls. It should be measured according to the 
extent to which he approaches the grand style, according 
to the extent to which he is capable of the grand style. 
This style and great passion have this in common — that 
they scorn to please; that they forget to persuade: that 
they command; that they will. . . . To become master 
of the chaos which is in one ; to compel one's inner chaos 
to assume form; to become consistent, simple, unequivo- 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 323 

cal, mathematical, law — this is the great ambition 
here. 277 

A preference for questionable and terrible things is a 
symptom of strength; whereas the taste for pretty and 
charming trifles is characteristic of the weak and the 
delicate. 237 

Art is the great means of making life possible, the great 
seducer to life, the great stimulus of life. 

Art is the only superior counteragent to all will to the 
denial of life; it is par excellence the anti-Christian, the 
anti-Buddhistic, the anti-Nihilistic force. 290 

Quanta of power alone determine rank and distin- 
guish rank: nothing else does. 295 

It is necessary for higher men to declare war upon the 
masses! In all directions mediocre people are joining 
hands in order to make themselves masters. Everything 
that pampers, that softens, and that brings the "people" 
or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of universal 
suffrage — that is to say, the dominion of inferior 
men. 297 

Woman has always conspired with decadent types, — 
the priests, for instance, — against the "mighty," against 
the "strong," against men. Women avail themselves 
of children for the cult of piety, pity, and love: — the 
mother stands as the symbol of convincing altruism. 300 

It is necessary to show that a counter-movement is in- 
evitably associated with any increasingly economical con- 
sumption of men and mankind, and with an ever more 
closely involved "machinery" of interests and services. I 
call this counter-movement the separation of the luxuri- 
ous surplus of mankind: by means of it a stronger kind, 
a higher type, must come to light, which has other con- 
ditions for its origin and for its maintenance than the 



324 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

average man. My concept, my metaphor for this type 
is, as you know, the word "Superman." 305 

Readers are beginning to see what I am combating — 
namely, economic optimism: as if the general welfare of 
everybody must necessarily increase with the growing 
self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse seems to 
me to be the case, the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts 
to a collective loss; man becomes inferior — so that no- 
body knows what end this monstrous purpose has 
served. 306-307 

The root of all evil: that the slave morality of mod- 
esty, chastity, selfishness, and absolute obedience should 
have triumphed. Dominating natures were thus con- 
demned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of conscience, 
— creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against 
God, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values. 309 

That which men of "power and will are able to demand 
of themselves gives them the standard for what they may 
also allow themselves. Such natures are the very op- 
posite of the vicious and the unbridled; although under 
certain circumstances they may perpetrate deeds for 
which an inferior man would be convicted of vice and 
intemperance. 

In this respect the concept, "all men are equal before 
God" does an extraordinary amount of harm; actions 
and attitudes of mind were forbidden which belonged to 
the prerogative of the strong alone, just as if they were 
in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of 
strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that 
the defensive weapons of the most weak (even of those 
who were weakest towards themselves) were established 
as a standard of valuation. 311 

The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 325 

has been the cause of all the great disorders in history ! 312 

The solitary type should not be valued from the 
standpoint of the gregarious type, or vice versa. 320 

Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their medi- 
ocrity! As you observe, I do precisely the reverse: 
every step away from mediocrity — thus do I teach — 
leads to immorality. 324 

What I combat : that an exceptional form should make 
war upon the rule — instead of understanding that the 
continued existence of the rule is the first condition of 
the value of the exception. 325 

One should not suppose the mission of a higher species 
to be the leading of inferior men (as Comte does, for in- 
stance) ; but the inferior should be regarded as the foun- 
dation upon which a higher species may live their higher 
life — upon which alone they can stand. 329 

My consolation is, that the nature of man is evil, and 
this guarantees his strength! 332 

There is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a 
true soldier in his veins. To be able to command and 
to be able to obey in a proud fashion ; to keep one's place 
in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment to 
lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is 
permitted and what is forbidden in a tradesman's bal- 
ance; to be more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and para- 
sitism than to wickedness. What is it that one learns 
in a hard school*? — to obey and to command. 335 

The means by which a strong species maintains it- 
self: — 

It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a 
test of the power of self-control and of freedom. 

It abandons itself to states in which a man is not al- 
lowed to be anything else than a barbarian. 



326 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of 
asceticism. 

It is not expansive; it practises silence; it is cautious 
in regard to all charms. 

It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides 
a test of self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its 
highest pitch in regard to points of honour. 

It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce 
for the gander" — but conversely ! it regards reward, and 
the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction. 

It does not covet other people's virtues. 341 

The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be generos- 
ity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. 
Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing 
these passions — on the contrary, a man should possess 
them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them by 
the bridle. ... 346 

Education: essentially a means of ruining exceptions 
in favour of the rule. Culture : essentially the means of 
directing taste against the exceptions in favour of the 
mediocre. 349 

What is noble? — The fact that one is constantly 
forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly 
searching for situations in which one is forced to put on 
airs. That one leaves happiness to the greatest num- 
ber: the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, 
of virtue, of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour- 
smugness, a la Spencer. That one instinctively seeks for 
heavy responsibilities. That one knows how to create 
enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That 
one contradicts the greatest number, not in words at all, 
but by continually behaving differently from them. 357 

The first thing that must be done is to rear a new kind 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 327 

of man in whom the duration of the necessary will and 
the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many genera- 
tions. This must be a new kind of ruling species and 
caste — this ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat 
lengthy and not easily expressed consequences of this 
thought. The aim should be to prepare a transvaluation 
of values for a particularly strong kind of man, most 
highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to his end, slowly 
and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slan- 
dered instincts hitherto held in check. . . . 363-364 

The revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peo- 
ples is in my opinion of less importance than the misfor- 
tunes which attend great individuals in their develop- 
ment. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived : the 
many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together 
constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty 
men. 369 

The greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, 
but then they also have the opposites of these vir- 
tues. I believe that it is precisely out of the presence 
of these opposites and of the feelings they suscitate, that 
the great man arises, — for the great man is the broad 
arch which spans two banks lying far apart. 370 

In great men we find the specific qualities of life in 
their highest manifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploi- 
tation. But inasmuch as their effect has always been 
overwhelming, their essential nature has been most thor- 
oughly misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. 370-371 

We must not make men "better," we must not talk to 
them about morality in any form as if "morality in it- 
self," or an ideal kind of man in general, could be taken 
for granted; but we must create circumstances in which 
stronger men are necessary, such as for their part will re- 



328 WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT 

quire a morality (or, better still: a bodily and spiritual 
discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which 
they will consequently insist ! 379 

We must not separate greatness of soul from intellec- 
tual greatness. For the former involves independence; 
but without intellectual greatness independence should 
not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters even in 
its lust of well-doing and of practising "justice." In- 
ferior spirits must obey, consequently they cannot be pos- 
sessed of greatness. 3 so 

I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that 
a single individual may under certain circumstances jus- 
tify whole millenniums of existence — that is to say, a 
wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more complete man, 
as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmen- 
tary men. sse 

He who determines values and leads the will of mil- 
lenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures — 
he is the highest man. 386 

We should attain to such a height, to such a lofty 
eagle's ledge, in our observation, as to be able to under- 
stand that everything happens, just as it ought to hap- 
pen: and that all "imperfection," and the pain it brings, 
belong to all that which is most eminently desirable, sss 

"Pleasure appears with the feeling of power. 

Happiness means that power and triumph have en- 
tered into our consciousness. 

Progress is the strengthening of the type, the ability to 
exercise great will-power: everything else is a misunder- 
standing and a danger. 40 3 

Man is a combination of the beast and the superb east: 
higher man a combination of the monster and the super- 
man: these opposites belong to each other. With every 



"THE WILL TO POWER" 329 

degree of a man's growth towards greatness and lofti- 
ness, he also grows downwards into the depths and into 
the terrible : ... 405 

The word "Dionysian" expresses : a constraint to unity, 
a soaring above personality, the commonplace, society, 
reality, and above the abyss of the ephemeral; the pas- 
sionately painful sensation of superabundance, in darker, 
fuller, and more fluctuating conditions ; an ecstatic saying 
of yea to the collective character of existence, as that 
which remains the same, and equally mighty and bliss- 
ful throughout all change; the great pantheistic sympa- 
thy with pleasure and pain, which declares even the most 
terrible and most questionable qualities of existence good, 
and sanctifies them; the eternal will to procreation, to 
fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity in 
regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating. 415-416 

At this point I set up the Dionysus of the Greeks : the 
religious affirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not 
of denied and partial Life. . . . 420 

God on the Cross is a curse upon Life, a signpost di- 
recting people to deliver themselves from it; — Dionysus 
cut into pieces is a promise of Life: it will be for ever 
born anew, and rise afresh from destruction. 421 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

In the following list no attempt has been made at com- 
pletion. I have set down only the important and more 
useful works concerning Nietzsche and his philosophy, 
and have further limited myself to such volumes as are 
in English. I have omitted entirely the large number 
of essays on Nietzsche which have appeared in maga- 
zines, as well as those books which embody only the vari- 
ous Nietzschean ideas. 

EXPOSITIONAL BOOKS 

The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, by 
H. L. Mencken. A brilliantly written and extensive ex- 
position of Nietzsche's thought, including an account of 
the philosopher's life, a discussion of his origins, a reply 
to his critics, and a chapter on how to study him. Mr. 
Mencken's book, though untechnical, is comprehensive, 
concise and admirably conceived. It constitutes one of 
the most valuable Nietzschean commentaries in English. 

Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Work, by 
M. A. Miigge. A large and scholarly treatise of special 
value to the philosophical student. This work, a pioneer 
one, is somewhat ponderous and uninteresting, but none 
the less exhaustive; and contains a bibliography consist- 
ing of 850 titles. 

The Philosophy of Nietzsche, by Georges H. 
Chatterton-Hill. A suggestive, academic study of the 
main points in the Nietzschean ethic. This book is too 

331 



332 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

technical in places to appeal strongly to the beginner, 
but is invaluable as supplementary reading. 

The Quintessence of Nietzsche, by J. M. Ken- 
nedy. An interesting and unassuming survey of 
Nietzsche's work, abounding with quotations. 

Nietzsche: His Life and Works, by Anthony M. 
Ludovici. Mr. Ludovici is the translator of many of 
Nietzsche's works into English, and has contributed to 
Dr. Levy's edition several prefaces and many explanatory 
notes. His book is complete and authoritative. 

Other adequate commentaries are: The Gospel of 
Superman, by Henri Lichtenberger, translated from the 
French by J. M. Kennedy; Friedrich Nietzsche, by 
A. R. Orage; Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher, 
Poet and Prophet, by Thomas Common; The Phi- 
losophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, by Grace Neal Dol- 
son; and Friedrich Nietzsche, by Georg Brandes, 
translated by A. G. Chater. 

BIOGRAPHIES 

The Life of Nietzsche, by Frau Forster-Nietzsche. 
This work, in two volumes, is the standard biography of 
Nietzsche, written by his sister. Though elaborate in 
detail and replete in personal correspondence and papers, 
it is not all that might be hoped for. One's devoted sis- 
ter does not always make the most penetrating biographer. 

The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche, by Daniel 
Halevy, translated from the French by J. M. Hone. 
M. Halevy has founded his work on that of Frau 
Forster-Nietzsche; and while his version improves on its 
model at many points, it is in places supposititious and 
over-drawn, and is conceived in too ironical a vein. 

Unfortunately there is no adequate biography of 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 333 

Nietzsche in existence. Nor is there likely to be one, in- 
asmuch as all the papers and data necessary for such an 
undertaking are in the possession of Nietzsche's sister. 

BOOKS OF SELECTIONS 

The Gist of Nietzsche, by H. L. Mencken. 
Nietzsche in Outline and Aphorism, by A. R. 
Orage. 

Nietzsche: His Maxims, by J. M. Kennedy. 



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